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ABSTRACT 
 
EMOTIONS, INTUITIONS AND RISK PERCEPTION IN CRITICAL CARE 
 
 
 
 
By 
Alex Dubov 
December 2017 
 
Dissertation supervised by Henk ten Have 
The theory of decision-making as it applies to bioethics and healthcare assumes a rational 
decision maker: someone who knows all his alternatives, has clear preferences, can rank and 
weigh risks and benefits of an intervention, and always acts in his own best interests. However, 
the growing body of research from the field of decision science shows that, in reality, such a 
purely rational decision maker does not exist. Instead, patients are rational within personal or 
environmental constraints such as uncertainty or ambiguity in which non-rational approaches 
such as emotion and intuition are instrumental. This issue is particularly important in critical 
care. To ensure that patients receive the end-of-life care that they want, especially considering 
the increase in futile care, proper risk communication is necessary. While the move from 
paternalism to the current emphasis on patient empowerment and shared decision-making means 
that patients and surrogates want comprehensive and understandable information about their 
v 
 
conditions and treatment in order to participate fully in decisions about their care, emotions 
complicate this decision-making. Though there is a great deal of empirical research on emotions 
and risk perception, there is a lack of philosophical research on this topic, especially when it 
comes to futility considerations in critical care. This research asserts that emotions should be 
considered a necessary component of ethical assessment of risk and communication about risk, 
especially in the field of critical care. It explores the existing literature on how people employ 
emotions and deliberation in their decision-making, and it questions the existing bias among 
normative scholars that decisions resulting from deliberation are inherently better or superior to 
those grounded in intuition. Furthermore, this research attempts to determine the value of 
autonomy in designing health policies grounded in behavioral economics. While providers want 
patients to make decisions that promote their own interests, this task is rarely achieved when 
patients are left alone to make important decisions. This research questions whether providers 
should let their patients make decisions that divert them from their own health goals or intervene 
by actively directing patients toward choices that are most likely to promote their goals. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Background 
The theory of decision-making as it pertains to bioethics and healthcare rests on a number 
of critical assumptions about the structure of healthcare and the behavior of its main stakeholders 
– patients and health providers. The first and most important assumption is that everyone is 
rational. In other words, most bioethical theory is built around the notion that patients and 
providers, as well as individuals and healthcare organizations, always act in their own best 
interests. If these stakeholders are not always rational, then they will not make decisions that 
promote their well-being and autonomy, thus complicating the normative work of bioethicists.1 
Second, bioethicists have traditionally assumed that patients and their families know their 
health preferences, especially when it comes to end-of-life choices and decisions. It would be 
difficult for a patient to maximize her well-being without knowing her preferences.2 Third, it is 
often assumed that patients and providers have enough information to make rational choices. It is 
assumed that as long as family or patients have accurate information on the benefits and risks of 
an intervention, they will be able to make the best decision for themselves, that is, their decision 
reflecting their preferences and intentions. Physicians are expected to learn of the patient’s 
values but only to assist in matching those values with the medical facts of the situation. In this 
exchange, the physician offers choices and evidence while the patients explain their values. 
Then, collaboratively, they search for a solution that is both consistent with the evidence and in 
accordance with patient values.3 
Another, less explicit, assumption of traditional bioethics is that patients’ values and 
preferences are context independent. The preferences or values that patients have and the 
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decisions that they make based on those values should not depend on how they arrive at those 
preferences or decisions.4 For instance, while completing advance directives, patients should 
arrive to the same kind of choices regardless of the way questions are framed and default options 
are presented. In the “withhold” version of advance directive (the default preference in favor of 
treatment) and in the “provide” version (the default preference against treatment), patients are 
expected to make the same kind of choices, as the default inherent in a question should not sway 
their pre-meditated values and preferences for medical treatment.5 
Finally, even if traditional bioethics may admit that patients and providers make 
mistakes, they assume that these mistakes are random and not systematic. So, if patients or 
providers miss the mark of a medically sound and beneficial choice in making their decisions, 
sometimes they will be above that mark and sometimes below. There is no possible way to 
predict what mistakes will be made and when. However, many recent studies demonstrate that 
there is a systematic way to predict some cognitive errors in patients’ decision-making and even 
to use this knowledge to improve their choices.6 The famous study by McNeil et al. can be used 
as an example. Researchers presented respondents with information about the outcomes of two 
treatments for lung cancer. Although the statistics presented were identical, they were framed in 
terms of survival or mortality rates. Even though respondents should react similarly to both 
statistical presentations, the number of those who favored radiation therapy over surgery went 
from 18% for those presented with the survival framing to 44% for those presented with the 
mortality framing.7 
This research focuses on both emotion and intuition as the two non-rational or non-
traditional decision approaches in individual decision-making about health risks. The traditional 
rational approach is described above. Within this approach, a rational decision maker is someone 
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who knows all his alternatives, has clear preferences, is able to rank and weigh risks and benefits 
of a particular intervention, and always acts in his own best interests. The growing body of 
research from the field of decision science shows that, in reality, such a purely rational decision 
maker does not exist.8 Patients are rational within personal or environmental constraints such as 
uncertainty or ambiguity (“bounded rationality”).9 While dealing with complex issues, they will 
tend to simplify their calculations and settle for a satisfactory, rather than an approximate-best, 
decision.10 Therefore, bounded rationality results from adaptation to the environment, and non-
rational approaches such as emotion and intuition are instrumental in this adaptation. Emotions 
direct attention and help patients attend to immediate needs. Intuition, informed by prior 
experience and existing knowledge, usually produces reasonably accurate and fast inferences. 
A further rationale for the concurrent study of emotions and intuitions in healthcare 
decision-making is their interconnectedness. If identified, emotions can be used as conscious 
triggers or modifiers of intuitive processing. As a result, emotional states often determine 
whether patients or providers will use either a deliberative or an intuitive decision-making style. 
For instance, fear and anger play a role in intuitive decision-making about risk – fear amplifies 
risk estimates and anger attenuates them.11 In evaluating risks of a particular intervention, 
providers and patients may often translate some complex thoughts into simpler emotional 
evaluations. Thus, they can compare good and bad feelings instead of trying to make sense of 
many conflicting logical reasons. It is not uncommon to observe this kind of intuitive evaluation 
of risk among patients – “How bad is it?” or “Well, how bad does it feel?” Consequently, any 
attempt to study the intuitive way of decision-making should consider emotion or affect as its 
basis. 
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Statement of the Problem 
In the US, about 2.5 million people die each year; approximately 41% of these deaths 
happen in hospitals, and nearly 60% of hospital deaths occur during or shortly after ICU care.12 
These numbers mean that more than one in five Americans die while in an ICU or soon 
thereafter. The overwhelming majority of these deaths follow decisions to limit life-sustaining 
treatment. Proper risk communication has an effect on what medical intervention the patient will 
receive and whether futile care will be provided. Proper risk communication is the best way to 
ensure that patients receive the end-of-life care they want. Additionally, it is the most effective 
way to limit the increase in provision of futile treatment that is responsible for driving up overall 
costs of healthcare. A recent study on frequency of futile treatment in ICU shows that more than 
one in ten patients being treated in ICUs were at some point receiving what doctors deemed to be 
futile care. In those cases, intensivists believed patients would never survive outside an ICU or 
that the burdens of their care “grossly outweighed” any benefits.13 Treating each of those patients 
costs about $4,000 per day. Given this substantial cost, strategies to reduce futile care could have 
an impact on total healthcare spending.14 
One of the ways to mitigate these costs is to create a working framework for risk 
communication that would address different cognitive limitations and emotional biases that 
affect the way in which risk information is interpreted. The move from paternalism to the current 
emphasis on patient empowerment and shared decision-making has meant that patients and 
surrogates want and need comprehensive and understandable information about their conditions 
and treatment. This must include information about the risks and benefits of the different 
treatment options if patients are to participate fully in decisions about their care.  However, 
complicating their queries, the intricacy of rational decision-making, are emotions. It is often 
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noted (but rarely studied) that patients and surrogates are swayed by their emotions at least as 
much as they are convinced by rational arguments. What role should emotions play when we 
judge whether an intervention and its complications are morally acceptable? Though there is a 
great deal of empirical research on emotions and risk perception, there has been a lack of 
philosophical research on this topic, especially when it comes to futility considerations in critical 
care. 
So, could emotions function as a normative guide when making judgments about morally 
acceptable risks? The dissertation research suggests that emotions and intuitions are necessary 
for ethical knowledge about risk. The aspect of emotion is often ignored in bioethical literature, 
especially when it discusses the intricacies of ethical assessment of risk in critical care.15  This 
research offers reasons for taking emotions and intuitions seriously as a part of moral decision-
making in critical care and emphasizes the need to create decision support tools that count in 
various emotional influences. The objective of this research is to identify and evaluate moral 
significance of emotional determinants and intuitive shortcuts that influence end-of-life 
communication and care of patients and families in the ICU. When emotions and intuitions are 
ignored, families may end up demanding unreasonable therapies that intensivists know will not 
work. Not able to comprehend the risks, families will continue to demand “everything to be 
done,” and biological, unperceptive life is prolonged. In this way, families force their loved ones 
to experience painful treatment prior to their death. The death is undignified, the patient suffers, 
and scarce resources are wasted. Therefore, this research asserts that emotions should be 
considered as a necessary component of ethical assessment of risk and communication about risk 
especially in the field of critical care in order to avoid the scenario described above. 
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Conceptual framework 
Moral philosophers, ethicists, and moral psychologists have long studied how people 
determine whether an action is morally wrong or morally acceptable. The traditional framework 
used to study moral judgement assumes that a deliberate process of reasoning and reflection 
leads to individual moral judgments in mature individuals. This rationalist approach argues that 
conscious reasoning is the cognitive mechanism ultimately responsible for moral judgments. 
Affective responses could sometimes be inputs to moral reasoning, but affect itself is considered 
amoral. People only determine the morality of an act after they have engaged in a careful 
consideration of it. Kohlberg developed his theory of moral reasoning by interviewing children 
and adults about what a hypothetical character should do in a moral dilemma.16 For example, 
Heinz’s dying wife needs an expensive drug in order to survive, but Heinz does not have enough 
money to pay for it; should Heinz steal the expensive drug to save his wife‘s life? Based on 
children’s and adults’ explanations of which acts were morally wrong or acceptable and why, 
Kohlberg concluded that as children grow to become young adults, they use more advanced 
forms of reasoning to resolve moral dilemmas. For instance, young children determine morality 
based on fear of punishment (Heinz should not steal because he will be arrested.), while 
adolescents determine morality based on rules they learned from society or their parents (Heinz 
should not steal because the law says so.). Young adults in the most advanced stage of moral 
development recognize that man-made laws are not absolute, and they use abstract reasoning, 
often based on justice, to determine morality (Heinz is justified in stealing because everyone has 
the right to receive medicine.).  Kohlberg’s rationalist approach to moral judgements has been 
used to demonstrate that moral development is synonymous with using logic to form a moral 
judgment.17 
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Although there is little question that people engage in moral reasoning, a debate remains 
about whether such reasoning and logic is the true cause of moral judgment. The social 
intuitionist approach to moral judgment used in this dissertation research differs from the rational 
models by proposing that moral reasoning may, in fact, be a mere consequence of moral 
judgments, rather than their cause.18 This framework claims that people come to accept moral 
truths based on immediate, affective assessments of situations. They then use their automatic 
evaluative responses to such stimuli as the basis of the moral judgments they form. This 
framework makes a distinction between reasoning and intuition. Reasoning is an effortful 
process that takes place slowly and deliberately, while intuition arises automatically, outside of 
conscious awareness. Moral intuition, then, is “the sudden appearance in consciousness of a 
moral judgment, including an affective valence (good-bad, like-dislike), without any conscious 
awareness of having gone through steps of searching, weighting evidence, or inferring a 
conclusion.”19 Like automatic evaluations more generally, moral judgments are instantly 
interpreted on good-bad dimensions as a result of one’s individual moral intuitions. Haidt offers 
the following example: suppose you were asked how you would feel about eating your pet dog 
after it died. You would likely have an emotional reaction to the mere thought of such an act. 
When considering hypothetical situations that are perceived as distasteful yet harmless, Haidt’s 
research subjects tried hard to support their negative emotional reactions with logical reasons. 
Most, however, were unable to provide evidence about harmful consequences yet remained 
determined that distasteful but harmless acts like eating one’s pet are universally wrong.20 
Social intuitionist framework suggests that these affective reactions and moral intuitions 
may be particularly hard to overcome when it comes to interpersonal disagreements over what is 
right, moral, or fair. When the initial, unconscious affective response is driving the attitudes of 
  
8 
 
the person, reasoned arguments of logic are unlikely to be effective at changing how one feels. 
Rather, affect-based attitudes are changed more easily using persuasion tactics that rely on 
emotion, and cognition-based attitudes are changed more easily using persuasion tactics that rely 
on rational argument.21 Therefore, this dissertation research will look specifically into ethical 
limits of persuasion in critical care and potential nudge strategies that may be effective in times 
when rational arguments fail. Haidt suggests that when moral intuitions and emotional reactions 
drive moral judgments, people may be hard pressed to justify their position as right or wrong. 
Rather than changing their attitude in the face of this inability, people tend instead to be left 
“morally dumbfounded” and stick to their moral intuition even when they can find no 
compelling rational argument to support such feelings.22 Moral intuitions are more prominent in 
situations when uncertainty is present. Uncertainty is present in most medical decisions. In the 
words of Atul Gawande, “Medicine's ground state is uncertainty. And wisdom - for both patients 
and doctors - is defined by how one copes with it.”23 Given that moral intuitions may drive 
uncertain decisions, this dissertation will also look into ways in which providers navigate 
morality of disclosures about uncertainty. 
Purpose of the Study 
In their last month of life, one in two Medicare beneficiaries visits an emergency 
department, one in three is admitted to an intensive care unit, and one in five has inpatient 
surgery.24 This statistic represents an important but unmet challenge in delivering end-of-life 
care, namely to increase the probability that the care patients receive in their last months is 
consistent with their goals, values, and preferences. A large body of research demonstrates that 
the majority of patients prefer less aggressive care and death at home to ER visits, ICU 
interventions, and hospital death.25 This mismatch between patient preferences and actual care 
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received in their last days can be in part explained by emotional influences on communication 
and decision-making. Caring for critically ill patients requires nearly constant decision-making. 
Ideally, decision makers carefully consider the risks and benefits of each choice before settling 
on the option that maximizes the patient’s well-being. However, the emotions and time pressures 
of the ICU may exacerbate contextual barriers to rational choice, impact autonomous agency, 
and lead to suboptimal choices. There is a need to understand and improve upon the ways in 
which end-of-life decisions are made. Instead of passively accepting emotional influences on 
choice, there is a need to discuss their ethical relevance and design morally appropriate policies 
aimed to increase the probabilities that end-of-life choices match the goals of patients. 
Research Questions 
This research intends to answer the following questions: 
1. What moral significance should be attached to emotional determinants and intuitive 
shortcuts that influence end-of-life communication and care in the ICU? 
2. What impact do emotional determinants and intuitive shortcuts in end-of-life choices 
have on liberty and autonomy? 
3. What are the moral limits to influence in end-of-life care? When providers see their 
patients falling prey to cognitive biases, should they let patients make decisions that 
divert them from their own health goals, or should they intervene by actively directing 
patients towards choices that are most likely to promote their goals? 
Significance of the Study 
There is a growing interest among health policymakers, insurance companies, 
researchers, and healthcare providers in using insights from behavioral economics and social 
psychology in order to persuade people to change their health-related behaviors and improve 
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their healthcare choices. For instance, the National Institutes of Health has designated the 
“science of behavior change” as a priority by making it a new Roadmap Initiative,26 and a report 
has been published detailing the proposed research and implementation agenda. Similarly, the 
United Kingdom Institute for Government and the Cabinet Office published a 96-page report, 
“MINDSPACE: Influencing Behaviour Through Public Policy,”27 exploring how behavior 
change theory can meet policy challenges. 
In addition to this growing interest in the study of behavior change, there is also a strong 
movement toward patient-centered, shared decision-making.28 This movement stems from the 
recognition that in order to practice medicine ethically, health care professionals must take 
seriously the values and preferences of their patients. At the same time, there is growing 
recognition that minor and seemingly irrelevant features of how choices are presented can 
substantially influence the decisions people make.29 Behavioral economists have identified 
striking ways in which trivial differences in the presentation of options can powerfully and 
predictably affect people's choices. For example, seriously ill patients’ choices to receive 
comfort-oriented care in advance directives are heavily influenced by whether such options are 
presented as the default,30 and ICU physicians more quickly enact do not resuscitate (DNR) 
orders for patients who will ultimately die when their ICU environment is busier than usual.31 
Given this interest in the study of behavioral change and the recognition that the 
environment in which choices are made substantially influences the decision people make, it is 
important to consider the ethical dimensions of nudge strategies implemented to improve 
decision-making in healthcare. This research explores the existing literature on how people 
employ emotions and deliberation in their decision-making, and it questions the existing bias 
among normative scholars that decisions resulting from deliberation are inherently better or 
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superior to those grounded in intuition. Furthermore, this research attempts to determine the 
value of autonomy in designing health policies grounded in behavioral economics. It recognizes 
that while providers want patients to make decisions that promote their own interests, this task is 
rarely achieved when patients are left alone to make important decisions. They may procrastinate 
or fall victim to cognitive biases and other pitfalls of human decision-making. Should providers 
let their patients make decisions that divert them from their own health goals, or should providers 
intervene by actively directing patients toward choices that are most likely to promote their 
goals? This question needs to be answered before nudge policies are implemented. 
Organization of the Study 
The first chapter discusses the fact that risk is perceived and acted upon in two ways. 
Risk as feelings refers to intuitive responses in the context of moral decision-making. Risk as 
analysis brings logic, reason, and scientific deliberation to bear on decision-making. This chapter 
presents various interpretations of dual-system theory in decision-making sciences which posits 
that in our decisions about risks we may rely on two systems of thinking. System 1 is a kind of 
thinking that occurs automatically and very quickly, includes the automatic development of 
memories, and is associated more with impressions and feelings. System 2 is a more effortful 
way of thinking that requires concentration and helps more effectively manage complex problem 
solving. We use these two systems in parallel and often rely on one more than we do on the 
other.32 This chapter also explores the role of heuristics, or “rules of thumb,” in making decisions 
about risk. Heuristics allow us to form judgments or select decisions based on only one or two 
pieces of information.33 This chapter takes a closer look at the nature of intuitive decisions and 
sets the stage for a discussion on whether moral judgment is accomplished by intuition or 
deliberation. 
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The second chapter will argue analogously that in the moral domain, patients and 
providers also rely on fast and frugal decision rules or decision norms that produce judgments 
quickly based on limited information. As was shown in chapter one, most research on heuristics 
has been conducted by psychologists in the area of risk and probability estimates. Their work 
deals not with moral questions but with some factual issues such as judgments of frequency, 
probability, and risk. Chapter two suggests that in a similar fashion, when confronted with a 
complex moral issue, people resort to moral heuristics and simplify their judgments by using 
familiar to judge unfamiliar. Decisions to limit or forgo life-sustaining therapy are one of the 
areas in clinical practice where moral heuristics can be particularly relevant. A number of studies 
demonstrate striking variability in these decisions (sixfold) even after adjusting for patient and 
ICU factors.34 Ideally, these decisions should depend on the goals and preferences of families, 
survival estimates and quality of life considerations, and illness severity. However, the recent 
research suggests this variability is not driven by the factors above, but, rather, by decision-
making norms deriving from hospital or ICU cultures. Assuming that moral heuristics are the 
results of these cultural decision-making norms, this chapter discusses a number of relevant 
moral heuristics, such as commission/omission distinction, means to an end/end in itself 
distinction, rule of rescue, and decision ownership. 
Given the fact that most decisions under uncertainty are susceptible to the influence of 
heuristics and often grounded in intuition, chapter three will take a closer look at the ethical 
limits of disclosing uncertainty to patients in order to avoid suboptimal decisions. Treatment 
decisions in chronic illnesses are complicated not only by uncertainty about their effectiveness 
and the balance of benefits and harms but also by multiple uncertain outcomes that patients must 
consider. When deciding between a number of alternative treatment options, patients need to 
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consider the potential for long-term and delayed effects of each treatment. It is often the case that 
some of these delayed effects of treatment described in the literature are ambiguous and may not 
even be attributed to the treatment itself. Consider a conversation that provider L. needs to have 
with her patient about two treatments. Dr. L. knows that one treatment choice is more 
efficacious, but the literature describes negligible and ambiguous risks that may not even be 
directly attributed to this particular treatment. Dr. L. also knows that disclosure of these 
ambiguous risks will likely sway her patient’s decision. People have a preference against options 
involving ambiguous versus known probabilities and respond to ambiguity by forming 
pessimistic judgments of risk (ambiguity aversion). This chapter discusses ethical questions that 
Dr. L may ask herself, namely – is it ever ethical to refrain from disclosure of ambiguous risks in 
order to ensure that patients will make the best choices for themselves? Might there be such a 
thing in medicine as too much information? If we recognize that possession of information 
carries trade-offs, are there situations when the ‘totality of evidence’ may increase a patient’s 
autonomy but reduce his welfare? 
Chapter four further analyzes the concept of autonomous choice as having the 
components of intentionality, rationality, and lack of persuasion. This chapter shows that 
physicians’ non-involvement is expected to safeguard intentionality. Rationality is preserved by 
means of appropriate risk communication. Advance care planning is seen as a safeguard against 
undue influence. Each of these assumptions and the possibility of autonomous choice will be 
further questioned on the basis of research discussed in previous chapters. Using the conceptual 
framework of autonomous choice, this chapter analyzes the impact of heuristics and biases on 
different dimensions of autonomy. When these emotional influences and heuristics are present in 
decision-making, efforts should be made to mitigate them. This chapter discusses the following 
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three questions: Is it plausible to assume that most of patients’ decisions are autonomous? Should 
autonomy be the guiding value in patient-physician communication? And, is it possible to 
remove physicians’ influence? This chapter sets the tone for the following discussion of ethically 
permissible modes of influence in healthcare. 
Chapter five reviews the ethics of persuasion in critical care. Rational appeals in critical 
care fail to move patients or surrogates to a better course of action. Appeals to their emotions are 
considered illegitimate because they may preclude autonomous choice. This chapter discusses 
whether it is always unethical to change someone's beliefs, whether persuasive communication is 
inherently harmful, and whether it leaves no space for voluntariness. To answer these questions, 
the chapter engages with Aristotle's work, Rhetoric.35 In considering whether there is a place for 
emotionally charged messages in a patient–provider relationship, the chapter intends to delineate 
the nature of this relationship and describe the duties this relationship implies. Chapter five 
presents examples of persuasive communication used in critical care and discusses whether 
providers may have a duty to persuade patients. This duty is supported by the fact that doctors 
often influence patients' and families' choices by framing presented options. Doctors should 
assume responsibility in recognizing these personal and contextual influences that may influence 
the medical choices of their patients. They should attempt to modify these contextual factors and 
biases in a way that would assist patients and families in reaching the desired outcomes. This 
chapter looks at the differences between persuasion and similar concepts such as manipulation, 
coercion, and deception. Considering the fact that patients and families often make irrational 
decisions and the fact that doctors inadvertently influence their choices, the chapter suggests that 
persuasion can be a positive tool in medical communication. When patients or families clearly do 
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not understand the risks, or make decisions that contradict their long-term goals, persuasion can 
be used as a positive influence. 
The sixth chapter will suggest solutions grounded in the principles of behavioral 
economics. These “soft paternalistic” approaches make use of interventions aimed at suggesting 
one choice over another by gently steering individual choices and enhancing directions yet 
without imposing a limit on available choices. Nudges propose to organize the context in which 
people make decisions and minimize the negative impact of cognitive biases against healthy 
behaviors. These terms “nudge” and “libertarian paternalism” were first used in Richard Thaler 
and Cass Sunstein’s book of the same title to describe “any aspect of the choice architecture that 
alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly 
changing their economic incentives.”36 The illustration used in this book explains how the 
placement of food in a cafeteria affects the choices people make when deciding what to eat; for 
example, if the fruit is placed before cake and cookies, patrons are more likely to take fruit. This 
chapter considers potential nudges that may improve communication and choices in end-of-life 
care. In addition to reviewing potential nudges, this chapter addresses the ethical aspects of using 
these strategies in healthcare. Given the current aspirations of medical professionals around 
increasing patient empowerment and promoting freedom and fairness, to what extent does nudge 
support these aims? This chapter explores the following questions: Can nudge be empowering, 
and can it bring about changes that are fair and sustainable? Should one be worried about the 
paternalistic aspect of nudging? When exactly do we nudge and is there a potential for nudges to 
misfire? 
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CHAPTER TWO 
INTUITION AND DELIBERATION 
Introduction 
There is a natural tension to decision-making in the critical care unit. In a busy ICU with 
multiple patients to assess and keep track of, it can be difficult to dissect every patient’s 
complaints and make clinical decisions both quickly and effectively. Emergencies, by definition, 
must be dealt with fast. For this, whether they are fully aware of it or not, critical care providers 
rely on their intuition, informed by their experience and education. During most of their day, 
they deploy intuition to assess patients and respond to critical situations. A cardiac patient comes 
in, and without even reading the chart, the physician knows which tests to order and what 
questions to ask the patient. ICU providers deal with this type of patient many times per day and 
are easily able to rely on their intuition to identify the next steps. While going with intuitive 
judgments makes sense in many cases, there are times when it can result in a critical 
misdiagnosis. This is the reason why physicians need to cultivate deliberative thinking. Being an 
excellent clinician requires balance between the two. Too much focus on deliberation, and the 
provider will get bogged down. Too much focus on intuition, and the proper diagnosis isn’t 
always made. 
Unfortunately, physicians don’t make correct diagnoses as often as they would like to 
think: the diagnostic failure rate is estimated to be 10 to 15%. The rate is highest among 
specialties in which patients are diagnostically undifferentiated, such as emergency medicine, 
family medicine, and internal medicine, including critical care.37 While there are many causes for 
diagnostic errors, cognitive error is the most common one. Usually, it is not a lack of knowledge 
that leads critical care specialists to failure but problems with the physician’s thinking. Consider 
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this example of failure in clinical intuition taken from a NEJM article by Pat Croskerry.38 A 21-
year-old victim of multiple stabbing is brought to a trauma center by ambulance. He is in no 
significant distress, lacking dyspnea or shortness of breath. His oxygen saturation, blood 
pressure, and pulse are all within normal limits. The resident is concerned about the chest stab 
wounds, but after a discussion with the attending physician and ultrasonography, the conclusion 
is reached that no additional treatment is indicated. All lacerations are cleaned and sutured, and 
the patient is discharged home. Five days later, he presents to a different hospital reporting 
vomiting, blurred vision, and difficulty concentrating. A CT of his head reveals the track of a 
knife wound penetrating the skull and several inches into the brain. The previously admitting 
resident has focused on the chest wound as the most significant injury. When he thought that the 
chest wound was stable, the satisfied resident failed to conduct a sufficient search to rule out 
other significant injuries.  
Critically ill patients admitted to an ICU experience, on average, 1.7 medical errors each 
day, and many patients suffer a potentially life-threatening error during their stay.39 Stories like 
the one mentioned above are not isolated incidents. Researchers believe that specialties like 
critical care characterized by a high degree of time pressure, data uncertainty, stress, and 
distractors have a higher incidence of errors compared to other fields of medicine.40 Ideally, 
medical decision-making is a straightforward process. A combination of clinical findings should 
generate a limited differential of known clinical conditions, ordered by their probability of 
occurrence. Diagnostic tests would then refine the list until only a few candidates exist with a 
clear favorite. Abundant evidence, however, suggests that real-world medical decision-making is 
rarely a rational and straightforward process. Physicians often fail to agree on the interpretation 
of diagnostic test results,41 are inconsistent in their approach to disease management,42 and arrive 
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at different diagnoses in the presence of identical information.43 Both physicians and patients are 
rational within personal or environmental constraints such as uncertainty or ambiguity (“bounded 
rationality”). While dealing with complex issues, they will tend to simplify their calculations and 
settle for a satisfactory, rather than an approximate-best, decision. Therefore, bounded rationality 
results from adaptation to the environment, and non-rational approaches such as emotion and 
intuition are instrumental in this adaptation.44 Emotions direct attention and help patients and 
physicians attend to immediate needs. Intuition, informed by prior experience and existing 
knowledge, usually produces reasonably accurate and fast inferences.   
This chapter will review the role of emotions and intuitions in healthcare decision-
making. Emotions and intuitions are interconnected. If identified, emotions can be used as 
conscious triggers or modifiers of intuitive processing. As a result, emotional states often 
determine whether patients or providers will use either a deliberative or an intuitive decision-
making style. For instance, fear and anger play a role in intuitive decision-making about risk – 
fear amplifies risk estimates, and anger attenuates them. In evaluating risks of a particular 
intervention, providers and patients may often translate some complex thoughts into simpler 
emotional evaluations. Thus, they can compare good and bad feelings instead of trying to make 
sense of many conflicting logical reasons. It is not uncommon to observe this kind of intuitive 
evaluation of risk among patients – “How bad is it?” or “Well, how bad does it feel?” 
Consequently, any attempt to study the intuitive way of decision-making should consider 
emotion or affect as its basis.  
Intuition and Deliberation 
 Intuition has occupied an important place in the history of philosophical thought. The 
word intuition is derived from the Latin word intuitus meaning “to look or to gaze.”45 The 
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etymology of the word places this concept close to what Plato and other philosophers call a 
direct perception. Plato describes intuition as the image of the ideal truth able to be perceived by 
the mind (nous).46 Aristotle has modified this Platonic notion of nous to refer to the capacity of 
the mind to abstract universals from reality known empirically by the senses. Aristotle writes 
about an intuitive mind that simply knows without constructing its proof on prior knowledge.47 
This notion of intuition as direct perception is evident in the writings of many modern 
philosophers. For instance, Descartes talks about intuition as the inner certitude that facilitates 
the perception of a relationship between ideas. He writes: “By intuition I understand, not the 
fluctuating testimony of the senses, nor the misleading judgment that proceeds from the 
blundering constructions of imagination, but the conception which an unclouded and attentive 
mind gives us so readily and distinctly that we are wholly freed from doubt about that which we 
understand.”48 Later on, he adds: “Intuition is the undoubting conception of an unclouded and 
attentive mind, and springs from the light of reason alone.” Descartes contrasts intuition with 
“deduction, by which we mean the interdependence of something as following necessarily from 
some other propositions.”49 He explains this contrast as follows: “Hence we are distinguishing 
mental intuition from certain deduction on the grounds that we are aware of a movement or a sort 
of sequence in the latter but not in the former.”50  
 In his philosophy of conception, Spinoza uses the concept of intuition of the scientia 
intuitiva as the third kind of cognition, different from the knowledge of objects and reason: “This 
kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of 
God to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things.”51 Spinoza argues that the highest virtue 
of the mind is to “understand things by the third kind of knowledge.”52 He uses the example of 
simple numbers and the ability to deduce the next numbers in a sequence to illustrate how 
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intuition works. This kind of intuition is the highest form of human cognition, and it is practical 
in being able to make quick and effortless associations.53 A similar concept of intuition is present 
in Kant’s epistemology. In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant lays the foundations of a theory of 
a priori judgments. According to this theory, one can arrive at correctly believing the truth of 
some statements, while not all, simply by contemplation. This type of knowledge is called a 
priori knowledge: knowledge that comes prior to experience. In these cases, it is the intuitive 
capacity of the mind that justifies such beliefs. The other type of knowledge is a posteriori, 
posterior to experience.54 Intuition is crucial to both kinds of knowledge. Kant defines intuition 
as follows: “In whatever way and through whatever means a cognition may relate to objects, that 
through which it relates, immediately to them, and at which all thought as a means is directed as 
an end, is intuition.”55 In Kant’s system of cognition, perceptions are broken down into 
sensations and cognitions. Cognitions, in turn, are broken down into intuitions and concepts. 
 One of the most complex and thorough accounts of intuition is found in the writings of 
Husserl, the father of the phenomenological method. This method emphasized the subjective way 
in which objects and ideas are mentally determined. Intuition is a central aspect of intentionality, 
as it is the process through which objects are presented to consciousness. Intuitive acts include 
perception, imagination, and memory. Intuition for Husserl is an act that possesses its object or, 
in other words, intuitions are inconceivable without the prior natural objects. Husserl sees 
intuition as an intentionality that “consist[s] in reaching its object and facing it as existing.”56 
Therefore, intuition is the source of all knowledge. Truth results from a correspondence between 
object as it is perceived and object as it is seen intuitively. Similarly to a Platonic or Aristotelian 
understanding of intuition, or the description of this concept as it is found in the writings of 
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Spinoza or Kant, intuition for Husserl is important in bridging the relation between the world and 
the mind.57 
 The more developed distinction between intuition and deliberation can be found in the 
modern philosophy of mind. Philosophers of mind are interested in the analysis of everyday 
“folk” concepts - more specifically beliefs – and their role in the explanation of thought and 
action. Thus, Dennett in his writings makes a distinction between belief and opinion.58 He sees 
belief as a basic mental state, which can be found in humans and animals. Opinions, in turn, are 
more sophisticated, “linguistically infected” states, found in humans alone. To have an opinion is 
to be committed to the truth of a sentence in a language one understands, often as a result of 
consciously making up or changing one’s mind. Similarly, Cohen makes a distinction between 
belief and acceptance. He argues that to believe something is simply to be disposed to feel it true, 
while acceptance presupposes conscious, rule-based reasoning. Belief is passive and non-
linguistic, found in animals and humans. Acceptance is active and linguistically formulated, not 
found in animals.59 Frankish describes belief as non-conscious, implicit, passive, and non-
linguistic. His concept of superbelief is conscious, explicit, active, and involves language. These 
theories have a common thread: the existence of two types of belief. One type is implicit, non-
linguistic, and intuitive, while the second type is explicit and involves language and 
deliberation.60 
 The most important psychological account of intuition and deliberation is found in the 
writings of Freud. Freud believed that the human mind is composed of two systems: one 
conscious and the other unconscious. He argued that these systems operate in different modes 
(“primary process” and “secondary process”): the former associative and the latter logical. Freud 
also believed that the contents of the unconscious are inaccessible to the conscious mind and that 
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the unconscious system is a source of motivation and mental conflict. However, the intuitive or 
unconscious in Freudian logic is not a reasoning system since it consists mostly of repressed 
impulses or memories. The unconscious only affects deliberative indirectly, through dreams and 
neurotic symptoms.61 Later, Jung, in his theory of the ego, described intuition as an irrational 
function, opposed most directly by sensation, and opposed less strongly by the "rational 
functions" of thinking and feeling. Jung defined intuition as "perception via the unconscious": 
using unconscious processes to bring forth ideas, images, and possibilities.62 Jung also described 
a person who mostly uses intuition as an "intuitive type," a person who acts not on the basis of 
rational judgment but on sheer intensity of perception. He talks about extroverted intuitive types, 
those who are oriented by new and promising but unproven possibilities. They are entrepreneurs 
and cultural revolutionaries. He also mentions introverted intuitive types who are oriented by 
images from the unconscious in their attempts to understand the meaning of events. They are 
mystics, prophets, and philosophers.63 
Research on intuition and its role in decision-making has been greatly influenced by the 
Nobel Laureate Simon and his concept of bounded rationality, coined in 1947. Bounded 
rationality is the idea that when people make decisions, their rationality is limited by the 
complexity of the problem, their cognitive limitations, and the available time to make the 
decision. Therefore, people often make choices in a satisfactory manner, seeking ‘good enough’ 
solutions rather than optimal ones.64 Simon developed a pattern-recognition based theory of 
intuition. He argued that the term ‘intuition’ may be used to describe decision-making that is fast 
and for which the actor is unable to describe in detail the reasoning that produced the answer. For 
Simon, intuition was “nothing more and nothing less than recognition” or “analyses frozen into 
habit and the capacity for rapid response through recognition.”65 In other words, Simon believed 
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that people store important information in their long-term memory in the form of coherent 
patterns, intuitive judgments being a product of pattern recognition. Simon also acknowledged 
the role of emotion in decision-making but concluded that ‘emotion-driven intuition’ results in 
irrational decisions.66   
 In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky used the theory 
of bounded rationality to explore the systematic biases resulting from choices based on intuitive 
errors. In their research, Kahneman and Tversky defined intuition as “thoughts and preferences 
that come to mind quickly and without much reflection.”67 Their research was guided by the 
notion that intuitive judgements are positioned between the automatic operations of perception 
and the deliberate operations of reasoning. Kahneman and Tversky were successful in 
identifying many situations in which people had very compelling intuitions that were 
normatively inferior to a deliberative analysis. Their heuristic and biases program of research on 
judgement under uncertainty emphasized the value of clear, rational thought. For instance, in one 
of their most famous demonstrations, participants were asked to consider the following problem: 
“Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a 
student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also 
participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.” Kahneman and Tversky asked participants which 
scenario is more probable: 1. Linda is a bank teller or 2. Linda is a bank teller and is active in the 
feminist movement. Participants’ intuitions led them to believe that the second option was more 
probable (85%) even though this is a logically impossible outcome as it is a subset of the first.68  
 Although Tversky and Kahneman stressed the fact that intuitive judgements sometimes 
succeed and sometimes fail, their research program was typically interpreted as indicating the 
down-side of intuitive judgements. They were able to identify three main heuristics that 
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underline judgements under conditions of uncertainty: representativeness heuristic (“what is 
typical”), availability heuristic (“what comes to mind easily”), and anchoring (“what happens to 
come first”).69  Their seminal work, for which Kahneman received the Nobel Prize in 2002, 
revolutionized research on judgement and decision-making, and their influence quickly spread 
beyond psychology into a number of fields such as medicine, politics, economics, and law. 
However, one of the limitations of this program, later recognized by Kahneman and Frederick, 
was considering these intuitive judgements as “cold,” or lacking emotion and affect. Kahneman 
and Frederick wrote: “The failure to identify [the affect heuristic] earlier reflects the narrowly 
cognitive focus that characterized psychology for some decades.”70 The predominant account of 
intuitive judgements during those decades was completely cognitive with no account for emotion 
or affect. Only later, researchers have started to emphasize feelings as an important aspect of 
intuition, describing intuitive judgments in affective terms, such as “gut feelings,” or “gut 
instincts.”  
 The most influential account of intuitive judgements being driven by emotions was 
proposed by Slovic and colleagues in what they would later call “affect heuristic.” Affect 
heuristic is a mental shortcut that allows people to make decisions and solve problems quickly, in 
which emotional response influences decisions.71 The affect heuristic is often used while judging 
the risks and benefits of an activity, depending on the positive or negative feelings that people 
associate with this activity. Risk as feelings refers to one’s fast and intuitive reactions to danger. 
Risk as analysis brings logic and deliberation to bear on risk management. The intuitive system 
and “risk as feelings” enabled human beings to survive evolution, and it still remains the most 
natural and common way to respond to risk. Slovic and colleagues noticed that while risk and 
benefit tend to be positively correlated (If a stock is riskier, it may offer a higher return.), they 
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are negatively correlated in people’s minds (i.e., herbal medicines perceived as high benefit and 
low risk).72 They concluded that this inverse relationship between perceived risk and perceived 
benefit of an activity is likely to be connected to the strength of positive or negative emotions 
associated with that activity. Affect heuristic explains that when people feel that an activity is 
good, they appear to judge risks as low and benefits as high; if they feel that it is bad, they may 
judge the opposite – high risk and low benefit.73 
 Despite this extensive research on intuition that spans hundreds of years of discourse, it 
has been historically difficult to define this concept. Epstein, one of the most famous researchers 
of judgement and decision-making, noted, “Intuition has been given so many different meanings 
that it makes one wonder whether the term has any meaning at all.”74 Dane and Pratt, in their 
2007 article on the role of intuition in managerial decision-making,75 list 17 various definitions 
of the concept. Some of them were mentioned earlier in this chapter. It is worth adding several 
more definitions. For instance, Wild defines it as “an immediate awareness by the subject, of 
some particular entity, without such aid from the senses or from reason as would account for that 
awareness.”76 Bruner describes it as “the act of grasping the meaning, significance, or structure 
of a problem without explicit reliance on the analytic apparatus of one’s craft.”77 Shirley and 
Langan-Fox write that intuition is “a feeling of knowing with certitude on the basis of inadequate 
information and without conscious awareness of rational thinking.”78 For Hogarth, intuition is 
“thoughts that are reached with little apparent effort, and typically without conscious awareness; 
they involve little or no conscious deliberation.”79 Finally, Shapiro and Spence consider intuition 
as “a nonconscious, holistic processing mode in which judgments are made with no awareness of 
the rules of knowledge used for inference and which can feel right, despite one’s inability to 
articulate the reason.” 80   
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 From the variety of definitions listed above, as well as from the earlier discussion of 
intuition research, one can deduce several aspects of intuitive decision-making. Researchers 
describe the process by which intuitive judgements are reached as nonconscious, fast, and frugal. 
This process occurs automatically with little or no effort on the part of the decision maker. There 
is little or no awareness on the part of the decision maker of how intuitive judgements have been 
achieved. The outcomes of intuitive processes are usually approximate and often experienced in 
the form of feelings rather than words or statements. Intuitions help decision makers to form 
relevant beliefs or hypotheses. Intuitions should not be confused with similar concepts such as 
instincts or insight. An instinct is a reaction that is innate; for example, quickly removing a hand 
when touching a hot surface. Intuitions are based on previous experience. They represent learned 
behavior. While insight can be achieved in an intuitive manner, it can also be reached through 
deliberative processes.  
Intuitive judgements have a number of strengths when it comes to clinical decision-
making. The last twenty years of psychological research into intuitive decision-making shows 
that compared to deliberative decision-making, intuitive decisions often result in better 
judgments, are more in line with expert opinion, and are more accurate.81 Intuitive judgements 
are based on automatic and unconscious cognitive processes. These processes are thought to be 
less limited in capacity than deliberation and, therefore, to be able to integrate larger amounts of 
information. Additionally, intuitions are better at incorporating feelings and affective cues in the 
decision-making process.82 Feelings and emotions are critical sources of information for 
decision-making. The story of Phineas Gage, shared by the neurosurgeon Damasio, serves as an 
illustration for this point. Phineas Gage was the victim of an 1848 mine explosion that hurled an 
iron rod through his skull and brain. Gage recovered, but his frontal lobe, and consequently the 
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ability to experience emotions, was damaged. His cognitive and intellectual abilities were 
preserved, but he was no longer able to make decisions. For instance, it would take him hours to 
decide where to dine by obsessing about each restaurant’s seating plan and menu. This story 
shows the importance of emotions for decision-making and the importance of intuition as vehicle 
that brings emotions into the decision-making process.83  
Despite the importance of intuitive processes in decision-making, there are also some 
critical pitfalls associated with reliance on intuition. Several decades of psychological research 
into intuitive decision-making shows that reliance on intuitive strategies and on strong, 
immediate emotional reactions can cause bias and error in decision-making. Numerous biases 
and heuristics have been documented in human judgement (e.g., framing, anchoring, and 
availability). Many of these biases have been attributed to failures of human intuition.84 Another 
pitfall of intuitive decision-making is that reliance on intuition may make it difficult for patients 
and their surrogates to articulate reasons for their preferences. Healthcare providers are often 
skeptical when families and patients lack plausible-sounding reasons for their decisions.85 
Finally, reliance on intuition may be appropriate for some stages of the decision-making process 
but not suitable for others. For instance, intuitions can lead to poor decisions when they are 
applied to information search and early stages of decision-making.86  
Dual Process Framework 
As shown earlier in this chapter, the contrast between two types of thinking -  one 
intuitive, fast, and automatic, the other deliberative, slow, and effortful – is present in many 
philosophical and psychological accounts of cognition. Some researchers have sought to unify 
these views under a general dual-process theory. According to these theories, one type of process 
is fast, automatic, effortless, and non-conscious, while the other is slow, deliberate, effortful, and 
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conscious.87 One way to conceptualize these systems is to think of the processes involved in 
driving a car. A new driver needs to rely on conscious processing, requiring focus and 
concentration. His driving involves mental effort, and he can be easily disrupted by a distraction. 
In contrast, an experienced driver, relying on automatic processes, can carry out the same task 
efficiently while being engaged in a conversation or finding a radio station. When needed, the 
experienced driver can switch to more deliberative processing, for instance, during bad weather, 
heavy traffic, or windy roads. Similarly, a provider faced with a new consultation may quickly 
recognize the constellation of symptoms and signs using pattern recognition and System 1 
thinking. At times, however, System 2 processing will be needed. For instance, imagine a 28-
year-old woman presenting with a two-month history of exertional chest pain when pushing her 
baby’s buggy. She has a past history of type 2 diabetes, hypothyroidism, and a BMI of 34.6. If 
this patient were a 58-year-old man, System 1 processing would lead most physicians effortlessly 
to a diagnosis of ischemic chest pain. In this case, however, the symptoms do not fit a well-
recognized pattern and require System 2 thinking. When a physician employs this type of 
thinking and orders a number of tests, he will diagnose the patient with critical stenosis of an 
artery.  
In 1984, Evans formulated his heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning, inspired by the 
results of two sets of experiments. One was the famous Wason selection task, or four-card 
problem. Here is the example of this task: “You are shown a set of four cards, each of which has 
a number on one side and a colored patch on the other side. The visible faces of the cards show 
3, 8, red, and brown. Which card(s) must you turn over in order to test the truth of the 
proposition that if a card shows an even number on one face, then its opposite face is red?”88 
Evans noticed that, on average, only 10-20% of people solve this puzzle correctly. In his second 
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set of experiments, Evans asked participants to evaluate the logical validity of a group of 
arguments. The task was further complicated by the fact that half of the valid arguments had an 
unbelievable conclusion, based on common sense prior beliefs. Participants consistently failed to 
correctly assess logical validity when the believability of the conclusion conflicted with the 
validity of the argument. Evans’ dual process theory of reasoning was an attempt to account for 
the biases documented in these experiments. In his first formulation of the theory, Evans 
assumed that reasoning is the product of the interaction of two types of processes: intuitive that 
generates specific representations of the task at hand while analytic processes derive judgements 
or inferences from these representations. Later, Evans rephrased the theory so that intuitive 
processes would generate default responses while analytic processes sometimes intervene and 
replace these default intuitive judgements. This means that the interaction between the two types 
of processes is sometimes sequential and other times competitive. Finally, since the analytic 
system works on the representations generated by the intuitive system, it is still susceptible to 
bias.89  
In judgement and decision-making research, Kahneman and Tversky have shown that 
decisions under uncertainty often rely on the automatic use of heuristics and not the deliberate 
use of logic and rules. Similarly to Evans’ view, Tversky and Kahneman claimed that there is a 
conflict between judgments and decisions made according to formal rules (such as probability 
laws) and those relying on heuristics.90 For instance, in one of their experiments, they told 
participants that a group of psychologists administered personality tests to 30 engineers and 70 
lawyers. Then, they offered participants personality descriptions based on these personality tests, 
some neutral and some representative of either the engineering or law profession, such as this 
description of Jake: “Jack is a 45-year-old man, married, and has four children. He is generally 
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conservative, careful, and ambitious. He shows no interest in political and social issues and 
spends most of his free time on his many hobbies which include home carpentry, sailing, and 
mathematical puzzles.” When participants were asked to estimate the likelihood that Jack was an 
engineer, the estimates were high regardless of base rate information. When participants had to 
assess a neutral profile, they again ignored base rate information. Instead, they calculated the 
degree of similarity between this profile and a stereotypical lawyer or engineer and concluded 
that both are more or less the same. Hence, the likelihood of this profile being an engineer is 
50%. Tversky and Kahneman performed this experiment with doctors and medical students in an 
effort to determine whether the results of the original experiment were due to participants’ 
inexperience with probabilistic problems. However, the results were the same, and experts made 
similar mistakes. They conducted many similar experiments demonstrating that when 
participants err in their judgements, it is usually the result of a fast and intuitive kind of 
reasoning process. By contrast, correct responses were given when participants consciously and 
deliberately reasoned through the tasks.91   
A simple task proposed by Frederick clearly demonstrates the work of both systems. 
Students were given the following problem: “A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs 
$1 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?” Most students quickly respond, “10 cents.” 
This answer jumps to mind: it is fast, automatic, and it is not clear where it comes from. On the 
other hand, when they had to think about the problem for a moment, they realized that it is not 
the correct answer. In order to get to the right answer, they needed to engage in conscious 
calculations.92 Given the number of similar experiments and the consistency of the results, many 
researchers sought to unify dual-process theories into a general dual-system view of cognition. 
According to this view, there are two cognitive systems: one system underlies fast, automatic, 
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effortless, and unconscious processes, while the other underlies slow, deliberate, high effort, 
conscious processes. The two systems were given different names by different authors: implicit 
and explicit, experiential and rational, heuristic and systematic, or associative and rule-based. 
Later, researchers started using the labels ‘System 1’ and ‘System 2’ to refer to the two systems. 
According to the researchers, what differentiates the two systems is: 1. their speed (slow 
versus fast), 2. their obedience to rules (automatic versus deliberate), and 3. the type of 
information they rely on to make decisions (affective, specific, and pattern-based for system 1; 
statistical, abstract, and theoretical for system 2). Most researchers also agree that both systems 
work in tandem, and some tasks can migrate from one system to another as expertise and skill 
are acquired.93 In the same work mentioned above, Frederick described the two systems as 
follows: “System 1 - executed quickly with little conscious deliberation; occurs spontaneously 
and does not require or consume much attention; it is unaffected by intellect, alertness, 
motivation or the difficulty of the problem being solved” and “System 2 - executed slowly and 
more reflectively; the kind of mental operations that require effort, motivation, concentration, 
and the execution of learned rules.”94 In 2011, Kahneman published Thinking, Fast and Slow, a 
New York Times bestseller on the dual system view, in which he claims that the main difference 
among the two systems is the amount of effort, attention, and control that the two types of 
processes require. System 1 operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no 
sense of voluntary control. System 2 gives attention to the effortful mental activities that demand 
it. It is often associated with the subjective experience of agency, choice, and concentration.95 
Kahneman claims that the dual-system view explains why people sometimes make very simple 
and surprising mistakes in judgement: they engage in the wrong type of reasoning. They use 
System 1 when they should engage System 2 instead. He also believes that System 1 gets 
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automatically engaged in any reasoning task, and that System 2 oversees, authorizes, and 
sometimes overrides System 1’s response.96  
Fuzzy trace theory is a type of the dual system theory often used in medical decision-
making. The phrase fuzzy trace refers to a distinction between verbatim memory representations 
that are vivid and gist memory representations that are “fuzzy” (vague and impressionistic). For 
example, if a physician tells a patient that she has a 22% chance of having a stroke in the next 
three years, she forms two kinds of memories for that information: 1. a memory of the precise 
details of what was said (''22% chance of stroke''), which fades rapidly and is subject to 
interference (e.g., from anxiety), and 2. a memory of the bottom-line meaning, or gist, of what 
was said (e.g., there is a good chance of having a stroke in the next few years). Multiple gist 
memories are typically encoded into memory for a single piece of information. Even though 
people are capable of processing both verbatim and gist information, they prefer to operate on 
gist memories rather than use verbatim ones.97 For instance, even if people are capable of 
understanding ratio concepts like probabilities and prevalence rates, which are omnipresent in 
health-related information, their choice in decision situations will usually be determined by the 
bottom-line meaning of it (e.g., "the risk is high" or "the outcome is bad") rather than the actual 
numbers. While most dual system theories assume that decisions generated by System 2 are 
superior to those made by intuition or System 1, fuzzy trace theory predicts the opposite. It 
assumes that intuitive processing is more sophisticated and is capable of making better decisions 
and that increases in expertise are accompanied by reliance on intuitive, gist-based reasoning 
rather than on literal, verbatim reasoning. For instance, simply educating people with statistics 
regarding risk factors can hinder prevention efforts. Health providers need to explain information 
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in more meaningful ways that facilitate forming an appropriate gist (i.e., explaining quantities 
qualitatively, visual presentation of information).98  
Dual system theories have a number of limitations. These theories assume that System 2 
decisions are better and less prone to cognitive errors. However, reliance on deliberation in 
health care decision-making has a number of pitfalls. Many choices ICU patients face are laden 
with strong emotions, such as feelings of anxiety or depression. When a patient experiencing 
negative emotions is asked to deliberate, his her thinking will go in line with her emotional state 
and may even intensify these emotions. Another disadvantage of deliberation is that people are 
often unware of factors that influence their choices. When asked to give reasons why they prefer 
certain options, patients may invent reasons that seem plausible, but they are not correct. If 
patients cannot articulate the reasons for their preferences after a decision is made, then asking 
them to do so as part of the decision-making process could lead them to a decision they might 
not otherwise make. Additionally, the mere fact of explaining reasons for patients’ preferences 
can decrease their satisfaction with decisions and agreement between their judgements and 
opinions of providers. Deliberation tends to cause people to focus on just a select few reasons for 
choosing one option over another. These reasons may not actually be the most important or even 
the real reasons for one’s preferences. Instead, they are likely to be the reasons that are easiest to 
articulate. As a result, deliberative reasoning can shift one’s perception of which option is the 
best.99  
Critics of dual-system theories point out the lack of conceptual clarity when it comes to 
categorizing System 1 and System 2 processes. For instance, the term unconscious is often used 
as a feature describing System 1, and conscious as a feature describing System 2. Most theories 
argue that consciousness enables higher-order, meaning-based, truth-value-preserving processing 
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of information, while the unconscious is restricted to a simpler, associative type of processing. 
Therefore, it is more advantageous to engage conscious processing for more complex 
decisions.100 This claim, as well as the distinction between “dumb unconscious” and “complex 
conscious,” has been challenged in recent literature. For instance, Dijksterhhuis and colleagues 
came to an interesting conclusion that when faced with complex decisions (what car to buy, 
where to live), people are better advised to stop thinking and let their unconscious decide. These 
researchers argued that explicit consideration of options and attributes overwhelms our capacity-
limited conscious thought. In contrast, the unconscious is capacity-unlimited and it is better 
positioned to weight information appropriately and decide optimally. In their study, participants 
were quickly (although consciously) presented with a set of twelve positive and negative 
attributes each about four different cars (i.e., 48 attributes total, with one car having 75% positive 
attributes, two having 50% positive attributes, and one having 25% positive attributes). One 
group of participants (“conscious thinkers”) made their decision after four minutes of 
deliberation and another group (“unconscious thinkers”) after four minutes of engaging in a 
distracting anagram-solving task. The unconscious thinkers group was most likely to choose the 
“good” car compared to the conscious thinker group.101  
This experiment demonstrates the issue with dual system approach to judgement. It 
highlights the tendency of dual system theorists to focus on static rather than dynamic properties 
of judgement and decision-making. Less attention has been given to the transitions from one 
system to another. Samuels refers to these transitions as crossovers or occurrence of processes 
with both System 1 and System 2 features, for instance, some unconscious processes that are 
rule-based rather than associative. Heuristics and biases, typically characterized as unconscious 
and automatic, can also be conscious and controlled. Similarly, emotions and emotional reactions 
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can be understood as resulting from both System 1 and System 2 processes. Several researchers 
have attempted to clarify the role of emotions in dual system theories. For example, Keltner and 
Haidt distinguish two classes of emotions. Primordial emotions are universal, biologically based 
patterns of responses that can be found in any culture. Elaborated emotions are more complex 
bundles of meanings, social practices, and norms that are constructed around emotions in a 
certain cultural context. The authors suggest that the deliberation process loosens the link 
between a primordial emotion and its original evolutionary function. For instance, the primordial 
emotion of disgust, initially designed to prevent people from consuming contaminated food, can 
be applied to norm violators (i.e., someone who committed incest) who might metaphorically 
contaminate the social group. Ochsner and Barrett describe emotion as resulting from 
interactions between System 1 and System 2 processes. System 1 bottom-up processes categorize 
events or objects as positive or negative and generate an emotional response. Top-down 
processes of System 2 can direct one’s attention to specific aspects of an object or event, 
regulating or inhibiting corresponding emotions. For these authors, consciously experienced 
emotions occur only when both systems are engaged and produce an emotional response.  
Despite the abovementioned tendency to associate emotion with System 1 processing, it 
is possible to assume that both systems can be involved in emotional processing and decision-
making. At times, System 2 processes cannot prevent or regulate emotional reaction. For 
instance, in a well-known psychological experiment, participants responded with disgust at the 
sight of chocolate in the shape of feces, despite being fully aware that the material was simply 
chocolate.102 Emotional reactions can also occur without deliberate awareness of the trigger. For 
example, when researchers briefly flashed pictures of spiders or snakes to people with phobias, 
research participants experienced elevated skin conductance responses demonstrating emotional 
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response to the stimuli.103 On the other hand, emotions can be elicited by deliberate, reflective 
System 2 processes. For instance, anxiety can result from thinking about what other people might 
think of me (System 2 processes) as well as by the simple perception of a spider (System 1 
processes). Fear can be elicited by actual exposure to a threat or by the anticipation of danger in 
the future. System 2 processes are not only important in elicitation of emotions but also in their 
regulation. People may attempt to reinterpret or re-categorize quick emotional reactions, for 
instance, when they realize the presence of a stereotype or implicit bias. They may try to direct 
their attention to a different and less emotionally laden aspect of emotional response, for 
instance, thinking about individual characteristics of a stereotyped person rather than group 
characteristics. Finally, one may attempt to teach their System 1 in order to respond differently to 
the stimuli.104   
Heuristic Decision-Making Model 
When faced with a clinical emergency situation, ICU providers are often expected to 
make diagnostic decisions within a limited time frame. A delayed decision, although an accurate 
one, is a futile decision if the patient deteriorates. Therefore, these urgent decisions have to be 
made with some degree of uncertainty, especially in an environment like the ICU. Physicians in 
a critical care unit make many decisions in the course of a working shift, some of which can have 
high consequences. Furthermore, critical care units often have unpredictable patient volume load 
as well as clinical acuity. Given the unfavorable nature of such an environment, the critical care 
unit is often a place that is vulnerable to error. The likelihood of the occurrence of errors in 
critical care is higher than in other areas of inpatient care. For instance, an observational study in 
Israel documented a rate of 1.7 errors per patient per day.105 In another study, 31% of ICU 
admissions experienced an iatrogenic complication (half of which were serious), where human 
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error was a major contributor.106 A prospective incident reporting system in Australia found that 
adverse events occur in 5% to 25% of patients admitted to the ICU,107 while errors occurred in 
20% of patients in a single center study in the United States.108 A high number of these errors 
can be attributed to diagnostic decision-making. Diagnostic reasoning involves the use of both 
System 1 and System 2 processes, the combination of which depends on the experience of the 
physician and the familiarity of the situation. Factors such as overconfidence, fatigue, and time 
pressure can create an overreliance on intuition when there may be insufficient expertise to 
justify its use. Cognitive biases or heuristics may lead to diagnostic inaccuracies and medical 
errors. 
The first part of this chapter outlines a number of perspectives on the role of emotion and 
intuition in medical decision-making. According to the traditional model of rational choice, when 
making a diagnostic decision, a physician will gather and evaluate all relevant information; he 
will then weigh each piece of this information according to some medical criterion, and then 
combine the pieces to maximize the chances of arriving at a diagnosis. The dual framework 
argues that physicians may try to arrive at the best diagnostic decision via pattern recognition 
and intuitive processes or via conscious and deliberative processes. However, the third way of 
conceptualizing medical decision-making would argue that reaching the best and most optimal 
decision may not be possible in the real world. Instead, physicians use simple strategies, seeking 
answers that are good enough with respect to the treatment goals. Therefore, the heuristic 
framework adapts a more situated view of decision-making through which it tries to understand 
how and when reliance on heuristics can result in smart choices.109 The term heuristic is 
translated from the Greek as “serving to find out or discover.” Einstein used this term in the title 
of his Nobel-prize winning paper on quantum physics, alluding to the fact that the view he 
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presented was incomplete but highly useful.110 Similarly, in the study of decision-making, 
heuristics are often referred to as “rules of thumb” that make use of less than complete 
information, often in a very useful way.  
 When it comes to the study of decision-making, heuristic has been defined in a number of 
ways. For instance, Shah & Oppenheimer explain that heuristics exist for the purpose of reducing 
cognitive effort during the decision-making process by means of: examining fewer cues, 
reducing the effort of retrieving cue values, simplifying the weighting of cues, integrating less 
information, and examining fewer alternatives.111 Sunstein describes heuristics as any mental 
short-cuts or rules of thumb that generally work well in common circumstances but also lead to 
systematic errors in unusual situations.112 However, the most helpful definition was proposed by 
Kahneman and Frederick as a strategy that assesses a target attribute by another property 
(attribute substitution) that comes more readily to mind. For instance, a person wants to 
determine whether an object has a target attribute. This target attribute is difficult to detect 
directly, often because of lack of information or time. Hence, instead of asking directly about the 
target attribute, this person asks about a different attribute, the heuristic attribute, which is easier 
to detect. If the person detects the heuristic attribute, then the person forms the belief that the 
object has the target attribute.113 For example, a parent refuses to vaccinate her child after she 
sees an isolated media report of a child who developed autism after being vaccinated. In this 
example, the target attribute is the effectiveness of vaccination, and the heuristic attribute is the 
vivid example of a rare and publicized event. In another example, a patient may think that 
because she has developed so many incident health problems in the past year, she is unlikely to 
also develop breast cancer because she is “due for a break.” She, thus, skips her mammography. 
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In this case, the target attribute is the importance of mammography, and the heuristic attribute is 
the belief that the patient is “due for a break.” 
Heuristics usually operate unconsciously. This has been demonstrated in experimental 
conditions. Subjects in the reported experiments usually do not mention the heuristic attribute 
when asked to explain how they arrived at their answers. In contrast, when subjects are asked 
about their evidence, if they have any, they usually give it. Moreover, when subjects are told 
about heuristics, they often deny that they used them, possibly because the attribute substitution 
seems questionable when it becomes conscious. Partly because heuristics are unconscious, they 
not easily corrected when they go astray.114 Researchers find that even experts on probability 
make the mistakes predicted by the various heuristics. When the experimental design makes the 
mistakes obvious enough, and there is no concurrent cognitive load, then experts do make fewer 
salient mistakes. Finally, attribute substitution plays a role that normal evidence does not, since 
attribute substitution silences or distracts from opposing evidence. When representativeness is 
substituted for probability in the example above where the mother decides on vaccination for her 
child, representativeness is not weighed against percentage estimates. Instead, the baseline 
percentages are overlooked, and the judgment is based almost completely on the heuristic 
attribute of representativeness.  
In the rest of this chapter, I will describe heuristics and cognitive biases relevant to 
clinical decision-making. The availability heuristic was referenced earlier in this chapter. It 
refers to the tendency of people to make judgements about the frequency of an outcome (i.e,. 
side effect of a drug) using whatever information is most accessible or most available. This 
available information may often be unrepresentative or incomplete, thus leading to erroneous 
judgments.115 For instance, vivid events such as plane crashes with multiple fatalities are more 
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readily accessible in people’s memories (due in part to disproportionate media coverage) than are 
more ordinary events with singular or few fatalities such as automobile fatalities. This leads to 
exaggerations of the likelihood of the vivid events. Similarly, celebrities developing cancer, 
made vivid by repeated media coverage, may increase cancer risk perception and worry.  
This heuristic becomes problematic when patients attempt to determine the association 
between a potential risk factor and the occurrence of a disease. Due to the media coverage of 
specific cases, such as a child who developed autism after being vaccinated, parents may develop 
biased beliefs about how events are associated. The availability heuristic may also be 
problematic when patients attempt to estimate the proportion of their peers who engage in a 
given action or hold a given opinion. For example, if a patient’s friends all discount the 
importance of prophylactic colonoscopy, this patient will likely avoid the procedure as well. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that people rely on the subjective perception of availability just as 
much as on general availability heuristic. For instance, when asked to list eight reasons why they 
should not adopt aggressive ICU therapy, patients feel more inclined to accept this therapy than 
those who were asked to list only three reasons. The group that had to come up with eight 
reasons found it difficult to make the list and concluded that they not strongly against this 
option.116  
When facing medical decisions in the ICU, patients make assumptions about how they 
will adjust emotionally to living with disabilities and declines in health. Because these decisions 
involve predictions of future feelings, wrong predictions about their future emotional states may 
lead to suboptimal decisions. Research shows that people are poor predictors of their future well-
being. Specifically, people overestimate the impact and duration of negative emotions in 
response to loss. Affective forecasting errors describe the process by which people anticipate 
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their emotional responses to future events.117 These errors are important in the context of ICU 
decision-making since patients often have to decide between treatment options with similar 
impacts on mortality but very different effects on their lives. They need to form realistic beliefs 
about their future quality of life in order to make decisions. However, when thinking about their 
future health, patients tend to focus narrowly on what will change in their life while ignoring 
how much of what they enjoy daily can still be continued. This is the reason why some patients 
may refuse life-saving amputations because they are not able to imagine their life using a 
wheelchair. Patients also fail to recognize the extent to which their coping mechanisms will help 
them in dealing with emotional suffering. Additionally, patients fail to predict their adaptation 
while estimating the duration of negative emotions. While people are mostly accurate at 
estimating the intensity and duration of a positive reaction, they systematically overpredict the 
intensity and duration of their negative emotional reactions. These affective forecasting errors 
may result in suboptimal treatment decisions.118  
 The anchoring heuristic describes the human tendency to rely too heavily on the first 
piece of information offered (the "anchor") when making decisions. Guided by this heuristic, a 
clinician may be perceptually fixated on the salient features in the patient’s initial presentation at 
an early point of the diagnostic process. Even when the new information comes to light, a 
clinician may fail to adjust this initial impression.119 There are many studies demonstrating the 
anchoring heuristic at work. For instance, researchers asked study participants to write the last 
two digits of their social security number and consider whether they would pay this number of 
dollars for items whose value they did not know, such as wine, chocolate, and computer 
equipment. They were then asked to bid for these items. The group with higher two digit 
numbers submitted bids that were between 60 percent and 120 percent higher than those with the 
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lower social security numbers.120 Even when the anchor is obviously wrong, its influence 
remains strong. Researchers asked students whether Mahatma Gandhi died before or after age 9, 
or before or after age 140. Obviously neither of these anchors can be correct, but the two groups 
still guessed significantly differently (average age of 50 versus average age of 67).121 Similarly, 
when it comes to medical risk estimates or diagnostic process, the influence of anchoring is 
present. A physician can anchor on a specific aspect of the patient’s history, a physical finding, 
or a laboratory result. For instance, a patient’s complaint of gas may cause the physician to miss 
an abdominal aneurism. The influence of anchoring can be strong among patients, resulting in 
misinterpretation of their risk of developing a disease. For instance, when asked to estimate 
whether their risk of developing colorectal cancer is higher or lower than 70 percent, patients 
gave higher estimates than when the original question asked about whether their risk was higher 
or lower than 30 percent.122 
The representativeness heuristic is the assumption that something that seems similar to 
other things in a certain category is itself a member of that category. In order to demonstrate this 
heuristic, Kahneman and Tversky presented participants with descriptions of people who came 
from a fictitious group of 30 engineers and 70 lawyers (or vice versa). The participants then rated 
the probability that the person described was an engineer. Their judgments were much more 
affected by the extent to which the description corresponded to the stereotype of an engineer (for 
example, “Jack is conservative and careful”) than by base rate information (only 30% were 
engineers), showing that representativeness had a greater effect on the judgments than did 
knowledge of the probabilities.123 This heuristic may affect clinical judgement. For instance, 
clinicians were given two scenarios of patients with symptoms suggestive of either a heart attack 
or a stroke and asked to provide a diagnosis. The heart attack scenario sometimes included the 
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additional information that the patient had recently been dismissed from his job, and the stroke 
scenario sometimes included the information that the patient's breath smelt of alcohol. This 
additional piece of information had a significant effect on the diagnosis and made it less likely 
that clinicians would attribute the symptoms to a serious physical cause.124 
The sunk-cost heuristic, sometimes referred to in literature as “irrational escalation,” is a 
tendency for people to pursue a course of action even after it has proved to be suboptimal, 
because resources have been invested in that course of action. A classic example of the sunk-cost 
heuristic was given by Thaler: “A family pays $40 for tickets to a basketball game to be played 
60 miles from their home. On the day of the game there is a snowstorm. They decide to go 
anyway, but note in passing that had the tickets been given to them, they would have stayed 
home.”125 This heuristic affects many decisions people make on a daily basis. They may keep 
useless clutter in their homes just because they paid for it, persist in a bad relationship or career 
just because they invested their time, or they may continue gambling to make their lost money 
worth it. Sunk cost heuristic can affect clinical decision-making in a number of ways. For 
example, a physician might be more reluctant to change medications after a course of an 
expensive cancer treatment that bears minimal results as opposed to an inexpensive treatment. 
Similarly, a clinician might be less willing to consider an alternative diagnosis after spending 
several hours or days pursuing an apparently inaccurate diagnosis than if less time were spent 
looking at the mistaken option.  
 The confirmation bias involves the tendency to ignore or rationalize contradictory data to 
make the pieces of the puzzle fit neatly into the presumed picture. An unusual complaint or 
laboratory finding is dismissed in the mind of a clinician as an “outlier” when it should actually 
raise a red flag indicating that the clinician’s presumption may be incorrect.126 Confirmation bias 
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often compounds an anchoring error when the clinician uses confirmatory data to support the 
anchored hypothesis even when clearly contradictory evidence is also available. For example, a 
clinician may steadfastly cling to patient history elements suggesting acute coronary syndrome 
(ACS) to confirm the original suspicion of ACS even when serial electrocardiography (ECGs) 
and cardiac enzymes are normal. According to research, clinicians form diagnostic impressions 
very quickly during the initial assessment, and it is often difficult to set aside these initial 
impressions to allow for new and or inconsistent information to be considered. Confirmation bias 
is able to impact not only the diagnostic process but may also lead to treatment errors. It is 
reasonable to expect that the drug a nurse is able to administer is the correct drug. Some obvious 
cues that this nurse has the wrong medication, such as a label marked ephedrine instead of the 
expected epinephrine, can be easily ignored or misinterpreted to confirm her expectation that the 
drug is correct.127  
 The bandwagon effect can be best demonstrated using the example of vitamin E that was 
believed to decrease the risk of heart attack due to its antioxidant effect. The idea seemed 
plausible in the early 1990s, and it was almost a common practice for doctors to recommend 
vitamin E. However, this practice was discredited by a number of studies that showed no 
demonstrable benefit of vitamin E. In fact, there was a potential for harm as it was associated 
with an increased risk of prostate cancer. Regardless, many practitioners still seem to be 
recommending Vitamin E two decades later, and it is still heavily promoted by vitamin 
companies.128 The bandwagon effect is a heuristic whereby the rate of uptake of beliefs or ideas 
increases the more that they have already been adopted by others. Medical bandwagons have 
been identified as “the overwhelming acceptance of unproved but popular ideas.” They have led 
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to inappropriate therapies for a numerous number of patients and have impeded the development 
of more appropriate treatment. 
The default heuristic occurs when a clinician or a patient gives preference to a default 
option over the active choice. A default option is the set of events or conditions that will occur if 
no action is taken. For instance, while patients can express their preference by explicitly 
answering a question or checking a box on a form, they usually tend to endorse the default option 
or the preference implied by no response or checking the box. They tend to do it regardless of 
implications and may consequently accept options they would not otherwise accept or reject 
options they would not otherwise reject.129 For example, Johnson and Goldstein found that organ 
donation rates in countries with presumed consent policies (where the default position is a 
preference to donate organs) were twice as high as in countries with explicit consent policies 
(where the default is a preference not to donate organs).130 Recent research links default options 
to advance directives and overuse of critical care during one’s last months of life. The text and 
structure of advance directives carries the default for aggressive life-extending treatment. For 
instance, in the widely used ‘Five Wishes’ document, the option “I want to have life support” is 
listed first in all three clinical scenarios, despite evidence that the ordering of choices may anchor 
patients and influence their selections. Researchers suggest that people will be significantly more 
likely to indicate preferences to forgo life-sustaining interventions when completing advance 
directives in which forgoing these interventions is the default than when they have to actively 
choose to forgo the interventions.131  
 One recent study suggested that decisions to withdraw life -sustaining treatment in the 
ICU are strongly related to the characteristics of the physician rather than the medical conditions 
of the patient. This study notes that intensivists influence decisions by framing the presentation 
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of options. Therefore, gain/loss framing is another relevant heuristic in the context of ICU 
decision-making. Framing heuristic occurs when decision-makers respond differently to different 
but objectively equivalent descriptions of the same problem.132 For instance, a study by McNeil 
et al. presented respondents with information about the outcomes of two treatments for lung 
cancer. Although the statistics presented were identical, they were framed in terms of survival or 
mortality rates. Even though respondents should react similarly to both statistical presentations, 
the number of those who favored radiation therapy over surgery went from 18% for those 
presented with the survival framing to 44% for those presented with the mortality framing. 
Similarly, intensivists may facilitate the decision about treatment withdrawal, focusing on the 
concept that “there is nothing more medically to be done” and invoking the image of 
abandonment and letting one die. They can also present this decision as the optimal level of care 
at the given stage of the patient’s illness, not focusing on what is medically effective but rather 
what is beneficial.133 
The gain/loss framing heuristic is related to the loss aversion in decision-making. Loss 
aversion is an important heuristic stating that people care much more about avoiding losses than 
they care about making gains. It is better to not lose $100 than to find $100 because losses loom 
larger than gains. Some studies have suggested that losses are twice as powerful, 
psychologically, as gains.134  In medicine, losses may take a variety of forms, including physical 
harm to a patient, perceived loss of reputation if a physician makes an error, and possibly even 
loss of licensure. In end-of-life care, the choice to overutilize life-sustaining treatment can be 
explained by loss aversion. Life-sustaining treatment decisions involve choices between two 
prospects – potential death from foregoing the treatment and a poor-health prospect 
(incapacitated status) resulting from accepting the treatment. For a healthy individual, the 
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difference between death and poor-health prospect is minimal; thus, a generally healthy patient 
with a critical condition will likely forego life-sustaining treatment. However, a chronically-ill 
critical patient may see these two options differently, considering death as a significant loss 
compared to an incapacitated state. Therefore, sicker people may choose to live longer in worse 
prospective health and may strongly prefer life-sustaining treatments.  
 The ambiguity aversion is another heuristic that may influence treatment decisions. It 
was first described by Ellsberg in 1961 as a preference for known risks over unknown risks. In 
his experiment, known as the Ellsberg paradox, people preferred to bet on the outcome of an urn 
with 50 red and 50 blue balls rather than to bet on one with 100 total balls but for which the 
number of blue or red balls was unknown. The concept of ambiguity aversion is also expressed 
in the English proverb: “Better the devil you know than the devil you don't.”135 In a recent 
experiment, researchers demonstrated ambiguity aversion in treatment decisions. They recruited 
more than 700 men between the ages of 40 and 75 and randomly assigned them to one of four 
conditions. One group received information about the risks and benefits of a prostate biopsy. The 
other groups received one of three hypothetical results from the prostate-specific antigen (PSA) 
screening test, which informs the decision to have a biopsy: normal, elevated, or inconclusive. 
An inconclusive test result, subjects were informed, “provides no information about whether or 
not you have cancer.” Of subjects who weren’t given the PSA screening results, only 25 percent 
chose to proceed with the prostate biopsy. However, 40 percent of subjects who received 
inconclusive PSA test results opted for the procedure. The mere presence of ambiguity led to a 
preference for a costly and invasive testing. Ambiguity aversion can also cause unnecessary 
treatment and testing in the ICU.136   
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The optimism bias can be another factor that drives unnecessary treatment and testing in 
the ICU. Optimism bias is a heuristic that causes a person to believe that they are at a lesser risk 
of experiencing a negative event compared to others. For instance, smokers often believe that 
they are less likely to contract lung cancer or disease than other smokers. Several factors exist 
that cause a person to be optimistically biased: their desired end state, their cognitive 
mechanisms, the information they have about themselves versus others, and their underlying 
emotional state.137 In the context of ICU, the optimism bias is present in the interpretation of 
prognostic information by surrogate decision makers when they consistently interpret grim 
prognostic statements in an overly optimistic way. For example, a study involving 80 surrogates 
presented them with several prognostic statements. Study subjects were asked what exactly each 
prognostic statement meant to them and used a numerical scale to demarcate the patient’s 
corresponding chance of survival. When presented with numerical prognostic statements such as: 
“He has a 90% chance of surviving,” “He has a 50% chance of surviving,” and “He has a 5% 
chance of surviving,” only 15% of surrogates interpreted these statements accurately. Most of the 
study subjects interpreted these statements more optimistically than they actually were (“A 50% 
chance of surviving” meant that the patient was likely to survive.).138  
The outcome bias is a cognitive bias which refers to the tendency to judge a decision by 
its eventual outcome instead of judging it based on the quality of the decision at the time it was 
made. In order to illustrate this bias, Baron and Hershey presented subjects with hypothetical 
situations. One example involved a surgeon deciding whether or not to do a risky surgery on a 
patient. The surgery had a known probability of success. Subjects were presented with either a 
good or bad outcome (in this case living or dying), and asked to rate the quality of the surgeon's 
pre-operation decision. Those presented with bad outcomes rated the decision worse than those 
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who had good outcomes.139 Similarly, Caplan and colleagues demonstrated that not only the 
harshness of judgements about appropriateness of care by other physicians, but also the 
willingness to make such judgements, was increased when there was a severe outcome. Outcome 
bias is, therefore, very important in relation to medical expert reports in medical 
errors/negligence claims made in critical care.140  
Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted the difficulties patients and providers face when trying to 
make healthcare decisions. Various heuristics and biases can affect the decision-making process 
in terms of how people make decisions and how critical medical information is presented. These 
heuristics can be traced to the simultaneous operation of dual cognitive processes in judgement, 
and particularly to the intuitive system, which highlights associations between events and offers 
rapid evaluations of decision situations. Research presented in this chapter shows that the 
responses of the intuitive system reflect not only cognitive strategies but also considerable input 
from the affective system. The theories of decision-making described in this chapter divide 
decision-making into two types of processes: intuitive (fast, reflexive, and requiring minimal 
cognitive resources) and analytical (slow, deliberate, and demanding more conscious effort). 
Intuitive processes are based on pattern recognition, allowing providers and patients to save time 
and effort by matching already-known patterns to particular decisions and actions. While some 
may consider intuition a better way of making decisions, and others may caution against its 
perils, the research presented in this chapter shows that this is not a useful dichotomy. It is 
simplistic to consider intuition as superior to analytical reasoning or vice versa. Human decision-
making involves both processes, and different situations require different approaches. For 
example, decisions that need to be made in a split second, those that depend on social and 
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emotional intelligence, and those that call for inspiration and creativity may be effectively made 
in the intuitive mode. On the other hand, those that have no room for error, such as treatment 
decisions about an aggressive cancer, can only be made analytically. 
The majority of current ethical decision-making models provide a logical and reasoned 
process for making ethical judgments, but these models are removed from research in the fields 
of psychology and decision-making. These models rely upon assumptions of rational and 
conscious reasoning despite the fact that many nonrational factors presented in this chapter 
influence ethical thought and behavior, including emotions, intuitions, and heuristics. In addition 
to a presumption of rationality, traditional bioethics models assume that patients and families 
know their health preferences, especially when it comes to end-of-life choices. There is also a 
presumption that, once given enough information, patients and families will use it to make 
rational choices. One less explicit assumption of traditional bioethics is that patients’ values and 
preferences are context independent. In other words, patients should make similar choices 
regardless of the framing of options in terms of survival or mortality rates. Research presented in 
this chapter proves the opposite – patients and families rarely have stable values and preferences. 
Their preferences are context dependent and can change with the way the options are presented 
to them. Finally, traditional bioethics assumes that even if patients and providers make mistakes 
in decision-making, these mistakes are random and not predictable. However, research presented 
in this chapter demonstrates that there is a systematic way to predict some cognitive errors in 
patients’ decision-making and even to use this knowledge to improve their choices. 
Considering the body of research discussed in this chapter, one can argue that bioethicists 
should do more than teach medical students and professionals how to recognize right or wrong. 
The moral duty of medical ethicists is also to help medical practitioners recognize the 
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circumstances that influence them to behave in ways they know aren’t right. There are many 
examples of practices that medical students would consider as wrong (for instance, pelvic 
examination on an anesthetized woman with no prior consent). However, their attitudes change 
dramatically by the end of their rotations. This example shows that only telling medical students 
or medical practitioners what is right or wrong will not immunize them against the cultural 
norms they encounter in hospital wards. Bioethicists would do a better job helping these 
practitioners recognize this attitude change by helping them understand their own moral 
psychology. People need to recognize the behavioral forces that influence their moral actions. 
Autonomy and beneficence, Kant and Mill, are not enough to immunize students against these 
forces. We need to integrate research from areas of psychologies and decision-making to help 
people deal with these forces and make better decisions despite heuristics and biases that may 
otherwise drive their decisions.  
Decision-making science suggests a number of strategies that can be useful in improving 
decision-making, especially when it comes to medical practitioners. Metacognition is one of 
these strategies. Metacognition refers to the deliberate monitoring of cognitive processes and 
their impact. It can benefit care providers in at least two ways. First, by identifying the cognitive 
strategy used to reach a conclusion, the appropriateness of the strategy in a particular context can 
be evaluated. In this way, errors may be recognized early on, before they cause harm. Second, an 
awareness and appreciation of thought processes may provide extra motivation to follow up on 
their accuracy in novel and unclear situations. It can also help in building expertise and 
experience. Cognitive forcing strategies is another method developed to help providers improve 
their ability to self-monitor and recognize their use of specific heuristics in decision-making, and 
then use predetermined actions to counteract them. For instance, providers can be forced to rule 
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out the worst-case scenario or to consider new diagnoses if three interventions fail to create 
improvement.   
Finally, providers should be taught to acknowledge the use and value of intuition in 
clinical decision-making. There are many situations in clinical practice and especially in critical 
care when the System 1 process provides the most effective starting point for diagnosis and 
action. An experienced intensivist can walk into the room of a patient with bleeding and launch 
right into intubation and transfusion, while a resident may be at loss for the criteria supporting 
these actions. Therefore, some situations in critical care call for decisions that emerge with little 
deliberation, while others require an analytic strategy. For intuition to develop properly, 
Kahneman and Klein argue that the context for learning must be defined by generally predictable 
elements and the ability to receive feedback on the quality and outcome of decisions. Pattern 
recognition ability and appropriate feedback are important in helping younger doctors recognize 
and use intuition in their clinical decision-making.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
MORAL HEURISTICS 
Introduction 
Mrs. D is an 84-year-old patient in the Emergency Department presenting with a severe 
shortness of breath and signs of right-sided pneumonia. She is hypoxic despite high-flow 
oxygen. The Emergency staff suspects an underlying neurological condition. Dr. I, an ICU 
provider, is called to consult on the potential ICU admission. Since the patient cannot 
communicate her wishes, Dr. I calls the patient’s husband. From the phone conversation, it 
becomes apparent that Mrs. D has a rapidly progressive neurodegenerative condition, and she 
would never want to be in intensive care for her pneumonia. Her GP confirms this information 
over the phone, and Dr. I decides against admitting Mrs. D to the ICU. When he returns to the 
Emergency Department, he finds Mrs. D intubated, on the ventilator with good oxygen levels. 
The Emergency staff had misinterpreted Dr. I’s instruction, and they had started to work on the 
ICU transfer. At this point, as Dr. I is reluctant to withdraw treatment, he proceeds with the 
admission and opts out for a ‘one way wean’. 
Now, imagine that Mrs. D has responded well to the ICU treatment, and she is ready to 
be transferred to the medical floor. However, her blood glucose level is 500 mg/dL. Dr. I decides 
to keep Mrs. D in the ICU until her hyperglycemia is resolved, though he would never have 
accepted a patient from the medical floor to the ICU as the result of the same finding. These two 
episodes in the treatment progression of Mrs. D may indicate that many morally relevant medical 
choices consist of simple and highly intuitive rules that reduce the effort associated with the 
decision-making process. Providers may often resort to automatic, unreflective moral judgments, 
for which they have a difficult time finding a suitable explanation. For instance, Dr. I decides to 
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keep Mrs. D in the ICU despite the fact he would never consider a transfer from the medical 
floor to the ICU under similar circumstances. He prefers omission (keeping Mrs. D) to 
commission (transferring Mrs. D). In the Emergency Department, Dr. I decides against 
intubating and admitting Mrs. D to the ICU. However, he changes his mind when he finds her 
intubated. This pattern of decision-making is similar to the way people decide the morality of an 
act based on commission-omission distinction. For example, people do not have a problem with 
keeping an excess of change given for a transaction (an omission) while they would never even 
consider stealing the same amount of money (an action). Similarly, in both cases, Dr. I prefers an 
omission to an equally (or even more) beneficial act of commission.  
This chapter will discuss the role of moral heuristics in judgments about life-sustaining 
treatment in an intensive care unit. I propose that end-of-life treatment intensity on a given ICU 
can be influenced by a number of moral “rules of thumb,” or heuristics. Moral heuristics are a set 
of strong, stable, and immediate moral beliefs. These beliefs are not results of a deliberative 
process. Rather, they are fast and frugal decision, rules, or norms that produce judgments 
quickly, based on limited information.141 Most research on heuristics has been conducted by 
psychologists in the area of risk and probability estimates. This work deals not with moral 
questions but with some factual issues such as judgments of frequency, probability, and risk. For 
instance, people tend to rely too heavily on the first piece of information offered (anchoring) 
when making decisions.142 When considering the probability of events, people take a mental 
shortcut and judge the probability by the ease with which examples come to mind 
(availability).143 People assume that once they have invested time, money, or effort into 
something they should stick with it even after it has proved to be suboptimal (sunk cost bias).144 
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Similarly, when confronted with a complex moral issue, people resort to moral heuristics and 
simplify their judgments by using the familiar to judge the unfamiliar.  
Moral Heuristics 
Simon, the “father” of heuristics, defines this concept as “methods for arriving at 
satisfactory solutions with modest amounts of computation,” suggesting the utility of a heuristic 
in its potential to reduce decision-making effort.145 Kahneman and Frederick define heuristics as 
a psychological process of attribute substitution. When people have to make judgments of a 
target attribute (a process that is computationally complex), they tend to substitute it with a more 
easily calculated heuristic attribute. In other words, when someone tries to answer a difficult and 
unfamiliar question, they may actually answer a related but different question, without realizing 
that a substitution has taken place.146 Consider this puzzle: A bat and a ball cost $1.10. The bat 
costs $1 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? Most people would tend to answer 
“10 cents” because the sum of $1.10 separates naturally in $1 and 10 cents. However, the right 
answer is 5 cents. This is an example of quick associative thinking otherwise called heuristics.147 
Analogous quick thinking may occur in the process of making moral judgments. Some 
researchers suggest that the human mind was conditioned by natural selection to develop certain 
moral heuristics: decision rules that quickly produce moral judgments based on limited 
information.  
Haidt has developed this idea into the moral foundations theory, which explains the 
origins of (and variation in) moral reasoning on the basis of moral intuitions or gut feelings.148 
He was able to gather empirical evidence that demonstrated how moral judgments take place 
automatically, at least in their initial stages. In a series of studies, Haidt used hypothetical 
scenarios meant to describe actions that people will find offensive, but harmless. In one scenario, 
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a woman cuts her national flag into pieces and uses the rags to clean her toilet. In another, a 
family thoroughly cooks and eats a pet dog after a car kills it in front of their house. His 
participants often immediately concluded that the action was wrong and then began searching for 
reasons. They would mention potential harms from eating the dog or guilt from using the flag to 
clean a toilet. When the interviewer dismissed these concerns, participants would drop one 
argument and start searching for another. These study subjects would not give up on their moral 
intuitions but, rather, try to find reasons to support them. Haidt concludes his studies by claiming 
that, while conscious reasoning may have something to do with moral judgments, it does not 
play the leading role as suggested by most moral theories. Moral actions correlate more with 
moral emotions than with moral reasoning.149  
Haidt’s approach to moral judgment stands in contrast with many previous rationalist 
theories, including Kohlberg’s theory of moral development. Instead of seeing reasoning as the 
driving force behind moral judgments, Haidt suggests that reasoning is often used for post-hoc 
rationalization of already formed judgments. These judgements are formed by quick moral 
intuitions. He defines these intuitions as follows: moral intuitions are “the sudden appearance in 
consciousness, or at the fringe of consciousness, of an evaluative feeling (like - dislike, good - 
bad) about the character or actions of a person, without any conscious awareness of having gone 
through steps of search, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion.”150 Therefore, moral 
intuitions are affect-laden, fast, and automatic reactions. Where do these intuitions come from? 
According to Haidt and colleagues, moral intuitions result from six innate moral modules that 
they refer to as moral foundations. Each foundation can be labeled in positive or negative terms: 
care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and liberty/oppression.151 
Foundations have a corresponding set of moral emotions. For instance, the value of care is 
  
57 
 
associated with feelings of compassion. The value of sanctity is related to the feeling of awe or 
disgust. Haidt compares these foundations to the tongue’s five chemical taste receptors. Just as a 
human tongue has distinct receptors for sour, bitter, sweet, salty, and savory foods, human minds 
have moral receptors or capacities to respond emotionally to actions that are related to the six 
moral foundations. For example, a suffering, defenseless animal engages the moral mind’s 
care/harm receptor, producing feelings of compassion.  
A number of scholars have engaged in research on moral heuristics or decision rules that 
generate our intuitions about fairness and justice, and right and wrong. For instance, Baron 
points out that consequentialism, or utilitarianism, provides normatively correct answers to moral 
dilemmas. However, people with no philosophical training are not thinking according to these 
normative guidelines but instead use simple heuristics.152 In a number of well-controlled 
experiments, Baron and colleagues have shown that people consider harmful acts worse than 
harmful omissions with otherwise identical predictable outcomes. This group of researchers has 
also documented that people’s moral decisions are affected in a seemingly irrational way by the 
status quo or a preference for the current state of affairs. For example, this heuristic is 
responsible for the strong opposition to human enhancement, preferring the current state of 
humanity.153 Additionally, Baron has shown the difference in moral evaluations of risks or 
damages when the risk or the actual harm is manmade versus natural. The latter are more 
accepted than the former. People are generally convinced that a manmade harm could have been 
avoided by more prudent behavior.154 Sunstein has described a number of moral heuristics: do 
not knowingly cause human death, do not permit wrongdoing for a fee, punish betrayals of trust, 
and do not tamper with natural processes for biological reproduction.155 These moral heuristics 
are different from the cognitive ones. As the name suggests, moral intuitions bear moral 
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implications while cognitive heuristics do not. Facts and simple logic can be a good test of 
whether a cognitive heuristic is at work. It is more difficult to demonstrate that a moral heuristic 
is at work due to the fact that it is more difficult to agree on what constitutes a moral error. In 
addition, an assessment of accuracy for moral heuristics requires social consensus, while 
assessment of accuracy for heuristics about objective facts do not.  
Moral Heuristics in Critical Care 
ICU providers must often make a decision between “watching” and “treating.” One of the 
hallmarks of a good medical decision is considering a patient’s clinical course over time. 
Changes over time should ideally influence decisions to transfer patients out of ICUs. In one 
experiment conducted by Poses, Bekes, Copare, and Scott, the researchers asked intensivists in a 
surgical unit to estimate the probability of incoming patients’ survival until they were discharged 
from the hospital. Between 48-72 hours after admission, the physicians were then asked for a 
new estimate. The authors assumed that physicians caring for the same patient would have better 
prognostication information after having opportunities for observation and discussion and that 
doctors would take full advantage of clinical data accrued over time. However, these hypotheses 
were disproved by the study. Even when having access to considerably new information during 
the 48-72 hours after admission, physicians’ estimates showed no significant variance and were 
similar to their initial estimates.156 Such little variance in estimation can be explained by 
anchoring bias. It is logically appropriate for people to adjust their probability estimates 
whenever new information suggests that the true probability is higher or lower than they initially 
thought. However, people tend to place too much weight on their first estimates and rarely adjust 
their estimates accordingly. This is an example of a cognitive heuristic in the decision-making of 
critical care physicians. It was relatively easy to factually demonstrate the presence of this bias in 
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the clinical decision-making of physicians. All researchers needed to do was compare the pairs 
of estimates made on admission and 48-72 hours later for the same patient.  
Now, consider a scenario where a physician practicing in Oregon is asked to 
prognosticate but for a slightly different reason than recovery or hospital discharge. The patient, 
Mr. S, is in the very early stages of dementia and has authored a living will laying out the terms 
under which the dementia must have progressed for him to commit physician-assisted suicide 
(PAS, or rather, euthanasia, as he will not be able to understand the purpose of taking certain 
pills by that point). As a former university professor, Mr. S has full information about his disease 
and its progression, which has helped him to get a good sense of what it may be like to be 
demented. He has been very persistent with his request, which his family describes as a 
competent and autonomous choice.  Furthermore, the family argues that there is no difference 
between considering PAS for a terminal cancer and for the request made by Mr. S. In both cases, 
the request needs to be persistent, competent, and autonomous, while the person must be 
terminally ill. The family now asks the physician to determine whether the criteria outlined in the 
living will meet these criteria, and whether this physician can help them to fulfill the wishes of 
Mr. S. Anyone reading this case will likely have a strong intuition that the consulted physician 
should not consider Mr. S. as a candidate for PAS. However, suppose we argue based on facts 
and research that to proceed with such a request would ease the tremendous individual, familial, 
and societal burden associated with Mr. S.’s condition. The yearly cost to society of dementia is 
estimated to be one hundred billion dollars.157 Furthermore, demented people have lost the 
concept of self, or as Arras describes it, “they continue to have biological life, but their 
biographical life has come to an end.”158 Regardless of research, factual arguments, and expert 
recommendations, people would still disagree with the suggestion to consider PAS for demented 
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patients. Most will look for contra-arguments, question the validity of research data, and will 
bring additional considerations such as dignity, voluntariness, and subjectivity of suffering. 
What makes these two examples so different? The first example is supported by facts 
demonstrating that physicians often fail to consider new clinical information while making their 
survival estimates. While intuitively we assume that providers constantly update survival 
estimates during the clinical course of a patient, the facts prove otherwise. The second example 
deals with values rather than facts. We intuitively feel that PAS for dementia patients is wrong. 
The factual information is then used for post-hoc rationalization of already formed judgments. It 
is relatively easy to demonstrate the influence of cognitive heuristics on the decision-making of 
medical providers. For instance, doctors tend to overestimate the risk of addiction when 
prescribing opioid analgesics for pain relief and to undertreat severe pain as a result, falling prey 
to the availability heuristics.159 In taking medical histories, doctors often ask questions that 
acquire information confirming their early judgments, or they may stop asking questions because 
they reach early conclusions, playing into confirmation bias.160 A physician who recently missed 
the diagnosis of pulmonary embolism in a healthy young patient who had vague chest discomfort 
but no other apparent risk factors might then overestimate the risk in similar patients and overuse 
chest CT angiography. This is an example of availability heuristic.161 However, it is more 
complicated to demonstrate the influence of quick intuitive judgments when it comes to values in 
medical decision-making. There is a scarcity of research related to this topic which can likely be 
attributed to the difficulty in using facts to prove the superiority of one moral belief over the 
other (i.e., the belief that the Oregon physician should proceed with PAS for Mr. S compared to 
the belief that he should not). 
  
61 
 
The decision to limit or forgo life-sustaining therapy is one of the areas in ICU practice 
where moral heuristics can be particularly relevant. According to statistics, one in five US 
patients die during or shortly after an ICU stay.162 An ICU admission is the time when most 
decisions to forgo life-sustaining therapies are made. A number of recent studies demonstrate 
striking variability in these decisions (sixfold) even after adjusting for patient and ICU factors.163 
Ideally, these decisions should depend on the goals and preferences of families, survival 
estimates and quality of life considerations, and illness severity. However, recent research 
suggests this variability is not driven by the factors above but, rather, by decision-making norms 
deriving from hospital or ICU cultures.164 These studies call for better insight into the way 
physicians reach and convey prognostic judgments and into specific organizational factors or 
decision norms that influence decisions to forgo life-sustaining therapy. Some of these norms 
have been described. For instance, Barnato et al. have compared the norms of decision-making 
about forgoing life-sustaining treatment between two hospitals based on their treatment intensity 
(both a low-intensity and a high-intensity academic medical center in the same state and health 
care system). The researchers identified several norms that may explain the difference in ICU 
treatment intensity. While ICU staff at the low-intensity center was more concerned with 
avoiding harms of commission, the high-intensity center staff was more focused on avoiding 
harms of omission. Additionally, the research showed that the low-intensity center perceived 
life-sustaining treatment as a “bridge to something” and the high-intensity center had a more 
open-ended approach to using it. The determination of dying at the low-intensity center was 
associated with a more pronounced role of intensivists. The high-intensity center, however, had 
more disagreements about the point at which a patient would be considered as dying; thus, 
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decisions about life-sustaining therapy were often deflected to another provider, surrogates, or 
the patient.165  
Similarly, researchers from Mayo Clinic and University of Chicago studied variance in 
physicians’ judgments about the use of cost-effectiveness data to guide their clinical decisions. 
There is an implicit pressure for an intensivist to consult cost-effectiveness data prior to 
suggesting an intervention. It is assumed that doctors should use cost-containment strategies to 
balance the competing needs of individual patient versus society. However, many physicians feel 
that their duty is to advocate for their individual patients without being exclusively utilitarian in 
their clinical thinking. The study uses moral foundation theory, specifically searching for 
correlations between the harm/fairness foundation and favorable perceptions of using cost-
effectiveness data and cost-containment strategies. Harm and fairness intuitions were 
independently associated with physicians’ judgments about cost-containment (but not associated 
with their objections to using cost-effectiveness analysis in clinical practice).166 Based on the 
examples above, one can argue that although the outcomes of moral judgments in a clinical 
setting may be conscious (i.e., escalation/de-escalation of treatment, cost-effectiveness versus 
individual needs of a patient), the processing leading to these judgments often is not. Fast 
processing is necessary in complex and evolving clinical scenarios to produce suitable responses. 
At times, such processing involves unconscious integration of various cues and considerations 
into one response. Because of the moral and clinical complexity, as well as the need for a prompt 
response, doctors may not rely solely on conscious deliberation. Intuitions and moral heuristics 
can play a role in facilitating prompt and appropriate response. Some of the moral heuristics are 
discussed below. 
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The Action Factor and Commission/Omission Distinction 
Psychologists describe omission bias as the tendency to judge harmful commissions 
(actions) as worse than equally harmful omissions (inactions).167 The presence of this bias has 
been well-researched and demonstrated in various domains of decision-making, including health. 
For instance, people tend to regard death resulting from vaccination as much worse than death 
resulting from not getting a shot. Public health specialists disagree regarding the need to either 
encourage or discourage PSA tests to screen for prostate cancer, thus serving as another example 
of this omission/commission distinction.168 Furthermore, providers may evaluate the harmful 
outcome (i.e., small risk of cancer) from prescribing hormone replacement therapy for 
postmenopausal women more harshly than the harmful outcome (i.e., bone fracture) from not 
prescribing.169 There are a number of good reasons to judge the outcomes from commission as 
worse than those resulting from omissions. Omissions may be a result of ignorance, but 
commissions are usually not. Additionally, commissions may involve more malicious intents 
than omissions; commissions require more effort, that in itself being a sign of strong intentions. 
Even the law usually treats omissions and commissions differently. For example, some states 
have “bad Samaritan” laws prosecuting those who failed to help someone in need.  
Nevertheless, there are many cases that do not involve these distinctions and should be 
judged equally. Some of the critical care examples are given in the introduction section. The 
judgments made in such cases are often the moral ones. Spranca, Minsk, and Baron illustrate the 
application of omission bias to judgments of morality by using the example of a tennis player 
who is set to face a tough opponent the next day in a decisive match. This tennis player knows 
that his opponent is allergic to a specific food. The researchers asked people which is more 
immoral – the tennis player recommending the allergenic food to his opponent or the opponent 
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himself ordering the food containing the allergen while the tennis player says nothing.170 While 
people would disagree on whether these scenarios should be judged equally, there is no moral 
difference between the two choices. Similarly, in the realm of critical care, withholding and 
withdrawing care can be used as the morally equivalent example of commission/omission 
distinction. Clinicians are psychologically more comfortable withholding treatments than 
withdrawing them. However, both philosophical and legal analysis demonstrate that there is no 
relevant distinction between decisions to withhold or to withdraw.  According to the Equivalence 
Thesis, if the moral distinction between withholding and withdrawing is absent, there can be no 
cases where it would be permissible to withhold treatment, but it would not be permissible to 
withdraw the same treatment (provided the treatment had already been started, but all other 
relevant factors are equal).171  
In the ICU context, where the stakes are high, doctors tend to favor omission over 
commission because of the psychological comfort from assuming one is less at fault if a patient 
dies. When an action results in a bad outcome, it is more difficult not to assume the blame for the 
cause and effect sequence. Thus, withdrawing care is often associated with a greater sense of 
causing the patient’s death, of responsibility, and even of guilt. Providers may experience similar 
sentiments in many other ICU scenarios. Dr. David Katz, a nationally recognized preventive 
medicine specialist, shares his example from the time he was the senior resident on-call for the 
ICU. Another resident on-call asked him to assess a female patient in her late 50s with advanced 
kidney disease who was in respiratory distress and needed to be intubated and transferred to the 
ICU. The patient was rapidly declining, and both residents suspected pulmonary edema. 
However, the difference in decision-making between the two residents was striking. The on-call 
resident was hesitant to inject the potentially dangerous cocktail of reducers and morphine into a 
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patient whose kidneys didn’t work. Dr. Katz, however, reasoned that if the patient had something 
that couldn’t be fixed in a short period of time, she was going to die; thus, it was best to assume 
she had something that could be fixed quickly and give it a shot. Dr. Katz, in short, felt that the 
potential harms of injecting drugs couldn’t make the patient worse off as she was already 
dying.172  
Individual providers may differ in the way they approach the commission/omission 
distinction. However, this distinction can be observed on the level of ICUs or hospitals and be 
rooted in a specific culture. Most of the studies related to decision-making about life-sustaining 
treatment are focused on individual provider-patient/family relations, ignoring the larger context 
of ICU culture and how that culture may differ across ICUs and hospitals. One of the lessons 
from the SUPPORT study was the need to address the health care context of end-of-life 
treatment in the ICU, not just individual decisions.173 Barnato and colleagues have noticed the 
difference in treating sins of omission and sins of commission between high and low-intensity 
hospitals. The staff at the high-intensity hospital was more preoccupied with sins of omission as 
an intern explained: “You know because we have the resources, the chance that we miss 
something would just make us feel terrible. You know ‘oh we could have done that and then we 
would’ve known, and then…” However, the low-intensity ICU staff was more interested in 
avoiding harms of commission as one of the intensivists reasoned: “Sure, we could trach him, 
but what then? We can be doing more harm than good.”174 
The Intention Factor and Means to an End/End in Itself Distinction 
Almost one of every five patients in the intensive care units of a major teaching hospital 
got treatment that was futile or “probably” futile, according to the doctors who treated 
them.  Furthermore, older patients, especially those admitted from a nursing facility, were most 
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likely to get care that did nothing to improve their quality of life, or even keep them alive for 
more than a brief period of time. These are the conclusions of the study by a group of UCLA 
researchers. This study was based on a survey of 36 critical care physicians who treated 1,136 
patients over a three-month period in 2011-2012. Of those ICU patients, 11% got care that their 
doctors deemed futile, and another 9% received treatment that physicians considered probably 
futile. These patients accounted for about 7% of all ICU patient days. The cost of futile treatment 
in one hospital’s ICU was estimated to average $2.6 million over three months.175 A number of 
consecutive studies attempted to explain the factors that lead to provision of futile care. Modern 
culture overpromises what is possible at the end of life, and it impacts the doctor-patient 
relationship. On the patient’s side, there is misinformation, unrealistic expectations, and a denial 
of death. On the provider’s side, there is an enabling role in an effort to avoid the discomfort of 
talking about death and intense emotions and wishing to fulfill the patient’s or surrogate’s 
omnipotent wishes.176  
Hospital cultures may have embedded incentives or disincentives for provision of futile 
care. Some hospitals perceive ICU care as a “bridge to something” and a means to an end 
(recovery). ICUs within such hospitals would not initiate aggressive care without having a clear 
endpoint. Some other medical centers have a rather open-ended approach to the use of life-
sustaining treatment. Instead of being viewed as a mean to achieve an end (recovery), this 
treatment is often considered an end in itself.177 The means/ends distinction may represent 
another moral heuristic in decision-making processes about life-sustaining treatments. The 
philosopher Immanuel Kant has formulated this distinction as the main difference between 
deontological and utilitarian approaches to ethics. Kant’s categorical imperative states that one 
should “act so as to treat people always as ends in themselves, never as mere means.”178 In other 
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words, everyone is intrinsically valuable; we ought, therefore, to treat people as having a value 
all their own rather than merely as useful tools by means of which we can satisfy our own goals. 
This is in contrast to some interpretations of the utilitarian view, which allow for the use of 
individuals as means to benefit the many. Similarly, ICUs may approach the use of life-
sustaining treatment with the intent to use it instrumentally in some cases and open-endedly in 
some other cases.  
Consider the example of a 69-year-old patient who collapses from a massive bleed in his 
brain. The neurosurgeon observes the rising pressure in patient’s skull and inserts a 
ventriculostomy tube, while the ICU team fights to control the pressure by pushing the patient 
into a coma. There is a worsening bleed below the skull caused by trauma during the fall, so the 
patient is taken to the operating room for drainage and stays a few days on a ventilator. Within a 
week, the patient’s pressures resolve, and the ventriculostomy tube is pulled, yet his eyes remain 
closed. Family have a difficult time catching the neurosurgeon making rounds. The patient 
receives routine ICU care, contracts pneumonia that is successfully treated, and remains 
unresponsive. Three weeks after the ICU admission, the family is told not to expect improvement 
given how serious the patient’s original injury was. After so many ups and downs, the suggestion 
to withdraw care is made, and it comes across as confusing. Why all the treatments just to end up 
here? After more family meetings, a tracheostomy and feeding tube become the middle ground, 
to “give the family more time,” and placement for the patient is sought in a long-term facility.  
 The concept of “treating the family” is well-known to ICU professionals.179 As in the 
example above, this concept at times drives the provision of futile care. While ICU staff 
recognizes the priority of patients’ wishes and interests, there are times when those interests 
begin to fade while the interests of families intensify. Families will have to live through the 
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aftermath of choices they make in the ICU; therefore, honoring their wishes to provide care that 
professionals consider futile may, in fact, be an act of caring and compassion. There are families 
and patients that do not place much value in the concept of good death. It is important for them 
to believe that they have fought until the very last moment. Can it be that in those cases the 
provision of futile care is an act of compassion? One can argue that by “giving the family more 
time,” the ICU staff essentially uses the patient as a means to an end - an end unrelated to his 
own well-being. In the abstract, fighting every second of the way sounds admirable. Practically, 
however, it may be cruel and unethical. In the example above, the ICU care was used open-
endedly as a mean in itself, leading to more futile care that treated the patient as a means to help 
the family achieve psychological closure. 
Time Factor: Timing of End-of-Life Conversations and Fairness 
Wesley Autrey, a 50-year-old New York construction worker and Navy veteran, was 
waiting for the subway train in Manhattan on January 2, 2007 while taking his two little 
daughters home before work. Nearby, a man collapsed, his body convulsing. Mr. Autrey and two 
women rushed to help. The 20-year-old man managed to get up but then stumbled to the 
platform edge and fell to the tracks between the two rails. The headlights of an approaching train 
appeared, and Mr. Autrey had to make a split-second decision. Autrey thought there might be a 
chance of survival if he could keep the man still until the train passed, so he threw himself on top 
of the man and held him down in the shallow trench between the rails. The train passed over 
them with inches to spare. When asked about the reason for his action, he responded, ‘‘I just saw 
someone who needed help. I did what I felt was right’’180 Would Mr. Autrey have acted the same 
way with more time to decide? What if this story took place on the deck of the sinking Titanic, 
and Mr. Autrey had nearly three hours to deliberate on the consequences of saving his own life 
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or sacrificing himself for the lives of other more vulnerable passengers? Researchers looking 
through historical records found that the Titanic crew’s survival rate was 18% higher than that of 
the passengers’. It is possible to assume that crewmembers were acting in their own self-interest, 
taking advantage of better access to lifeboats.181  
These two examples demonstrate that the outcome of moral decisions may vary a great 
deal depending on the time that is available for their consideration. The various inherent and 
perceived differences between the near and the distant future are likely to render near future 
events more emotionally arousing than distant ones, thereby affecting any judgments or 
decisions that are based on emotion.182 Furthermore, because perceptions of fairness, ethics, and 
morality tend to be based on precisely these types of affective reactions, it is plausible to assume 
that such judgments will be relatively more extreme for events set in the near future than for 
events set in the distant future.183 The two examples above lead to the similar conclusion that 
temporal orientation could be an important factor in determining which cognitive or emotional 
processes or judgements we engage in in response to problems with moral implications. Some 
moral questions leave the possibility of contemplating them carefully while other moral 
judgements have to be made under time pressure. Therefore, temporal perspective can be a 
heuristic that alters the outcomes of moral judgements when every other aspect is held constant. 
Similarly, the timing of end-of-life conversations in an ICU may impact the moral evaluation of 
the resulting decisions.  
The temporal orientation in moral decision-making can serve as a moral heuristic, as the 
difference in judgements resulting from near and distant future perspectives is not the product of 
deliberate processing, but of quicker, more reflexive processes that are less available to 
conscious intervention. According to Greene’s dual-process theory of moral judgements,184 there 
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are two separate methods for moral reasoning: the intuitive or emotional method and the 
conscious, controlled reasoning method. In everyday decision-making, most decisions use one or 
the other system – emotional System 1 that operates on fast and frugal heuristics or deliberative 
System 2 that brings in logic and reflection. When it comes to moral dilemmas in which a person 
must compromise between violating moral rules and maximizing overall good, these systems 
come into conflict. Emotional processes trigger deontological judgments and focus on “right 
action,” whereas controlled cognitive processes tend to prompt consequentialist judgments and 
focus on “best results.” These processes do not contribute equally in all moral dilemmas since 
various dilemmas are able to engage emotions at different levels. When people consider 
decisions with consequences that are more remote in time, emotions are less engaged, and people 
tend to evaluate those decisions as morally right, just, and fair. When people are faced with 
decisions that are time-sensitive and pressing, they tend to focus on the consequences of these 
actions and the “best results,” disregarding their moral appropriateness.185  
According to recent research, the vast majority of patients with incurable cancer talk with 
a physician about their options for care at the end of life but often not until late in the course of 
their illness. The researchers found that these belated conversations tend to occur under 
particularly stressful conditions - when patients have been admitted to a hospital for critical care. 
This deprives patients of the opportunity for deliberation that would have been possible months 
earlier when the conversation could have occurred under less trying and hectic conditions, the 
authors suggest. Among the nearly 1,000 patients who passed away and whose records document 
an end-of-life discussion with a physician, the median time of those discussions was 33 days 
before death. For four out of ten patients, the discussions occurred only in the last 30 days of life. 
Nearly half of all the patients that participated in the study received aggressive care, such as 
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chemotherapy, in the last 14 days of life and acute hospital care or ICU care in the last 30 days of 
life.186 Another study documented that the timing of end-of-life conversations varies significantly 
from unit to unit and by the provider type. Decisions to limit or withhold treatment made hours 
before a patient's seemingly unavoidable death were seen as appropriate by surgeons, and 
delayed or avoided by physicians. For surgical patients, decisions were more commonly left until 
the providers thought death was imminent and inevitable, meaning no additional treatment 
interventions were deemed available.187 
Identifiability Factor: Rule of Rescue 
People often have a strong intuitive sense that we ought to rescue those in serious need, 
even in cases where we could produce better outcomes by acting in other ways. This moral 
urgency is the reason why we mount expensive searches — for sailors lost at sea, for example—
when there is little chance of finding those who are missing. Given that these searches are 
expensive, and the chance of success is negligible, logically we would be better off spending this 
money for a more important cause. This intuition is the reason why we offer critically ill patients 
intensive care even when the prognosis is terrible. This rescue heuristic is also the reason why 
some patients receive a second or third heart or liver transplant even though first-time recipients 
have a higher one-year survival rate.188 Jones coined the term “rule of rescue” to describe the 
imperative we feel to rescue identifiable individuals facing avoidable death, without giving too 
much thought to the opportunity cost of doing so. He writes about it as follows: “Our moral 
response to the imminence of death demands that we rescue the doomed. We throw a rope to the 
drowning, rush into burning buildings to snatch the entrapped, dispatch teams to search for the 
snowbound. This rescue morality spills over into medical care, where our ropes are artificial 
hearts, our rush is the mobile critical care unit, our teams the transplant services.”189  
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The influence of the rescue heuristic was observed in laboratory conditions. For instance, 
researchers asked one group of study participants how much money they would give to help 
develop a drug that would save the life of one child and asked the other group how much they 
would give to save eight children. The answers were about the same. But when researchers told a 
third group a child’s name and age, and showed her picture, the donations shot up—now there 
were far more to the one than to the eight.190 While charities struggle to raise money to feed the 
thousands of starving children in third world countries, stories of a single victim capture the 
attention of the masses. In 1987, one child, ‘‘Baby Jessica,’’ received over $700,000 in donations 
from the public when she fell in a well near her home in Texas.191 Similarly, the plight of a 
wounded Iraqi boy, Ali Abbas, captivated the news media in Europe during the Iraq conflict, and 
£275,000 was quickly raised for his medical care.192 In another case, more than $48,000 was 
contributed to save a dog stranded on a ship adrift in the Pacific Ocean near Hawaii.193 These 
stories seem to share a number of characteristics: an easily identifiable victim, acutely impending 
death, a reasonable chance of effective rescue, acceptable costs to those involved, and 
exceptionality of occurrence.194  
Critical care is a specialty designed to save immediately threatened identifiable lives. 
ICU providers are often faced with distressed people and, triggered by empathy, they feel the 
urge to alleviate their distress. However, this impulse to save identifiable lives runs against the 
need to limit futile care in the ICU. Rationing of health interventions provided in the ICU is 
necessary and unavoidable. Many ethical quandaries arise when a treatment is needed but is not 
cost-effective. While it might be reasonable to forgo an expensive, marginally effective, and 
significantly burdensome treatment, the strong pull of the rule of rescue leads physicians and 
patients to believe otherwise. Thomas Schelling describes this phenomenon as follows: “Let a 
  
73 
 
six-year-old girl with brown hair need thousands of dollars for an operation that will prolong her 
life until Christmas, and the post office will be swamped with nickels and dimes to save her. But 
let it be reported that without a sale tax the hospital facilities of Massachusetts will deteriorate 
and cause a barely perceptible increase in preventable deaths—not many will drop a tear or reach 
for their checkbooks.”195 
Rule of rescue represents a moral heuristic. While rule of rescue gives rise to “good 
Samaritan” behavior, which is highly praised in many moral traditions, it can also lead to 
systematic moral errors. In the case of “Baby Jessica,” whose family received over $700,000 in 
donations, one could argue that if those donations had instead been spent on preventative care for 
children, hundreds of lives could potentially have been saved. There are a number of potential 
drivers for this heuristic. Identifiable victims stimulate a more powerful emotional response than 
do statistical victims, thus appealing to System 1 versus System 2 processing. Moreover, 
identifiable victims are guaranteed victims, whereas statistical victims are, by definition, 
probabilistic. Decision-making research suggests that people are loss-averse—they dislike losses 
much more than they like equivalent valued gains. If saving a statistical life is seen as a gain, but 
saving an identified victim is seen as avoiding a loss, people will then place greater value on 
identified victims than on statistical ones. People engage in retrospective thinking while 
considering the needs of an identifiable victim, while the needs of statistical victims are 
prospective. People feel more responsible for retrospective events as compared to the tragedies 
that might occur. Finally, people feel greater concern toward victims as the reference group they 
are part of grows smaller. The more disperse the risk among the population is, the less disturbing 
the risk becomes in people’s eyes.196  
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Naturalness Factor: Preference for Natural Death 
Throughout history, people have tried to reduce the risks imposed by nature. Antibiotics, 
vaccines, and many treatments have been celebrated as triumphs against nature’s forces. 
However, lately, people have begun to associate naturalness with reduced risk. The food industry 
is the most prominent illustration of this trend: it is almost impossible to take a trip to the grocery 
store without noticing labels like “all natural,” “organic,” or “non-GMO.” Sales of organic food 
in the United States increased at a rate of 20% or more annually between 1990 and 2002.197 This 
preference for natural things influences medical decisions. For instance, obstetricians and 
gynecologists who showed preference for natural over identical synthetic hormones also held 
more negative attitudes toward hormone replacement therapy, considering it an “unnatural” 
intervention whose overall benefits outweigh risks. Similarly, the preference for a natural remedy 
over an identical synthesized medicine was negatively associated with attitudes and behaviors 
toward the influenza vaccine.198 According to Rozin et al., there are two types of justifications 
for “natural preference”: instrumental and ideational. Instrumental reasons refer to the specific 
advantages of natural products: they are more appealing, healthier, and/or kinder to the 
environment. Ideational reasons refer to the belief that natural is inherently better in a moral 
sense. This moral heuristic is often at work when people assess the risks of particular treatments 
or interventions.199  
Lowenstein and colleagues suggested that people confront and deal with risk in two 
different ways. Risk as feelings refers to our intuitive, fast, mostly automatic reactions to danger. 
Risk as analysis brings logic, reason, and scientific deliberation to bear on risk assessment and 
management. This type of risk assessment is sensitive to changes in probabilities as it objectively 
weighs costs and benefits according to their probabilities. People rarely assess risk in an 
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analytical way and rely on feelings elicited by potential costs and benefits, independent of 
probabilities.200 This approach to risk assessment goes in line with affect heuristic. According to 
this heuristic, we automatically assign good and bad labels to items or events. “Good” events 
elicit positive affect and are seen as beneficial and safe, while “bad” items elicit negative affect 
and are seen as riskier and less beneficial. Given the fact that natural items are often perceived as 
good, they will likely elicit positive affect. Therefore, they are often perceived as having high 
benefit and low risk. A number of studies confirmed this correlation between low risk and high 
benefit for natural relative to artificial items. People perceived a high level of riskiness for 
genetically modified foods or animals, forms of energy, or chemicals.201 Similarly, people are 
usually more upset when an emergency is caused by humans as opposed to some natural 
events.202  
The futility conversations and end-of-life choices in the ICU are often centered around 
the concept of good death.  Within the context of end-of-life care, a good death is a natural death. 
Technology and treatment become the obstacles that stand in the way of reaching this good 
death. A good death is the one without machines, tubes, and lines. It is believed to be more 
dignified and aesthetically pleasing. It is also considered to be more dignified as the body is no 
longer surrounded by noisy and invasive equipment making its humanity and dignity less 
recognizable. The presence of life-sustaining equipment often increases the sense of patients’ 
dependency and vulnerability, while the withdrawal of invasive treatment is often presented by 
the care team as restoring patient dignity. Additionally, natural death is often presented as though 
it happens in its own time, according to nature’s course. On the other hand, due to its suddenness 
and unresponsiveness to technological intervention, natural death can also be viewed as 
uncontained, random, and uncontrollable. Thus, the ICU care team often has to navigate the 
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meaning of the natural death in a way that would help decision-makers feel better about their 
difficult choices.203  
Many end-of-life disputes and disagreements arise from the determination about those 
responsible for causing death when medical treatment is unsuccessful, which makes it an 
important moral issue. There is a tension between the concept of natural death, which attributes 
death to patients’ bodies, and hastening death through withholding or withdrawing treatment, 
which attributes death to intensivists. Therefore, natural death becomes a moral heuristic, 
determining causation and attribution in end-of-life choices. Some physicians may attempt to 
avoid this causation by engaging in gradual withdrawal of life support in order to mimic the 
natural decline and death. If life support is removed rather abruptly, then death will follow, and 
the ICU staff will be perceived as guilty of causation. In order to support the grieving family, 
physicians often will balance medical action with inaction, gradually reducing dependence on 
mechanical ventilation and allowing for a diffusion of responsibility for death to the patient’s 
body. The patient’s body is then described as no longer being able to take advantage of the 
technology, and through this gradual process is given permission to die, which shifts the 
responsibility for death away from the physician.204 This is also the reason why researchers have 
begun to advocate for a change in language in “do not resuscitate” DNR forms. These proposals 
have instead called for “allow natural death” (or AND) forms. While the language of “do not 
resuscitate” invokes the image of abandonment and places guilt on the surrogate and care team, 
the language of natural death invokes the image of dignified death and places responsibility for 
dying on the patient’s frail body.205 
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Agency Factor: Decision Ownership 
A large body of research in a variety of fields stresses the important influence of 
ownership on human motivation, attitudes, and behavior. The state of ownership promotes 
feelings of responsibility or stewardship, increases willingness to assume personal risk or make 
personal sacrifice, and enhances self-image.206 People may experience feelings of possession in 
the absence of formal claims of ownership, and they can feel ownership toward non-physical 
objects such as ideas or artistic creations.207 Building on these observations, it is possible to 
assume that decision ownership amongst critical care providers can serve as a moral heuristic 
when it comes to treatment decisions. When a physician has a sense of decision ownership, they 
then become personally invested in clinical decisions made for their patients. Decision 
ownership is the cognitive-affective phenomenon in which a medical practitioner develops a 
sense of responsibility over decisions about care for a particular patient and personal investment 
in this decision-making process. The possessive nature of medical decision ownership 
differentiates it from other similar attitudes such as responsibility or commitment.208 
As a cognitive-affective state, decision ownership includes both intellectual and 
emotional components. The state of ownership reflects personal thoughts and beliefs regarding a 
particular decision (cognitive), as well as feelings of efficacy and competence (emotional).209 On 
the cognitive level, a provider will feel invested in the decisions they make in care for a patient. 
The provider will not see him or herself as just a medication prescriber but will be actively 
involved in all aspects of patient care being thorough, proactive, and responsible. This 
assumption of responsibility for a decision may lead to feelings of ownership as a result of one’s 
self-investment in it (time to discern, energy, care, concern). On the affective level, a resident 
may feel an affective connection between self and the treatment decisions made in a particular 
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case (“this is MY decision” or “that was MY idea”). Similar statements (“this is MY decision”) 
include both affective and cognitive information based on factual beliefs and affective 
judgments. The psychology of possession describes three criteria to develop ownership – the 
need to be in control (efficacy), the opportunity to know the target of ownership intimately 
(familiarity), and the investment of personal time, energy, and effort (self-investment).210 There 
is a causal relationship between the amount of control a provider has over a particular clinical 
case and the degree of decision ownership in that case. Furthermore, the longer a provider knows 
the patient and the deeper the relationship between them, the greater the degree of decision 
ownership that will be manifested by that physician. Finally, the more a physician invests 
himself or herself into a clinical case by investing their time, ideas, and 
psychological/intellectual energy, the more they feel ownership over decisions resulting from 
this investment.  
Unfortunately, the opportunity to foster ownership of decisions in patient care is not 
readily available in the context of ICU care. According to a number of recent studies and 
statistics, there is a nationwide shortage of intensive care providers.211 As ICU bed utilization, 
acuity of illness, complexity of care, and associated costs continue to rise, critical care providers 
are increasingly needed and sought after. Research shows that the presence of intensivists on 
ICU units can reduce the mortality rate by 40%.212 Currently, the death rates for patients 
admitted to the ICU average 10-20% in most hospitals. More than 200,000 patients die in US 
ICUs each year.213 A recent meta-analysis demonstrated that with full implementation of 24/7 
coverage of ICUs by a trained intensivist, at least 53,850 lives could be saved annually.214 
However, more than half of the nation’s ICUs have no intensivist coverage whatsoever, and 
high-intensity coverage is present in a mere 26% of ICUs.215 The staffing pattern is even worse 
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in medical ICUs and, more so, in smaller non-teaching hospitals. In the midst of these shortages, 
the critical care environment has become increasingly more stressful with high levels of 
shiftwork occurring among various providers. ICUs may employ only one or two full-time 
providers who develop and run the department and a larger group of workers who come, treat 
patients, and leave. This fragmentation results in the loss of patient continuity.  
Lack of ownership induced by the shiftwork mentality in critical care may foster 
diffusion of responsibility. Diffusion of responsibility refers to the observation that the mere 
presence of other people in a situation makes one feel less personally responsible for the events 
that occur in that situation.216 Analogously, if an unidentified provider will take over their patient 
tomorrow, an intensivist or a hospitalist currently covering that ICU may reason not to invest in 
their decisions as much as they would if they were following the case. They may not be 
motivated to do their best and will tend to shift their responsibility onto some unspecified 
“other.” In the current system of shortages, providers may find themselves as unwitting 
bystanders whose decisions have no identifiable beginning, middle and end. Instead, they have to 
decide in an evolutionary manner, not knowing who else will be involved in this decision later 
and owning just a small part of the decision process. Decreased ownership may also lead 
providers to focus on short-term benefits and disregard future losses.217 In some treatment 
situations, the course of action that is most desirable over the long run may not be the best course 
of action in the short term. The immediate relevance of short-term treatment decisions is often 
necessarily prioritized in patient care, even though future-oriented thinking is an important 
characteristic of optimal treatment choices. 
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Organizational Culture as the Origin of Moral Heuristics 
Moral intuitionist theories suggest that moral heuristics are influenced by the social and 
organizational context in which they occur. Moral choices are often embedded in contexts such 
as a situation framed with a certain kind of language that compels decision makers toward more 
or less intuitive approaches to moral judgment. The nature of moral intuitions themselves also 
reflect social influences. In the social intuition model of Haidt and colleagues, moral intuitions 
both (a) develop at a cultural/societal level as a kind of evolutionary solution to problems of 
cooperation and coordination and (b) bevelop in specific ways within any given individual 
from the mix of social influences to which that individual is exposed.218 Haidt gives several 
examples about the way motivated reasoning may shape our moral intuitions and judgements. He 
starts with the notion of “post-hoc reasoning,” or the idea that moral reasoning typically occurs 
after a moral judgment is made and that it involves a post hoc search for arguments to support 
that judgment. In other words, this search does not lead us to the moral judgement but instead 
follows from it. Post-hoc reasoning may stem from our desire for harmony and agreement with 
others. According to Haidt, “it would be strange if our moral judgment machinery was designed 
principally for accuracy, with no concern for the disastrous effects of periodically siding with our 
enemies and against our friends.”219 Similarly, our moral judgements may often be based in the 
desire to avoid or resolve cognitive dissonance. We often reason defensively, seeking to align 
beliefs and behavior in an integrated and consistent self-image. 
 Organizational culture helps to determine what is considered morally right or wrong, 
acceptable or unacceptable in an organization. Similarly, hospital culture may determine when 
and what kind of moral heuristics are used in making end-of-life decisions. According to recent 
research, there is substantial variation in end-of-life intensive care and life-sustaining treatment 
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use between hospitals. At the hospital level, norms of practice may influence these treatment 
decisions. For instance, in the abovementioned study conducted by Barnato and colleagues, 
researchers found differences in physician practice patterns and institutional norms associated 
with life-sustaining treatment use and ICU length of stay. The low-intensity center had a close-
knit culture with strong social norms. The levels of social persuasion that form moral norms and 
intuitions were high in that setting.220 People loved to talk about moral questions and 
communicate their moral judgements to others in an effort to reach some consensus on the moral 
norms. Therefore, the formation of moral intuitions in this setting likely was an adaptive process 
that aligns with people’s desire to fit in and belong. Moral judgements in such settings are not a 
single act occurring within a single person but an ongoing process that happens over time and 
involves many people. On the other hand, the high-intensity hospital had higher volumes of 
patients and higher patient case mix index due to the institution’s status as a referral center that 
attracts patients needing treatment other hospitals would not provide. The complexity of cases, 
need for faster decision-making, and high levels of cognitive load dictated moral norms in this 
institution.  
Cognitive load may contribute to a higher reliance on moral heuristics. By cognitive load, 
I mean the level of mental activity that takes up one’s cognitive bandwidth.221 A provider may 
have higher levels of cognitive load with an increase in the number of competing mental tasks, 
the complexity of a task at hand, the psychological state he is in (eg., fatigue), or environmental 
factors (such as noise or presence of others). Researchers found that, on average, a hospitalist 
deals with three problems per patient visit. The number of problems rises with chronic diseases 
or physician’s specialty.222 Intensivists are working under very high levels of cognitive load as 
they deal with multiple uncertainties while handling several problems simultaneously. It is 
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estimated that physicians have about eight unanswered questions for every ten patient visits.223 
The need for physicians to cope with a wide range of problems leads to high cognitive load and 
reliance on moral heuristics. In this context, cognitive load is perceived as a quantity that varies 
(how much one’s bandwidth is tasked) rather than a state that is either present or absent. It is 
possible to assume that under greater levels of cognitive load, the providers’ medical decisions 
will be more likely to be influenced by moral heuristics. In order to better understand the 
interrelatedness of cognitive load and moral heuristics, it is important to consider this connection 
from the point of dual process cognition, in which System 1 and System 2 processes handle 
different types of mental activity. System 1 processes are relatively effortless, can occur outside 
of consciousness and without intent, and are not disrupted under high levels of cognitive load. 
System 2 processes involve intentional, conscious, and effortful thought. High levels of cognitive 
load can interrupt or impair these processes by “taking up” the necessary cognitive resources.  
Certain features of the healthcare environment may increase cognitive load and reliance 
on moral heuristics. In the domain of medical care, a number of mental processes become 
spontaneous and effortless with training. Physicians are able to diagnose a variety of disorders 
automatically when a patient’s symptoms match previously observed patterns of symptoms. This 
is similar to driving a car. A novice driver relies more on System 2 processes, paying attention to 
steering and breaking. An experienced driver relies more on System 1 processes unless they are 
in a situation where they need to focus and pay more attention. Similar to an experienced driver, 
a physician should be able to shift from System 1 to System 2 processes when a clinical case 
becomes more complex. However, under cognitive load, her ability to switch can be 
compromised, resulting in poorer care. This is likely to happen more often in a teaching hospital 
since fatigue, work stress, and emotional exhaustion continue to remain high among residents 
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even after new work hour regulations.224 Moreover, research shows that the mere presence of 
others in a situation (in this case interns) may influence a physician’s moral judgements. We look 
to others for cues to interpret the meaning of a situation, especially when it is ambiguous.225  
 Increases in cognitive load correlate with increases in patient case mix index. An increase 
in case mix index means that physicians are seeing sicker patients with more complex needs. A 
number of studies report that the level of case difficulty influences diagnostic reasoning and 
accuracy in physician decision-making. Case complexity refers to features of a patient’s history 
that affect cognitive load during decision-making such as number of comorbidities, number of 
potential alternatives during differential diagnostic process or when considering a variety of 
treatments, and time constraints imposed on the task.226 In his pioneering work, Woods suggests 
that the complexity of a task can be evaluated according to component complexity, coordinative 
complexity, and dynamic complexity. Component complexity represents the number of cognitive 
tasks that need to be executed to arrive at a decision as well as the number of information cues 
that must to be processed during this decision-making process. Coordinative complexity refers to 
the number of alternatives that need to be considered. For example, a treatment decision for a 
patient on a ventilator with multi-organ failure has higher coordinative complexity than the same 
task for a patient with uncomplicated mild infection in general practice. Dynamic complexity 
reflects the speed of changes in a patient’s condition or clinical evidence. Each of these three 
components are higher in critical care than in any other specialty, leading to high cognitive load 
and a reliance on moral heuristics.227  
 Finally, certain clinical environments characterized by a higher level of shiftwork and a 
lower level of decision ownership will result in a reliance on moral heuristics. As a patient 
moves among specialized services within a hospital, and as shifts of providers come and go, 
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there are numerous episodes in which control of, or responsibility for, the patient passes from 
one health professional to another. Lack of decision ownership results in a diffusion of 
responsibility among providers. This shiftwork mentality may also lead a provider to prioritize 
short-term gains over long-term consequences. Within short horizons of decision-making, the 
treatment decision-making process of a provider may be focused on short-term benefits, 
increasing the likelihood that this physician may disregard potential negative outcomes that 
another provider may manage days or months later in the course of the patient’s treatment.228 
Finally, during their shifts, providers make more isolated decisions and are unlikely to have the 
opportunity to make interrelated choices in the ongoing care of a patient. Isolated decisions are 
problematic because their consequences can rarely be fully appreciated. When a physician makes 
these choices without thinking about their cumulative effects, that physician may make a number 
of apparently good choices which will collectively lead to a bad outcome. Isolated decisions 
made under the shiftwork mentality may lead to greater risk-seeking behavior. Therefore, an 
environment characterized by continuity and reduced shiftwork will decrease physicians’ 
reliance on moral heuristics and will improve the overall quality of treatment decisions.229  
Conclusion 
 From both a medical and ethical standpoint, the ICU is one of the most taxing clinical 
settings in a hospital. Given the complexity of ICU medical treatments, the fragility of the 
patients therein, and the sheer volume of patient indications to consider, physicians are often 
required to make difficult decisions quickly. The question can then be posed: with life-sustaining 
ICU care being so multifaceted and complex, how do medical professional make judgments in 
these settings in an efficient and timely manner? The answer, simply put, is via moral heuristics.  
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 In this chapter, I suggest that in the ICU, physicians utilize a number of moral heuristics 
(or “rules of thumb”) to create a framework of strong, stable, and immediate moral beliefs that 
afford clinicians the ability to produce judgments quickly based on limited information. These 
heuristics are not the result of a deliberative process but exist as fast and frugal, subconsciously 
derived decisional rules for the ICU setting. In short, intensivists, when faced with complex 
clinical and moral problems, utilize moral heuristics to simplify the decision-making process by 
using the familiar to judge the unfamiliar.  
 I described six moral heuristics frequently used by doctors in the ICU. The first heuristic 
is called the action factor, and relates to the commission/omission distinction. This heuristic 
causes ICU physicians to judge harmful commissions (actions) as worse than equally harmful 
omissions (inactions). Thus, to an ICU intensivist, it is worse to have a patient die from a 
withdrawing a treatment than to have a patient die from not having a treatment started. The next 
heuristic is the means to an end/end in itself distinction. Here, physicians will make judgments 
one way or another based on how they view the role of a treatment; meaning, whether or not the 
ICU treatment is viewed as helping to facilitate further progress or is simply buying time 
becomes an important distinction. The third heuristic is the time factor. In this case, the temporal 
perspective of an ICU case can result in physicians using different cognitive tools to make 
decisions. Decisions that are time-sensitive and need immediate action are processed through a 
lens of emotional consideration and are focused on achieving the “right action.” Decisions that 
can be processed over longer periods of time, however, are viewed through a lens of more 
objective cognitive reasoning, and tend to be framed in the context of bringing about the “best 
results.” The fourth heuristic is the rule of rescue. Physicians often have a strong intuitive sense 
that they must act to save patients who they have identified to be in serious need, even in cases 
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where better outcomes could be reached by acting in other ways. That is to say, ICU physicians 
might be more inclined to go to drastic measures to save a patient they know is sick than to 
consider how this use of time and resources might otherwise be used. The penultimate heuristic 
is the preference for natural death. This heuristic is directly tied to our current societal belief that 
natural is better; meaning, a physician might decide that it’s better for a patient to pass without 
the use of tubes, machines, and drastic technological and mechanical support. The final heuristic 
is the decision ownership. This concept states that as medical practitioners invest themselves into 
a clinical case, they feel ownership over decisions resulting from the investment. Thus, a 
clinician might be less inclined to fully apply themselves to a case they have been recently 
assigned to or only have passing oversight on.  
 It should be noted that while these moral heuristics help make ICU intensivists’ decision-
making processes quicker and easier, this does not mean that they help guarantee well-thought 
out, moral outcomes. Indeed, heuristics such as those mentioned above might actually often 
bring about medically futile or inappropriate treatments, rather than help ensure ethical and 
medically-sound outcomes. This discrepancy is due to the fact that these heuristics typically 
allow physicians to make immediate, gut judgments, which can then be validated via post-hoc 
rationalization. Moral heuristics such as those discussed in this chapter will always play a role in 
medical decision-making, for better or for worse. Further study into this topic could help 
elucidate ways in which to train ICU physicians how to avoid harmful moral heuristics. Further 
study could also help medical settings develop hospital cultures that afford physicians adequate 
resources (like time and support) which can in turn better guarantee that patients will receive 
moral and medically appropriate treatments.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
UNCERTAINTY COMMUNICATION AND LIMITS OF DISCLOSURE 
Introduction 
Dr. Feng cleared her schedule for the rest of the afternoon in order to have some extra 
time to discuss biopsy results with Ms. Reid. There was a chance that the lump on her neck 
might be cancerous. During their conversation, Dr. Feng informed Ms. Reid that the pathology 
results from the thyroid nodule aspiration are unclear. Some of the cells raised a concern about 
possible malignancy. Dr. Feng presented two potential options – repeating the aspiration or 
removing a part of the thyroid. “Is this a big surgery? Do I have to stay in the hospital?” Ms. 
Reid asked. With her job as a teacher and her kids, an inpatient stay would be difficult. “No, it’s 
a day surgery, and one I do routinely. The complications we might see are mainly bleeding and 
infection. We can control bleeding by cauterizing blood vessels or tying them off, and if there are 
signs of infection, like if the wound becomes red or if you develop a fever, we will start you on 
an antibiotic. There is always a slight risk of injuring a nerve to your vocal cord, but this 
complication is rare,” responded Dr. Feng. Ms. Reid said she would prefer surgery. The surgery 
was scheduled to take place in a few days, and it went as planned. However, only days after the 
surgery, Ms. Reid came in for an emergency appointment with Dr. Feng. It was obvious that she 
was irate, but her voice could barely be heard above the noise of the clinic. “I thought you said 
this was rare,” she said, shaking a printout of a journal article on the subject. “My recurrent 
laryngeal nerve was injured. I’m a teacher, and I have children! I need my voice. I would have 
never done the surgery if I knew there was a three percent risk that I would lose my voice!” Was 
Dr. Feng negligent in explaining the risks of surgery to Ms. Reid?  
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A similar question was raised in the landmark decision Canterbury v. Spence. In this 
case, 19-year-old patient Jerry Canterbury underwent surgical laminectomy performed by 
neurosurgeon William Spence. However, the day after the procedure, Canterbury fell out of bed 
and became paralyzed from the waist down. Spence re-operated to relieve pressure on the spinal 
cord, restoring most motor function, but Canterbury had enduring bowel and bladder 
dysfunction, necessitating a penile clamp. This incident took place in 1959, and the meaning of 
informed consent was not necessarily clear. Canterbury later sued, claiming Spence hadn't 
adequately informed him of the risk of paralysis. Spence argued that he had followed the 
community standard for disclosure, and the district court agreed. Nevertheless, the court deciding 
Canterbury's appeal ruled that, “True consent… is the informed exercise of a choice, and that 
entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options available and the risks attendant 
upon each.”230 
This court ruling established two principles applicable to medical decisions today: 
consent is not merely the granting of permission but an exercise in choosing, and choice requires 
disclosure of a certain amount of information. However, the question remains: how much 
information is adequate? Apparently, as much as necessary for a patient to decide: “The scope of 
the physician's communications to the patient must be measured by the patient's need, and that 
need is whatever information is material to the decision.”231 Modern medicine is guided by the 
principle that more information is always better. Providers expect their patients to be empowered 
with medical facts in order to make wise choices about treatments, but are there situations in 
which more information is, in fact, detrimental to a decision? 
In the context of critical care, patients must deal with multiple sources of uncertainty 
when facing treatment options involving two or more rational alternatives. When deciding 
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between alternatives, they often need to consider the potential for long-term and delayed effects 
of each treatment. Some of these delayed effects can be ambiguous and may not even be 
attributed to the treatment itself according to the available literature.  
Consider a conversation that a Dr. L. needs to have with her patient about two 
comparable choices of treatment. Given the specifics of the patient’s conditions, Dr. L. knows 
that one treatment choice is superior and more efficacious, but the literature describes negligible 
and ambiguous risks that may not even be directly attributed to this particular treatment. Dr. L. 
also knows that disclosure of these ambiguous risks will likely sway her patient’s decision. 
Compared to known probabilities, people have a preference against options involving ambiguous 
risk and respond to ambiguity by forming pessimistic judgments of risk (ambiguity aversion). 
Research shows that perceptions of ambiguity are associated with fatalistic perceptions about 
treatment choices, and the communication of ambiguity regarding the effectiveness of health-
protective measures makes people less willing to adopt them.232  
In this chapter, I would like to discuss ethical questions that Dr. L may ask herself, 
namely – are there ethical limits to the disclosure of ambiguous risks? In other words, is it ever 
ethical to refrain from the disclosure of ambiguous risks in order to ensure that patients will 
make the best choices for themselves? Might there be such a thing in medicine as too much 
information? Finally, if we recognize that possession of information carries trade-offs, are there 
situations when the “totality of evidence” may increase the patient’s autonomy but reduce his  
welfare?  
In order to answer these questions, I will first consider the implications of shared 
decision-making and whether this approach will be successful in facilitating informed decisions. 
According to shared decision-making, under conditions of ‘equipoise’ – when the evidence 
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supporting a treatment is limited by scientific uncertainty – the patient’s values and preferences 
should be the determining factor in decision-making. However, the science of decision-making 
brings into question the assumption that patients hold stable values and preferences. Research 
shows that patients instead construct values and preferences in the moment of decision-making 
based on the available cues. This understanding may change our approach to the disclosure of 
information.  
Shared Decision-making and Uncertainty 
Shared Decision-making (SDM) is an approach to clinical decisions in which patient and 
clinician work together to reach a mutually agreed-upon decision that is consistent with the best 
available evidence, as well as patient’s preferences.233 The SDM concept evolved from the legal 
doctrine of informed consent, which legally binds a physician to provide the patient with salient 
information regarding the proposed treatment in order to obtain authorization from the patient. 
Generally, the patient must be provided information regarding treatment benefits, risks, and 
alternatives, though the depth of information disclosure required varies by jurisdiction. In some 
states, physicians are obligated to provide an amount of detail that is similar to what most other 
physicians would provide (this is called the “professional standard”). In other states, physicians 
are held to a more patient-centered standard and are required to provide the amount of 
information that the typical patient would want (the so-called reasonable person standard).234 
Neither standard explains precisely how a physician should decide what a reasonable person 
would want to be told. Disclosure may vary depending on the unusualness of the procedure and 
the probability of the outcome. The physician must judge whether to address all conceivable 
risks, just the most common risks, or only the most important risks. For example, in sports 
medicine, one can discuss the global level of risk from playing football (including injury, 
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medical cost, and time lost from study or work) or a specific outcome (such as muscle aches, 
knee injuries, or deaths). The former approach has been called a thick conception of risk, or a 
conception that comprises all conceivable harms, while the latter approach has been called a thin 
conception of risk, focusing only on the most common and immediate harms.235 
The difficulty in deciding the amount of risks needed to be disclosed in end-of-life 
decision-making can be illustrated by the case of 43-year-old Miklos Arato, who was diagnosed 
with pancreatic cancer during a nephrectomy. The surgeon who incidentally discovered and 
resected the tumor and the oncologist who administered chemotherapy were not asked for and 
did not volunteer to share a specific statistical estimate of prognosis. Testimony from his 
physicians suggests that Mr. Arato was told that most victims of pancreatic cancer die of the 
disease and that he was at great risk of recurrence and death. The tumor recurred, and Mr. Arato 
died one year after diagnosis. His family sued the surgeon and oncologists, claiming that they 
had violated California’s informed consent doctrine because Mr. Arato was not told that 95% of 
people with pancreatic cancer die within five years. Ultimately, the Supreme Court decided in 
favor of the physicians, affirming the trial judge’s verdict. They argued that it was “unwise to 
require as a matter of law that a particular species of information be disclosed;” however, they 
emphasized that in declining to endorse the mandatory disclosure of life expectancy 
probabilities, they did not mean to signal a retreat from the patient-based standard of 
disclosure.236 This case demonstrates that different patients and their families will want different 
amounts and different kinds of information for their decision-making to be adequately informed. 
Moreover, it is impossible for care providers to strive to provide every potentially meaningful 
piece of information, as the list of facts can be unreasonably long and even attempts to be 
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reasonably inclusive would over-burden most patients. However, excluding items that seem 
irrelevant to the clinicians will almost certainly leave some patients inadequately informed. 
To engage in SDM, clinicians must help patients understand that there is a decision to be 
made, describe available options (including risks, benefits, and uncertainties associated with 
available options), elicit patients’ preferences about probable outcomes of options, and work 
together to establish a next step in the decision-making process.237 SDM is typically described as 
most appropriate for decisions that are considered “preference-sensitive,” where there is 
equipoise between treatment options with equal or similar outcomes from a medical standpoint. 
In these situations, patients’ preferences for the possible risks, benefits, and trade-offs between 
options are central to the decision. Most of the professional guidelines and best practices for 
SDM describe the following six steps that should occur during a SDM process regarding 
preference-sensitive medical decisions: the provider should invite the patient to participate, they 
should present options, they should discuss information on benefits and risks for each option, 
they need to elicit the patient’s preferences for good and bad outcomes, they must facilitate 
deliberation and decision-making, and finally, they must assist with implementation of the 
decision.238 It can be argued that uncertainty poses a special set of difficulties for each step of the 
shared decision-making process.  
Invitation to participate in the decision-making process. This step can be affected by 
providers’ perceptions about their patients, and the effort to engage patients in the decision-
making process may vary accordingly. There is a growing body of research showing that the 
level of physician involvement in decision-making may vary according to physician’s perception 
of how much uncertainty their patients will be able to tolerate. Physicians who perceive their 
patients to be averse to uncertainty may opt to forgo SDM, yet at times this may be in the best 
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interest of the patient.239 These paternalistic attitudes related to patient participation in decision-
making seem to be counterproductive because they preclude giving patients the opportunity to 
react to uncertainty and may only increase their worries. The fact that physicians are unlikely to 
engage patients in the decision-making process when they think that their patients would have a 
difficult time coping with uncertainty may be a projection of the physician’s own discomfort. 
One may question whether physicians’ perceptions represent an accurate assessment of their 
patients’ attitudes. Providers may simply project their own attitude towards uncertainty onto their 
patients. A long line of research suggests that when information about another person’s state, 
mood, or attitude is unknown, the perceiver’s judgement is likely to drive behavior. Power 
differential is a psychological concept used to explain a disparity of relational power that arises 
because of a patient’s vulnerability.240 Some compare this concept to a parent/child relationship 
where physicians may be unnecessarily protective and form inaccurate perceptions of patients’ 
reactions to uncertain information.  
Presentation of options. Providers are often hesitant to communicate uncertainty to 
patients, despite the prevalence of uncertainty in medical decisions. A recent summary reported 
that nearly half (47%) of all treatments for clinical prevention were of unknown effectiveness, 
and an additional 7% involved an uncertain tradeoff between benefits and harms.241 Despite this 
high incidence of situations where uncertainty needs to be discussed, the majority of providers 
have not been trained to manage uncertainty and display confidence to their patients, with 
limited or no disclosure of uncertain risks. The lack of communication about uncertainty is 
demonstrated in a study that analyzed 1057 clinical encounters by primary care physicians and 
surgeons. Researchers found that only 16% to 18% of discussions met the minimum criteria for 
an informed decision. This study also found that a discussion of uncertainty about risks and 
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benefits of treatment was done only 1% of the time for basic decisions, 6% for intermediate 
decisions, and 17% for complex decisions.242  
What are some of the reasons for such inadequate communication of uncertain risks? The 
reasons for withholding information on uncertain and ambiguous risks can be divided into 
patient-related and provider-related reasons. Providers may often doubt that conveying 
information related to ambiguous risks will serve a useful purpose because many patients do not 
understand the concept of risk and because patients have a poor memory of the disclosed 
information. Indeed, some patients might experience cognitive or emotional burden from 
overwhelming amounts of information that are highly uncertain. They might not want to spend 
time during family conferences reviewing detailed quantitative risk information to understand 
how little evidence is available for their condition. Instead, they might want to spend more time 
talking about their fears, concerns, and hopes. Providers might rightly assume that some patients 
want to spend less time focusing on incidental findings with small clinical significance.243 
Therefore, deciding how much information is appropriate to share becomes a very burdensome 
task for a provider.  
In addition to patient-related reasons for withholding information about ambiguous risks, 
there are some provider-related reasons. Providers may feel that being explicit about the 
uncertainty is misleading, because it conveys more precision than is warranted. In order to 
address this misplaced imprecision, some professional bodies separate the quality of evidence 
(ambiguity) and the strength of recommendation (probability) in their summaries of evidence and 
recommendations. For instance, the American College of Physicians uses a four-category scale 
(insufficient, low, moderate, high) to rate the quality of evidence about the expected effect of a 
treatment or intervention and a two-category scale (weak or strong) for the strength of 
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recommendation.244 However, this separation between quality of evidence and strength of 
recommendation can be very confusing. When a provider conveys to a patient that a side effect is 
extremely likely (or extremely unlikely) to occur, it is implied that this provider has high 
confidence in that statement. It would make little sense for a provider to say that a side effect 
was extremely likely and then add that he has low confidence in that statement. In addition, 
confusion may arise from various overlapping (and at times conflicting) goals a provider may try 
to achieve while communicating uncertainty. Communication of uncertainty may serve a number 
of goals, such as: to convey doubt or to increase the level of confidence in a finding, to inform 
patients about their estimated disease risk and the limitations of these estimates, or to help 
patients understand the general complexity or unpredictability of illness and its management.245 
These goals are not always consistent with one another and may require different methods and 
approaches to communicating uncertainty.  
Information about risks and benefits. When asked explicitly, most patients report that 
they like to be informed about uncertainties, as this information deepens their trust in their 
providers and improves the patient-provider relationship. At the same time, many patients 
indicate that they would like to receive information on whether something is safe or not, rather 
than numerical probability information.246 These self-reported findings seem to be related to the 
concept of ambiguity aversion. As described in chapter two, ambiguity aversion is defined by 
Ellsberg as a preference for known risks over unknown risks.247 Ambiguity aversion should be 
distinguished from risk aversion. Risk aversion is demonstrated in situations where a probability 
can be assigned to each possible outcome while ambiguity aversion is expected in situations 
where the probabilities of outcomes are unknown. In a healthcare context, when patients are 
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confronted by ambiguous information about risks, they tend to evaluate these risks 
pessimistically, overreact, or avoid making decisions altogether.248 
Ambiguity aversion in a healthcare setting is explained in chapter two with the example 
of the men who received differing amounts of information about the risks and benefits of a 
prostrate biopsy. In this example, the mere presence of ambiguity led to preference for a costly 
and invasive test.249 More research has shown that some patients have higher ambiguity aversion 
than others. For example, less optimistic people were reported to have higher ambiguity aversion 
compared with highly optimistic people. Researchers have attempted to explain causes of 
ambiguity aversion. People have been found to prefer the ambiguous option if they feel 
competent and in control about the issue that is at risk.250 Moreover, ambiguity aversion is more 
likely to occur when choosing between options that either have a high probability of losing or a 
low probability of winning.251 Researchers suggest that ambiguity aversion only occurs in 
comparative situations when the risky and ambiguous options are presented simultaneously. 
Ambiguity aversion complicates discussions of risks and benefits.  
Exploring preferences for good and bad outcomes.  When uncertainty is present, it 
becomes difficult to explore patients’ preferences for two reasons. First, a patient may find it 
impossible to compare the desirability of various outcomes because they cannot formulate a 
“precise guess” about the likelihood of these outcomes. This incompleteness in preference is 
usually called indecisiveness in beliefs. Second, even if the patient is able to assess, subjectively, 
the likelihood of each outcome, their preferences over decisions might still be incomplete due to 
a possible inability to compare certain outcomes. This incompleteness of preferences is called 
indecisiveness in tastes.252 Providers attempt to approach indecisiveness in tastes and beliefs by 
providing more information. However, there are psychological limits to the amount of 
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information patients are able to process and practical limits in the time and resources available to 
facilitate this processing. In the setting of all these limitations, communicating uncertainty may 
simply confuse and lead patients to defer decision-making to the clinician—paradoxically 
diminishing rather than enhancing patient autonomy.  
Communicating uncertainty may also prompt different information-seeking behaviors. 
Some patients may respond to uncertainty by actively seeking information. The attempt to 
resolve uncertainty may help them to cope with it. Loewenstein describes this behavior in his 
information gap theory. This theory describes information-seeking “as arising when attention 
becomes focused on a gap in one’s knowledge. Such information gaps produce the feeling of 
deprivation labeled curiosity. The curious individual is motivated to obtain the missing 
information to reduce or eliminate the feeling of deprivation.”253 However, uncertainty may also 
lead to information avoidance and confusion if patients lack the proper resources to interpret 
available information and manage uncertainty. In one study, for example, 13% of people who 
were tested for HIV never received their results,254 even though in a separate study, those who 
initially avoided learning their HIV status showed an improvement in mood upon receiving their 
test results (regardless of their HIV status).255 Information avoidance may be used as a coping 
strategy by people who have difficulty tolerating potential but uncertain negative health 
consequences. A similar example can be seen in those who receive or fill prescriptions but do not 
take medications because of their fear of side effects. 
Deliberation and decision-making assistance. While physicians are expected to provide 
decision-making assistance, the simple presence of uncertainty can affect patients’ decision 
satisfaction. For instance, one study demonstrated that communication of scientific uncertainty 
leads to decision dissatisfaction among women facing cancer treatment decisions.256 Knowledge 
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about uncertainty adds additional anxiety to patients facing “high stakes” decisions such as those 
involved in cancer decisions or ICU decision-making. Additional research has shown that 
patients can experience three types of regret following treatment decisions: outcome regret, 
which is regret about a negative health outcome following a decision; option regret, which is 
regret about the choice one made; or process regret, which is regret about the quality of the 
decision-making process.257 Uncertainty can trigger process regret as well option regret in case 
of a bad outcome. In addition to regret, patients who negatively appraise uncertainty might 
subsequently experience fear, anxiety, panic, and a desire to reduce uncertainty. These negative 
emotional responses may lead to heightened vigilance about illness, which may further 
exacerbate worry about illness. Decision dissatisfaction, regret, and negative emotional 
responses to uncertainty may complicate the physician’s attempts to provide assistance with the 
decision-making process.   
Definitions of Uncertainty 
Since uncertainty is omnipresent in healthcare, and it may significantly impact every 
component of shared decision-making, it is important to have a working definition of this 
concept. Due to the fact that uncertainty may affect various areas of clinical practice (such as 
prognostic information, treatment recommendations, or aligning treatment goals with patients’ 
values), a few existing definitions seem to mirror the multifacetedness of this concept. The 
Merriam-Webster dictionary defines uncertainty as “the state of being indefinite, indeterminate, 
unreliable, unknown beyond doubt. Not clearly identified or defined, and/or not constant.”258 
According to Mishel, uncertainty is a “cognitive state created when an event cannot be 
adequately defined or categorized due to lack of information.” She further defines clinical 
uncertainty as the “inability to determine the meaning of illness-related events resulting from the 
  
99 
 
ambiguity, complexity, unpredictability of illness, deficiency of information about one’s illness 
and its consequence.”259 These definitions highlight the variety of types, sources, and 
manifestations of uncertainty, which might also explain the difficulty in addressing uncertainty 
in healthcare settings. Most of the definitions conceptualize uncertainty as a “state” or a 
“cognitive state” and emphasize a lack of pertinent information or knowledge. Therefore, 
uncertainty can be viewed as a subjective awareness regarding gaps in one’s knowledge. In this 
way, uncertainty is different from ignorance or lack of awareness about incomplete knowledge.  
Uncertainty in medicine can stem from a number of sources. For instance, Beresford 
categorized uncertainty into three types: technical, personal, and conceptual. Technical sources 
of uncertainty describe situations in which there is not enough evidence to adequately predict the 
prognosis or the effect of interventions. The information may not be available (due to rapidly 
increasing medical knowledge), or the provider may be unsure whether they have the most recent 
data. Personal sources of uncertainty originate from the doctor-patient relationship and include 
uncertainty about patient’s values and preferences. Conceptual uncertainty arises from an 
inability to apply treatment guidelines to a specific case.260 There is often an inherent variation in 
one’s disease progression or in the way that a patient responds to medical interventions which 
complicates the provider’s task of applying clinical data generated at the population level to a 
specific case. Beresford’s categorization is helpful in distinguishing between uncertainty related 
to data, uncertainty in applying the data to a specific patient, and uncertainty about the unique 
characteristics or preferences of a patient. This categorization also demonstrates that the 
management of uncertainty is more complicated than the simple provision of additional 
information. While this solution has been suggested by a number of authors, a mere provision of 
information may help with the technical uncertainty, but it will not address the other sources of 
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uncertainty. In the words of Atul Gawande, “Medicine's ground state is uncertainty. And wisdom 
- for both patients and doctors - is defined by how one copes with it.”261 
This chapter will focus on ambiguity as a special kind of uncertainty. Given that many 
decisions in critical care revolve around potential intervention, this chapter will discuss 
ambiguity in decision-making about treatment alternatives. Most of the existing literature 
approaches uncertainty in this type of decision-making from the perspective of risk. Under risk, 
the consequences of possible outcomes for a given decision are not certain, but the probabilities 
of different outcomes can be estimated. Providers use risk estimates to facilitate decisions about 
various treatments (i.e., 20% chance that the treatment will be successful, 10% chance of a side 
effect occurrence, etc.). These estimates describe uncertainty in probabilistic terms, and they are 
derived from population studies measuring the occurrence of a given outcome. However, these 
estimates may have limited applicability at the individual level since they are based on past 
patterns of the occurrence of a specific outcome. Providers may struggle with using this 
postdictive information in a predictive manner with an individual patient. Furthermore, both 
providers and patients often struggle with the complexity of risk information. For example, 
providers and patients often need to process and interpret multiple risks simultaneously and to 
make sense of risks that change over time and as a consequence of different actions. Providers 
may know the probabilities of an outcome yet still be uncertain about the severity of this 
outcome and its scope or timing. This type of uncertainty is described as complexity.262 
Ambiguity is different from decisions under risk or complexity. Under risk or complexity, the 
probabilities of different outcomes can be estimated, whereas under ambiguity, even these 
probabilities are not known. Some authors describe ambiguity as “uncertainty about 
uncertainty.”  
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Ambiguity can be defined as uncertainty about the strength or validity of evidence about 
risk. Ambiguous situations are specifically problematic because the information available to 
inform a decision is inconsistent or (to make matters even worse) contested.263 Ambiguity is not 
uncommon for decisions about treatments. Knowledge about treatment effects, in specific rare 
but serious side effects, is nearly always less precise, as some newer treatments may have been 
studied for only a few years. Treatment decision-making for elderly patients can serve as an 
illustration for uncertainties involving risk, complexity, and ambiguity. While risk estimates are 
available for many treatments, usually these risks are described in the general population and 
may not be applicable to elderly. Clinicians often need to individualize certain decisions based 
on their patients’ health and life expectancy. Treatment decisions for a healthy individual with a 
normal long life expectancy are relatively straightforward. Complexity occurs when there are 
variations in health and life expectancy. For patients with moderate morbidities, physicians need 
to assess estimates of life expectancy, weigh the expected benefits and downsides of a treatment 
adjusted for health conditions, and decide whether this treatment is in the patient’s best interests. 
Physicians may deal with ambiguity when treating elderly patients with complex medical 
problems since they may not be included in treatment guidelines and, therefore, risk and side 
effects may be unknown.  
In scientific literature, ambiguity is often expressed statistically through the use of a 
confidence interval around a point estimate. While physicians may struggle with communicating 
uncertainty, it can be especially difficult to explain ambiguity to patients. Patients may struggle 
to understand “uncertainty about uncertainty,” and it may result in additional anxiety and 
pessimistic judgments about treatment and prognosis. While most people exhibit at least some 
aversion to both risk and ambiguity, research shows that risk and ambiguity aversion are two 
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different phenomena of very different magnitudes. Risk aversion is simply a trade-off between 
amount and probability according to the individual preference of a patient. Ambiguity aversion, 
which tends to be much stronger, is instead irrational and leads to suboptimal decisions.264 
Researchers have tried to describe ambiguity aversion and its sources. For instance, Heath and 
Tversky explained it as a sense of incompetence or lack of control.265 Fox and Tversky described 
it as comparative ignorance driven by the comparison with more familiar events or more 
knowledgeable individuals.266 Hsu and colleagues suggest that ambiguity aversion can be 
explained through informed opponent theory, such as betting against another person who has 
seen a sample of cards from the deck. Even when there is no informed opponent, people usually 
act as if there is one.267 Regardless, the source of ambiguity aversion remains unclear.  
Unique Challenges Posed by Ambiguity and Informational Uncertainty 
Ambiguity represents a special kind of uncertainty and poses a unique set of challenges 
for patient-provider relationships and the decision-making process. Ambiguity aversion, or 
anxiety and pessimistic judgments about a treatment involving ambiguous risk, has been 
described above. Disclosure of ambiguous risks represents another challenge. Providers 
understand that different patients will want different amounts and kinds of information in order 
to be adequately informed. Physicians also realize that it is impossible to strive to provide every 
potentially meaningful piece of information. The resulting list will be infinitely long, and even 
attempts to be reasonably inclusive will overwhelm most patients. Consequently, physicians 
must decide which risks to discuss and emphasize. Oftentimes, they may have to choose between 
two alternative courses of action. One is to explain to the patient every risk involved in the 
procedure or treatment, no matter how remote or uncertain. This may create anxiety for the 
patient who is already unduly apprehensive and who may, as a result, refuse to undertake the 
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procedure or treatment in which there is, in fact, minimal risk. Even if this anxious patient 
consents to the procedure, her anxiety may actually increase the risks due to the physiological 
results of stress. The other course of action would be to recognize that the patient’s mental and 
emotional condition is important, that heightened anxiety may lead to suboptimal decisions (and 
can be viewed as a harm in itself), and, therefore, disclosure of ambiguous risks can be avoided 
to spare the patient from anxiety and decisional conflict. A number of ethical arguments can be 
used to support both courses of action.  
Deontology Versus Consequentialism 
The decision to disclose minor and ambiguous risks can be argued from a deontological 
and a consequential position. According to the deontological line of reasoning, in order for 
actions to be ethically sound, they must be made on the basis of principles that are worthy in 
themselves, apart from any consideration of the consequences that those actions may have. The 
consequential reasoning weighs relevant harms and benefits of an action, both physical and 
psychological, in order to choose the option that is most likely to benefit the patient. When it 
comes to nondisclosure of risks, the duty of truthfulness is strong in deontological theories, and 
nondisclosure of minor harms will violate Kant’s Categorical Imperative. Kant wrote an essay on 
the subject, titled “On the Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic Motives,” in which he argued 
that “the duty of being truthful… is unconditional… to be truthful (honest) in all declarations, 
there is a sacred and absolutely commanding decree of reason, limited to no expediency.”268 
Consequentialism, however, evaluates actions only according to their likely consequences, and, 
in this view, nondisclosure may be ethically legitimate, depending on the anticipated 
consequences in a given case. This line of reasoning might view nondisclosure of ambiguous 
risks more favorably, since by paying the negligible price of omitting potentially redundant 
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information, physicians may maximize patients’ happiness and well-being. Veatch echoes 
similar sentiment when he argues that “physicians, being committed (theoretically) to the 
consequentialist principle of working for the benefit of the patient, have traditionally been 
particularly skeptical of the moral relevancy of the ‘truth for truth’s sake’ principle.”269 
The deontological position regarding nondisclosure of ambiguous risks finds its clear 
formulation in the following passage from Mill’s On Liberty: “That the only purpose for which 
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is 
to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He 
cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will make him happier, because, in the 
opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right.... Over himself, over his own body and 
mind, the individual is sovereign.”270 In other words, even if a self-regarding action results in 
harm to oneself, it is still beyond the sphere of justifiable influence by means of deception or 
non-disclosure. An attempt to justify such influence by referencing a patient’s emotional 
incompetence can be a convenient way of overriding that patient’s wishes since what a physician 
may consider irrational is, at times, a value judgment. According to deontological thinking, harm 
often results from a failure to meet an obligation. Morality generates obligations. In the case of 
ambiguous risks, physician needs to meet a number of obligations such as truth telling, provision 
of all relevant information, and maintaining a patient’s trust.  
The consequentialist approach of working for the benefit of the patient can be inherently 
skeptical of the moral relevancy of the “truth for truth’s sake” principle. This approach requires a 
moral judgment to be made: whether or not to disclose an ambiguous risk. In doing so, the 
possible harms and benefits, both physical and psychological, should be weighed, and the option 
that is most likely to benefit the patient is then selected. But is a physician equipped to make 
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such a decision? In order to distinguish between what may be perceived as insufficient, adequate, 
or excessive information for a patient, there should be a unique kind of relationship: one of 
empathy, insight, and sensitivity. Even if one assumes that physicians are equipped to make such 
an assessment, the lack of time and continuity of relationship with a patient suggests that this is 
not a reality in most clinical settings. Additionally, this requires a judgment of the patient’s 
hopes and fears and personal circumstances and whether (from the patient’s perspective) there 
are any risks are worth running. While the deontological approach will consider failure to inform 
a patient of ambiguous risks as negligence to respect patients’ autonomy, a consequentialist 
would argue that disclosure of information and dialogue rests with welfare rather than autonomy.  
Harm versus Benefit 
Physicians must place the well-being of their patients above all other competing interests, 
and this consideration alone often places them in a position in which they must choose between 
two alternative courses of action. One is to explain to the patient every risk, no matter how 
remote and ambiguous; this may result in alarming a patient who is already anxious and who 
may, as a result, refuse to undergo a necessary treatment that, in fact, bears minimal risk. The 
other option is to recognize that the patient’s mental and emotional condition is important while 
tailoring the extent of risk information to the particular patient to avoid unnecessary anxiety and 
apprehension. The second option reflects the notion of therapeutic privilege. Meisel and 
Kuzcewski describe this concept as follows: “The therapeutic privilege permits physicians to 
tailor (and even withhold) information when, but only when, its disclosure would so upset a 
patient that he or she could not rationally engage in a conversation about therapeutic options and 
consequences.”271 In justifying this concept while considering harms and benefits of 
nondisclosure of ambiguous risks, it is important to keep in mind that physicians and patients 
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may weigh these harms and benefits differently. Physicians are trained to focus on the patient’s 
physical and mental health, so they may not see health risks to counterbalance the anxiety-
avoidance benefits of nondisclosure. On the other hand, patients may see non-medical harms of 
non-disclosure such as costs of ignorance and lack of control over their treatment. Given the 
cultural importance of self-determination, these substantial costs can outweigh the benefit of 
avoiding anxiety.  
In addition to avoiding anxiety, physicians may cite secondary harms stemming from 
anxiety such as nocebo effects and irrational decisions. When taking medications, patients 
frequently experience nocebo effects produced by negative expectations rather than by the drug 
itself. These nocebo effects add to the burden of illness and lead to care-seeking behavior. 
Research shows that nocebo effects can be induced by what doctors tell patients about a 
medication, and they are likely to occur when providers disclose uncertain risks to 
hypochondriac patients with high levels of somatization.272 Furthermore, anxious patients may 
be prone to make irrational decisions about their treatment that will lead to unfortunate 
outcomes. Physicians may find it very difficult to strike a balance between helping patients 
overcome fears that prevent them from pursuing promising treatments and respecting the 
different weights people assign to avoidance of ambiguity and ambiguous risks. For instance, 
Pellegrino and Thomasma believe that “overly hasty decisions not to treat (out of deference to 
the principle of autonomy) may be more damaging to the patient’s best interests than some 
degree of paternalism.”273 They feel that patient autonomy should be one of the goals of 
treatment, but not to the exclusion of all other considerations, and that the most appropriate 
model of treatment is the one that maximizes overall potential benefit.  
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It may seem that while considering ambiguous risks of a treatment, a patient may reject 
the physician’s recommendations and make irrational decisions about their own care. The 
irrationality of fear-driven decisions was discussed in the case of Lane v. Candura, where a court 
was asked to override a patient's refusal of treatment. The patient in Lane had initially consented 
to amputation of her gangrenous leg but withdrew her consent on the morning of the scheduled 
operation. Responding to a psychiatrist's testimony that the patient was incompetent to make a 
rational choice, the trial court held that the irrationality of the patient's choice justified the 
appointment of a guardian to make the decision. However, this view was rejected during the 
appeal hearing due to the fact that the physician and the trial court were both interpreting 
rationality to mean medical rationality. The patient was deemed irrational and incompetent 
because her decision differed from that of her treatment team. There were no questions about the 
rationality and competence of this patient up until the point when the patient changed her mind 
and rejected the surgery. The treatment team was ready to proceed with the surgery if the patient 
were to change her mind and consent again. In the view of the healthcare team, rationality and 
competence were equal to agreement with the medical viewpoint.274 Similar attitudes may be 
present in decisions about avoiding disclosure of ambiguous risks in order to make sure the 
patient follows the optimal course of treatment.  
Disclosure of Certain Risks Versus Disclosure of All Risks 
The 1994 Smith v. Tunbridge Wells Health Authority case demonstrates the difficulty in 
deciding what risks should be disclosed to the patient and whether there is an obligation to 
disclose all inherent risks, no matter how remote and ambiguous they may seem. In Smith v. 
Tunbridge Wells Health Authority, a claim was brought by a 28-year-old man who was not 
warned of the negligent risk of impotence inherent in rectal surgery. The claimant succeeded 
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despite the testimony of experts referencing the fact that most surgeons did not warn patients of 
that specific risk. The judge found that failure to warn a patient of a risk of such importance to 
him was ‘neither reasonable nor responsible.’ This case highlights the importance of considering 
the potential impact of ambiguous risks on the welfare of individual patients. While most 
providers would base their decisions about the disclosure of risk information on a statistical 
probability of certain negative outcomes, the potential impact of these adverse events on one’s 
life should be an important consideration.275 It is possible to assume that in a similar case as 
described above but involving an elderly man facing rectal surgery, a provider may contemplate 
an ambiguous risk of impotence differently. While the notion of a 1% risk threshold is often 
operational in clinical practice in decisions on what qualifies as a ‘material’ risk that must be 
disclosed, the legal and ethical approach regards risk incidence as only one of several elements.  
The severity of the outcome associated with a risk also matters. One may argue that 
considerations of incidence and severity of risks are usually linked in decisions about disclosure. 
For instance, negligible risks of serious outcomes are usually emphasized, as well as high risks 
of relatively minor adverse events, but not low risks of minor outcomes. Furthermore, certain 
characteristics of individual patients may also serve as a determinant in consideration about the 
necessity of a discussion about ambiguous risks. There might be no need to present a well-
educated patient with an exhaustive list of every conceivable complication of treatment. Rather, 
the patient may need to become an active participant in a dialogue about treatment and risks that 
are specifically of concern to that patient. For instance, the complications of hand surgery may 
be more material to a concert pianist than the average patient. The treatment’s urgency can serve 
as an additional layer of considerations. Details of risks tend to matter more when the treatment 
is more elective and less urgent. The high number of legal disputes about cosmetic surgeries can 
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serve as an example. Finally, temporal orientation of ambiguous risks can be an additional factor 
worth considering in decisions about disclosure. The subjective gravity of adverse effects 
depends on whether these effects may occur in the short term or in the distant future. Even 
serious risks are judged as subjectively less severe if they will happen in the distant future.  
The subjective value assigned to particular risks can, in part, be explained by the risk as 
affect paradigm developed by Slovic, in which risk is arranged along two axes relating to dread 
and uncertainty. Dread risks, such as nuclear reactor accidents, are uncontrollable, catastrophic, 
and not equitable, whereas risks from things like caffeine or aspirin are controllable, individual, 
and equitable. Slovic categorizes ambiguous risks, such as those from nitrogen fertilizers, as 
dreaded due to the fact that these risks are not observable, unknown to those exposed, and 
delayed.276 On the other hand, more common and serious risks, such as car accidents, are not 
dreaded because they are observable, known to those exposed, and immediate. While these 
examples are nonmedical, the concept of dread may help explain why patients fear some medical 
risks that are uncontrollable and uncommon more than others that are common. Since the goal of 
risk communication is to inform patients about risks, to encourage an informed decision, and to 
promote shared decision-making, it is important to remember that certain forms of risk and risk 
communication formats may evoke strong emotions and can be assigned more subjective weight.  
Moral Obligation to Inform Patients about Ambiguous Risks 
The decision to shield patients from unavoidable uncertainty is problematic for a number 
of reasons. First, there is considerable potential for a breach of trust when areas of uncertainty 
are not disclosed, as patients may feel betrayed if and when their treatment does not work or if it 
progresses in ways not previously flagged. Second, the principle of autonomy, which protects 
patient self-determination, goes hand in hand with truth-telling. Non-disclosure of ambiguous 
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risks to patients, therefore, ignores and demeans the patient’s rights of autonomy and can be 
equated to paternalism on the part of physician. Finally, one can argue that from a moral 
standpoint, there is no significant difference between lying and non-disclosure when the 
physician’s motivations, and the consequences of the action from the patient’s perspective, are 
the same.  
Veracity and Patients’ Trust 
It is difficult to overestimate the importance of trust in patient-provider relationships. 
Many authors consider trust as “the fundamental virtue at the heart of being a good doctor.”277 
As a result, patients trust doctors to provide them with the information on which they can base a 
decision about whether or not to proceed with a procedure or treatment. A relationship built on 
trust acknowledges the expanding role of patients in the decision-making process regarding their 
health care. This cooperative partnership and shared decision-making, rather than a more 
paternalistic approach, has increased the need for physicians to fully discuss treatment options 
and risks so that the patient can make an informed decision. However, this element of full 
disclosure of information is not entrenched in the traditional codes of ethics governing physician 
behavior. The Hippocratic Oath does not mention veracity, nor does the Declaration of Geneva 
of the World Medical Association or the American Medical Association in its "Principles of 
Medical Ethics."278 As a matter of fact, the writings of Hippocrates urge physicians to conceal 
“most things from the patient while you are attending him.”279 Until recently, many physicians in 
the US reverted to nondisclosure and non-discussion in the face of uncertainty about patients’ 
prognosis and the best course of treatment.  
Is there a moral obligation for a full disclosure of information between physician and 
patient? Disclosure within the patient-physician relationship encompasses the communication of 
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information to patients that is comprehensive, accurate, and helpful in making decisions about 
therapeutic options. According to Beauchamp and Childress, three arguments contribute to the 
justification of an obligation to veracity: 1.) Respect is owed to others. 2.) Obligation of veracity 
is closely connected to the obligations of fidelity and promise keeping. 3.) Relationships between 
physicians and patients are ultimately dependent on trust, and adherence to veracity is essential 
to foster trust.280 Therefore, the need for disclosure of information is not only important to the 
process of deciding between several therapeutic options but also fundamental to the ongoing 
relationship between physician and patient. When a patient perceives a lack of communication or 
selective communication of facts by their physician, it can serve as an additional stressor. 
Psychiatrists have noted that the loss of self-esteem that results from poor communication can 
occur in a setting that is inherently stressful. This effect is magnified where the lack of 
communication deprives an individual of the opportunity to make decisions on such important 
matters as the choice between treatment options. A patient in this situation tends to feel "isolated, 
alone, and abandoned, even though [he] may try hard to deny such feelings by clinging to the 
helpful reassurances that [his] physicians provide."281  
While physicians may feel an impulse to reduce worry and decisional conflict when 
describing treatment options to patients, bioethics literature suggests that ambiguity in risk 
information should be communicated to patients to avoid an artificial sense of certainty. If 
patients are informed about ambiguous risks, they can, in turn, alert their provider early on in 
case they see the signs of adverse effects. Furthermore, anxiety and uncertainty arising from 
ambiguity can be interpreted as indicators that patients truly understand information and can 
engage in shared decision-making. Miesel suggests that “almost any encounter with a physician 
may entail some emotional stress for the patient” and “it would be quite unusual if a patient, 
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informed of the serious risks of a proposed treatment, were not upset by the disclosure, but it is 
not clear that being upset necessarily interferes with one’s ability to engage in rational decision-
making.”282 Patients’ anxiety does not always translate into harm for the purpose of 
nondisclosure. The deliberate withholding of information from a competent patient, thereby 
disempowering this patient, requires greater justification than the reference to anxiety, distress, 
and inability to make rational choices. 
Paternalism 
Paternalism, as a model for the patient-physician relationship, is most often cited as an 
example of a model in which conflicts arise from the physician's desire for beneficence and the 
patient's need for autonomy. The paternalistic model is often compared to the relationship 
between incompetent children and their need for beneficent parental guidance. Beauchamp and 
Childress define paternalism as “the intentional overriding of one person’s known preferences or 
actions by another person, where the person who overrides justifies the action by the goal of 
benefitting or avoiding harm to the person whose preferences or actions are overridden.”283 
There are grades of paternalism, varying from the weak form, in which interventions are sought 
to protect patients from their non-autonomous actions, to the strong form, in which action is 
taken for patients who remain autonomous. One can argue that limited disclosure of ambiguous 
risks may fit under the paternalistic model. The presence of paternalism can be explained by the 
fact that the patient does not even know that a decision to withhold information has been made 
and, thus, makes a treatment decision believing it to be based on all material information when it 
is not. Consequently, the treatment decision is also tainted when the physician has exercised the 
authority to determine that information should be withheld out of “beneficent” considerations.  
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While patients may not have the medical expertise of their doctors, they are nonetheless 
in a better position to determine what is in their best interest based on the information made 
available to them. In many instances, a physician, due to his knowledge and expertise, may have 
a clear understanding of what treatment should be undertaken. However, it is the prerogative of 
the patient, not the physician, to determine for herself the direction in which she believes her 
interests lie. When a physician is concerned that the patient would make an inappropriate choice 
by placing an undue weight on the information about ambiguous risks and consequently refusing 
beneficial treatment, it should still be the patient and not the physician who determines what 
weight is due or undue. Both the physician and patient’s assignments of weight reflect different 
values, and the purpose of shared decision-making is to protect the subjective values of the 
patient. A physician may appreciate the risks of a decision not to undergo treatment and the 
probability of a successful outcome of the treatment. However, no physician is trained to weigh 
these risks against the individual subjective fears and hopes of the patient. Such evaluation and 
decision is a nonmedical judgment reserved for the patient alone. A patient should be denied the 
opportunity to weigh the risks only where it is evident he cannot evaluate the data, such as when 
there is an emergency or the patient is a child or incompetent.  
When a patient is denied the ability to evaluate risks on the basis that the information 
about uncertain risks of treatment will upset the patient so that they will not be able to engage in 
decision-making in a rational way, such reasoning conflates capacity with outcome.284 There is 
no way to predict the way the patient will react to disclosure of ambiguity. When a provider 
avoids disclosure of certain information because it will upset the patient, this implies that the 
doctor has a highly developed predictive skill regarding the decision-making of individual 
patients. Furthermore, research shows that in many cases the desire to shield patients from 
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uncertain information reflects the provider’s own inability to deal with uncertainty.285 Attempts 
to conceal ambiguity from patients may often be motivated by the provider’s desire to protect 
their medical authority, since sharing uncertainty with patients may reveal both the limits of 
medical knowledge and the extent of this particular provider’s ability to apply medical 
knowledge in patient care. Therefore, provision of information about uncertainty can be 
interpreted as a means of addressing the imbalance of power between the informed doctor and 
the vulnerable patient. On the other hand, concealing uncertain information from a competent 
patient equals disempowerment and paternalism. Tailoring of information to achieve the “best” 
result for the patient effectively allows the provider to substitute her judgment without a sound 
moral justification.  
Distinction between Non-Disclosure and Lying 
Assessments of patients’ ability to tolerate ambiguity and engage in a competent 
decision-making process are subject to a number of cognitive biases. Outcome bias leads to 
judging decisions by the outcomes that follow them, rather than by the thinking that goes into 
them. As a result, people facing easy choices (e.g., choosing places to eat) seem more competent 
than people facing hard ones (e.g., choosing medical treatments).286 Hindsight bias leads to 
exaggerating the competence of people who experience good outcomes from a treatment and 
underestimating that of those who do not.287 Furthermore, preconceived ideas about decision-
making competence can also reflect motivated thinking288 when a moral justification about limits 
of disclosure depends on patients’ perceived tolerance of uncertainty and their ability to make 
competent choices. Examples of such motivated thinking are abundant. For instance, supporters 
of physician-assisted suicide will emphasize competence and voluntariness of assisted dying, 
while those who oppose such regulations will point out that decisions about suicide can never be 
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competent or voluntary. Advocates of reproductive rights for adolescents usually make strong 
claims for teens’ competence, while opponents of adjudicating teens as adults will claim that the 
opposite is true. Is it possible to assume that such motivated thinking about one’s competence 
and ability to tolerate uncertainty can be, in fact, deliberate misrepresentation?  
Several authors attempt to argue that in certain cases, nondisclosure and lying can be 
viewed as morally equal. For instance, Cox and Fritz use the example of two young hospital 
patients staying at a hospital in late December.289 Both are very anxious to get home for 
Christmas. When Dr. A. makes his rounds, one of the patients asks him whether he will be home 
for Christmas. Not wanting to upset the boy, Dr. A. replies “Yes,” even though he is sure this 
patient will not make it home for the holidays. The other child does not ask Dr. A. such a 
question but instead talks excitedly about being home for Christmas dinner. Similarly, Dr. A. 
does not want to upset the child, so he avoids mentioning that going home for Christmas is 
unrealistic at this point. Is it possible to draw any moral distinction between the two scenarios? 
This question seems to mirror the debate surrounding the commission/omission distinction - the 
tendency to judge harmful actions as worse, or less moral, than equally harmful omissions 
(inactions) because actions are more obvious than inactions. Many moral philosophers argue that 
the omission-commission distinction is, in itself, morally irrelevant. Some also argue that in the 
example above, the distinction between non-disclosure and deception is irrelevant due to the fact 
that the underlying intention not to upset his patients is constant in both cases.  
Consider one more hypothetical scenario. Three patients – Smith, Doyle, and Green – all 
in their early 70s with no previous history of heart disease, but with increased risk of a heart 
attack, are given recommendations about low dose daily aspirin. Smith is told to take one aspirin 
daily to prevent the possibility of a heart attack. Doyle is told to take one aspirin daily to prevent 
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the possibility of a heart attack even though there is not enough evidence to make a 
recommendation about using daily aspirin for this age group, as the elderly are underrepresented 
in clinical trials involving aspirin for prevention. Green is told to take one aspirin daily to 
prevent the possibility of a heart attack even though the benefits of taking daily aspirin may not 
be enough to outweigh the uncertain risk of internal bleeding that is potentially high in this age 
group. (In other words, the elderly are at a high risk of bleeding, and the heart disease protection 
gained from low-dose aspirin use may be offset by serious risks of bleeding. The overall balance 
of harm and benefit could go either way.) No one has been lied to, yet Smith has not been as 
fully informed as Green. What exactly does their provider need to disclose, and in how much 
detail, in order to ensure truthfulness? In this scenario, Smith has been deceived by non-
disclosure, as he does not have a full appreciation for the situation. His provider has been less 
truthful to him. However, it is pointless to discuss truthfulness unless there is clarity over exactly 
what information should not be withheld. The relevance of information is crucial. This provider 
would not be criticized for withholding the weather forecast from Smith. Some ethicists would 
argue that non-disclosure becomes deceptive if patients would reasonably expect their providers 
to disclose this information.  
Conclusion 
In today’s medical landscape, the issue of uncertainty is of paramount importance. As 
facilitating patient autonomy continues to be lauded as the gold standard of ethical and moral 
patient care, many health care providers may find themselves torn and confused as to how to 
communicate uncertainty in medical treatments with those in their care. In this chapter, I worked 
to explore the ethical limits of the disclosure of ambiguous risks in patient care.  
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The chapter began with an overview of the concept of the shared decision-making model 
as it relates to the topic of conveying uncertainty. First, this section on shared decision-making 
addressed the role of the physician in extending an invitation to the patient to participate in the 
decision-making process. Next, this section explored how physicians should present treatment 
options to patients when uncertainty is involved. The next topic addressed was how uncertainty 
factors into the process of informing patients about treatment risks and benefits. The section 
elucidated how doctors can best explore patient preferences for good and bad outcomes and the 
clinician’s role in assisting a patient’s deliberation and decision-making process. In short, the 
shared decision-making model seeks to involve patients and physicians in a partnership, where 
uncertainty in treatment is taken into account, and patient preference dictates how the physician 
goes about disclosing ambiguity.  
After exploring the facets of the shared decision-making model and how uncertainty 
plays out in these conversations, the chapter turned to definitions of uncertainty. Though there 
are a variety of definitions of uncertainty, most definitions agree that uncertainty is rooted in 
individuals’ personal assessments of risk and their discomfort with ambiguity. Thus, medical 
professionals should be mindful to understand that what one person might define as an uncertain 
risk might not be viewed the same way by another person.  
The chapter continues by examining how uncertainty provides a unique set of challenges 
in the medical setting. The first challenge is that depending on what moral theory one uses (such 
as deontology versus consequentialism), the dialogue about uncertainty will be drastically 
different. Secondly, uncertainty is directly tied with both the concept of patient harm versus 
patient benefit; physicians and patients alike must engage in a dialogue to establish what harms 
and benefits the patient might sustain as a result of treatment and how uncertainty might shift the 
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patient’s perspective. Finally, uncertainty also provides a unique challenge to physicians in their 
decision about how much ambiguity they are ethically and morally obligated to disclose.  
The chapter concludes by addressing how uncertainty and the moral obligation to inform 
patients about ambiguous risks might play into medical treatment. It is suggested that veracity 
and patients’ trust is of inherent and utmost importance to the medical profession, and that non-
disclosure of uncertainty, while sometimes valid, must be done with good reason and careful 
consideration. Next, the last section addressed the concept of paternalism and how disclosure of 
uncertainty factors into a now frowned upon system of practicing medicine. Finally, the last 
section addressed the fine line between non-disclosure and lying and how this line often becomes 
harder and harder to locate in many clinical settings.  
I would like to finish this chapter by noting that uncertainty in medical care is a complex 
issue. There are no easy answers as to when, what, and how physicians should disclose medical 
ambiguity to those in their charge. This fact underscores the importance of continued dialogue 
and shared decision-making between patients and doctors, as such a course of action will help 
ensure moral and ethical outcomes in clinically uncertain circumstances.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PERSUASION 
Introduction 
Rhetoric and persuasion are praised in ancient philosophy but condemned by modern 
philosophy. This change in attitude can be explained by a shift in the concept of autonomy from 
being open to some forms of influence to being deemed incompatible with persuasion. The 
modern criticism of rhetoric stems from the criticism of all authority that threatens autonomy. 
Since autonomy is closely related to rationality and deliberate choice, rhetoric is depicted as a 
force that clouds rationality, influencing people to act from desire as opposed to deliberation. 
This chapter explores the relationship between autonomy and persuasion through the prism of 
modern critique, considering whether it is legitimate to influence one’s desires, whether 
persuasive communication is inherently harmful, and whether it precludes voluntariness and free 
choice. In order to address these questions, the chapter engages the famous defense of rhetoric 
presented in Aristotle’s work Rhetoric.  
In his work, Aristotle closely links rhetoric with the understanding of voluntary action. 
He describes a voluntary action as one that is conceived and implemented by the individual, as 
this is the action in which the “initiative lies within ourselves.”290 He writes that both reason and 
emotion can prompt desire, and, thus, both can help determine action. Emotion is not opposed to 
reasoned judgment but is instead an important aspect of it. Therefore, one’s emotional response 
to a situation is not simply a result of one’s understanding but a part of that understanding. 
Aristotle also claims that appeals to reason alone can rarely influence an audience. A rhetorician 
always finds his audience with a pre-existing set of emotions, coloring what aspects of the 
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situation they will understand. One cannot counter the way already existing emotion clouds the 
vision by eliminating all emotions. One must replace distorting emotions with clarifying ones. 
Consequently, is there a place for emotionally charged messages and persuasive 
communication in a patient-provider relationship? Some may consider this communication as an 
integral part of providing risk information to patients. Physicians always find patients with a pre-
existing set of emotions. Providers also know that appeals to reason alone may not be the most 
effective form of risk communication. They are aware of the difference between patients 
knowing they are at risk and feeling at risk. In considering the ethical permissibility of 
persuasion in this context, one should further delineate the nature of the relationship between 
patient and provider and describe the duties that relationship implies. Inasmuch as this 
relationship is grounded in care, the section on care ethics discusses the moral permissibility of 
persuasion in patient-provider interactions. The care perspective provides answers to the 
questions of whether there is a duty to persuade and whether the instance of persuasion will 
damage the existing relationship. The final section of this paper provides examples of persuasive 
communication used in critical care. These examples and the previous justification grounded in 
care ethics or Aristotelian Rhetoric are not intended to demonstrate that all persuasion in 
healthcare is good nor that all forms of influence used by providers are legitimate. Rather, these 
concepts are described in order to reassess the principles by which one judges the legitimacy of 
influence in medical communication. 
Definition of Persuasion 
What Persuasion Is 
The history of persuasion reaches back into ancient times and goes parallel with the 
history of rhetoric because since its origins in Ancient philosophy, rhetoric was understood as the 
  
121 
 
art of persuasion. Plato was the first to discuss the ethical aspects of persuasion in his critique of 
the Sophist perspective on public speaking based on style and emotional appeals. According to 
Plato, the only moral means to persuasion is grounded in logic.291 His disciple Aristotle 
developed a great insight on this issue, agreeing with Plato on the importance of truth, and 
supporting the Sophists in their belief that persuasive communication is very useful. He defined 
rhetoric in terms of “observing in a given case the available means of persuasion.”292 These 
means include a number of appeals grounded in logic (logos), in emotion (pathos), and in the 
communicator (ethos). In his work Rhetoric, regarded by many scholars as “the most significant 
work on persuasion ever written,”293 Aristotle claims that the goal of rhetoric is not so much in 
finding the truth about an issue but, rather, in convincing an audience to make the best decision 
about that issue.  
There is hardly a single good definition of persuasion. The word persuasion comes from 
the Latin verb persuadere, to persuade, from per, strongly, and suadere, to urge. In line with the 
etymology of the word, some authors define persuasion as “a human communication designed to 
influence others by clarifying their beliefs, values, or attitudes.”294 A definition given by 
Bettinghaus and Cody frames persuasion as an intentional act on the part of a communicator: “a 
conscious attempt by an individual to change the attitudes, beliefs, or behavior of another 
individual or group of individuals through the transmission of some message.”295 Smith 
highlights the role of perception in his definition, claiming that persuasion happens when the 
audience feels free to reject the communicator’s position. Persuasion is “a symbolic activity 
whose purpose is to effect the internalization or voluntary acceptance of new cognitive states or 
patterns of overt behavior through the exchange of messages.”296 This aspect of voluntariness 
and freedom is echoed in the definition given by O’Keefe: “a successful intentional effort at 
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influencing another’s mental state through communication in a circumstance in which the 
persuadee has some measure of freedom.”297 Therefore, a number of concepts are implicit in 
these definitions. There is some sense of having a goal on the part of the communicator. This 
intentional aspect is important because considering every possible attempt to influence as 
persuasion would include under its heading all communicative behavior. Persuasion is also a 
process; it does not occur momentarily. This process occurs in the context of freedom and 
communication.298  
It feels important to further outline the concepts involved in persuasion. Counting a 
communication as an act of persuasion involves an intentional and successful attempt to change 
one’s attitude or behavior. Consider the example of a person who tries to escape a burning 
building by jumping from the window. A team of firefighters waits to catch her on the ground; 
however, she is afraid to make the move. There is something counter-intuitive in saying, “I 
unintentionally persuaded her to jump” or “I persuaded her to jump but failed.” The firefighting 
team may have tried to persuade her and then failed, and they obviously could not persuade her 
without having a clear intent. To claim that she was persuaded to jump implies a successful 
attempt. This intentionality, however, should leave enough room for the woman to choose freely. 
If she had been knocked down unconscious and then thrown out of the window, this act would 
not count as an act of persuasion. Moreover, the desired effect in this case was achieved by 
means of communication; she was talked into jumping. Most likely this communication was a 
process consisting of an engaging dialogue and a number of arguments designed to help this 
scared woman feel better about her decision. This communication was designed to change her 
feelings and, as the result, to change her behavior. The firefighting team may have resorted to 
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some sort of emotional appeals rather than appeals to her logic in order to offset her fear and 
make her jump.  
What Persuasion Is Not 
There are a few notions that are mistakenly used synonymously with persuasion. 
Coercion is one of them. It is often assumed that since both behaviors seek to influence people, 
the distinction between them is minimal. However, the concept of coercion implicitly involves 
an assumption of compliance, use of trickery or force, and the intent to harm. Coercion occurs in 
an atmosphere of constrained choice, where the individual is influenced to act contrary to his 
preferences.299 Some authors suggest that the main difference between coercion and persuasion 
is found in the willingness of the initiator to harm. Unfortunately, they don’t further outline the 
concept of harm. For instance, what if the receiver is only led to believe that the intent to harm 
exists, while, in fact, there is no such willingness?300 Related to this, Smith argues that the 
perception of the receiver makes all the difference. Coercion occurs only in cases when the 
receiving party believes they have no choice but to comply, while persuasion happens in 
instances when they feel free to choose. There is an element of intentionality in both coercion 
and persuasion; nevertheless, persuasion implies no threat, a positive result, no willingness to 
harm, and no choice constrained.301   
Persuasion is not manipulation, and manipulation is not coercion. These concepts are 
often mistaken and used interchangeably. Coercion involves a victim who knowingly acts 
against her own will. A victim of manipulation may falsely believe that she is acting in accord 
with her will. Coercion allows for maintaining one’s sense of self. Manipulation, on the other 
hand, takes away one’s dignity even though the victim may not recognize this to be the case. 
Therefore, deception is one of the most important aspects of manipulation. Both coercion and 
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manipulation imply influence. While coercive influence involves a threat that can’t be resisted by 
the victim, manipulation exerts the type of influence that could be resisted, although it is not.302 
Persuaders are often criticized for being manipulative even though not all persuasion is 
manipulative. Persuasion necessitates a trusting relationship based on mutual respect and 
interest. Manipulation objectifies its victim and precludes the possibility of a relationship. Trust 
and respect are inadvertently undermined by the act of manipulation. Manipulative strategies are 
designed to create an illusion of free choice in order to lure the victim into a decision that would 
probably be resisted under normal circumstances. Persuasion is generally viewed as a positive 
force used to produce positive outcomes by fostering one’s free choice. To persuade someone 
usually means to awaken in this person a desire toward a particular course of action.303  
Persuasion is not deception. Even some great philosophers such as Socrates and Kant 
have criticized persuasion as being deceitful. This excerpt from Kant’s critique can be used as a 
good example of this suspicion: “Rhetoric, in so far as this means the art of persuasion, i.e., of 
deceiving by a beautiful show (ars oratoria), and not a mere elegance of speech (eloquence and 
style), is a dialectic, which borrows from poetry only so much as is needful to win minds to the 
side of the orator before they have formed a judgment and to deprive them of their freedom.”304 
However, persuasion is not deceptive, but it is the art of making the truth apparent. It is generally 
assumed that providing a logical argument involves the desire to make clear the true nature of 
one’s circumstances. Rational argument is believed to be the only ethical way of influencing 
someone, while a persuasive appeal to emotion and reason is believed inappropriate because it 
may prevent a person from seeing the real facts of the situation (i.e., deceive the person). 
However, in the example of the burning building used above, this assumption translates to the 
belief that a logical argument is enough to make the escaping woman jump. Nevertheless, she 
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might remain clinging to the window after having her circumstances and options explained. Her 
fear causes her to misjudge the nature of her circumstances. Replacing this emotion with the 
reminder of her love and responsibility for her kids may prompt a more appropriate judgment of 
the situation. Firefighters may appeal to her emotions, not to cloud her ability to understand the 
facts, but to put her in a state of mind in which she will read the facts more reasonably.  
Critique of Persuasion in Modern Philosophy 
Autonomy and Voluntariness 
The concept of autonomy is theoretically rich and is not easy to define.305 An attempt to 
define it would move from an understanding of autonomy being an individual property to 
determining what conditions must hold for a person to be autonomous with respect to his desires 
or actions. Since individual actions are motivated by one’s desires, in order to consider those 
actions autonomous, it is necessary to assure that the desires behind the action are autonomous as 
well.306 Therefore, most accounts of autonomy would include the right to be free to self-govern 
and the state of being capable of and actually exercising self-government.307 Beauchamp and 
Childress incorporate these notions of right and agency in their influential definition of the 
concept as “at a minimum, self-rule that is free from both controlling interference by others and 
from limitations, such as inadequate understanding, that prevent meaningful choice.”308 
According to the Kantian account of autonomy, a person is autonomous if it is her, and not some 
outside force, that directs what desires she has and what actions she performs.309 This condition 
is similar to the later distinction made by Frankfurt and Dworkin with respect to “higher order” 
desires and “lower order” psychological needs. A decision is autonomous if it is consistent with 
these “higher order” beliefs and not only driven by the “lower order” needs without reflection.310 
Rationality is the second condition for an autonomous decision. This decision should be made in 
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an impartial manner, based on relevant information, and lead to a choice with the best 
outcome.311 The third condition requires lack of undue influence by external factors. While 
complete independence may not be required, covert influences on decisions would pose a threat 
to autonomy.312  
The modern suspicion of persuasion stems from this account of autonomy, understood as 
inseparable from human rationality. Many philosophers, including Kant, Descartes, and Locke, 
voiced their concerns with persuasion and its compatibility with autonomous choice. Descartes 
dismisses rhetoric as useless, since he considers forceful reason and clear orderly thoughts 
sufficient to convince any audience. 313 Locke argues that the art of rhetoric, “all the artificial and 
figurative application of Words Eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate 
wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead he judgment and so are perfect cheats.”314 
Some modern authors are apprehensive about the possibility of changing another’s desires, 
assuming this change may not be in the best interests of the one persuaded. While guidance 
provided in the form of rational arguments is warranted, the appropriateness of influencing one’s 
desires is questioned. Considering autonomy as a good in itself, the way one makes choices 
becomes more important than what one chooses. The account of autonomous choice is presented 
as being completely free from desire and emotion.315 These philosophers believe that a person 
can act either from desire or from reason. Actions grounded in desires are similar to those of 
animals driven by impulses. Furthermore, they claim people should always act reasonably and 
avoid the influence of desire in order to sustain their autonomy. Desire lacks rationality, and, 
thus, a desire driven action prevents one from acting from reason and exercising personal 
autonomy.316 
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Consequently, if autonomy is of reason alone, the only possible forms of influence should 
be restricted to those that appeal to one’s reason. Lockean and Kantian notions of consent 
presume that reason either rules over desires or serves them. Reason determines what desires 
should be fulfilled and represses desires that are deemed unreasonable. It is necessary that reason 
always be used to consider the alternatives of a choice and determine when to serve desires. In 
this context, persuasion is seen as a force that excites desires and clouds reason.317 The persuadee 
is not in the position to consult her reason, and, being swayed by desires, she is not able to make 
an autonomous choice. Persuasion, therefore, amounts to compliance with another’s wishes. On 
the other hand, the ability to consider the options and come to agree with another constitutes 
consent. Modern philosophers set up a dichotomy between force and consent in order to discuss 
influence. A person can never be led to a good she has not made her own, since the act of making 
this end her own, the act of autonomous choice, is inseparable from the value of that end. Her 
personal good can never be a reason to take away her choice.318  
Increased potential of harm 
Taking the force\consent dichotomy one step further, some authors voiced their concerns 
about the possibility of forceful persuasive messages to result in harm such as anxiety, guilt, 
blame, and stigma.319 They describe how campaigns aimed to promote breastfeeding resulted in 
feelings of guilt and shame among mothers who were not able to breastfeed.320 Persuasion 
ascribes an ‘ought’ component to risk communication in clinical settings and tells patients the 
desirable way to think and act. The potential for guilt and anxiety increases together with the 
sense of moral responsibility attached to the health messages, leaving patients feeling guilty 
every time they are not able to follow the recommendation. Correspondingly, persuasive 
communication may stigmatize and inadvertently blame those who lack complicity.321 For 
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instance, those who choose to carry on with the intensive treatment provided for their 85-year-
old family member may feel ostracized in an environment geared to promote age-based rationing 
of the ICU resources. Furthermore, even if one could demonstrate that emotion is necessary for 
judgment and that emotional considerations are necessary in the design of effective risk 
communication, there is still a danger of promoting the mindless acceptance of risks.322  
The notion of harm calls into consideration the understanding of good. Instead of 
considering good as something set and established, many philosophers tend to consider good as 
always developing and progressing. Locke echoes this idea in his famous quote, “men may 
choose different things, and yet all choose right.”323 One of the important features of human 
good is that it must be consciously chosen. It is better to make a bad choice voluntarily than to 
make a good choice under one’s guidance. Therefore, the notion of human good is found in one’s 
ability to map one’s own future, rather than in getting to a particular destination on the map. 
Kant agrees with this paradigm when he writes, “what is essentially good is the mental 
disposition, let the consequences be what they may.”324 The human good is found in one’s 
maxim and not in the realization of that maxim. For instance, Kant would argue that a choice to 
tell the truth has intrinsic moral worth found “in the maxims of the ill which are readily in this 
way to manifest themselves in action, even if they are not favored with success.” 325 Thus, 
goodness is found in the choice of telling the truth regardless of the fact of whether the truth has 
been told.  
There are a number of reasons why one could consider the act of choosing as the locus of 
human good. Personal choice is cherished because it provides one with a chance of obtaining 
results that are in line with his preferences. Having this ability to choose is a valuable “predictor 
of what brings us enjoyment or advances our aims.”326 Choice adds meaning to many things and 
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circumstances that would lack it otherwise. For instance, a gift chosen by one’s lover has more 
meaning than a gift chosen by his secretary. The more marginalized and ostracized people 
become, the less choice they have. Choice grants one with a status he might not otherwise 
possess, as choice is the main determinant of one’s capacity and judgment. Furthermore, it is 
believed that choice is instrumental in the development of qualities such as maturity, 
independence, and responsibility. It is always linked to one’s growth and development. People 
derive joy from having the ability to exercise choices. Finally, choice is inseparable from self-
determination.327 Considering the connection between choice and human good, it is possible to 
argue that persuasion can be harmful when it appeals to one’s desires and, thus, precludes the 
real choice from happening.  
Legitimacy of influencing one’s desires 
By definition, persuasion affects one’s desires, and this fact alone renders it morally 
questionable. When persuasion is perceived as an attempt to convince another by appealing to 
her logic, it need not be considered unethical. Such a form of influence leaves the person free to 
consider her alternatives and objectively choose between them. The firefighting team from the 
example above can explain to the frightened woman why she can’t get out from the burning 
building by any other means but jumping. Then, they would allow her to consider the advantages 
of the option being offered in order to understand for herself why jumping down is a preferable 
option. In this way, the team would respect her right to determine her own actions. Appealing to 
her emotions or shaming her into jumping is inappropriate because it encourages an unthinking 
response on her part and forces her to feel a certain way. Similarly, when a situation in critical 
care is presented by a provider in such a way that the family must fear one choice, that family is 
consequently bound to make the other choice. For instance, when the option of resuscitation is 
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presented as a very aggressive procedure (patient’s ribs are broken and chest is compromised), 
families are forced to choose the DNR option. However, they were persuaded and swayed by the 
presentation and language choice rather than determined by consideration of the relevant 
circumstances. This strong emotional appeal might have clouded their ability to consider the 
soundness of their reasoning and prevented them from interpreting the real facts of the 
situation.328  
This sentiment is reflected in the National Research Council statement: “To say that 
success requires that the recipients do or believe what a particular message source desires is to 
assume that that message source is a better judge of the recipients’ interests than the recipients 
themselves.”329 This statement is made in view of the traditional association between persuasion 
and paternalism in medicine. Such persuasion reflects paternalistic values of dominance and 
change, functioning from within a “power-over” framework in which the physician, as a 
persuader, attempts to shape the views and feelings of her listeners. The absence of persuasion in 
medical communication will reflect the belief that individuals are the experts of their own lives, 
capable of self-determination. The provider’s expectation that families or patients will follow his 
suggestions rather than their own opinions seems to negate their rights and responsibilities 
dictated by the ability to choose.330 Furthermore, persuasion about what is good or bad does not 
involve the prescription of a right behavior. One can be persuaded to lose weight because obesity 
increases the likelihood of diseases. However, this persuasion will not entail the exact steps 
needed to be taken to prevent obesity, it will not outline certain foods and habits that need to be 
abandoned, and it will not determine the locus of responsibility for the weight loss (e.g., 
personal, societal, institutional, etc.).  
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Finally, the possibility of shaping one’s desires is questioned by some philosophers. 
According to Locke, the only possible response to a desire is to temper it. In his discussion of 
virtue and education, he points out that the virtuous person is one who achieves a “mastery over 
his inclinations” and the “ability to resist pleasure and pain”.331 If children are to be educated in 
virtue, they must be taught “the art of stifling their desire.”332 The “right direction of our conduct 
to happiness” depends on “the moderation and restraint of our passions so that our understanding 
may be free to examine, and reason unbiased give its judgment.”333 If one has learned to give 
reason authority over one’s actions, a good argument that jumping from a window is best will 
influence the woman to jump regardless of any fear she feels. The difference between virtue and 
vice, for Locke, “lies not in the having or not having appetites but in the power to govern and 
deny ourselves in them.”334 Locke claims that virtue requires reason to oppose desire. He 
famously wrote: “Reason and desire very seldom if ever coincide.”335 Kant echoes this dualism 
in his discourse on the conflict between duty and inclination. This conflict is the only way for 
someone to recognize an act as moral. His emphasis on obligation implies that human beings 
find themselves knowing they should do something other than what they want to do. Obligation 
requires that it is possible for an act to proceed from the “absolute spontaneity” of the will, free 
from any inclinations.336 Morality, thus, requires no change in our inclinations but, rather, that 
we act from duty instead of from inclinations. Even in his discussion of virtue, Kant falls into the 
language of mastering desires rather than shaping them. 
Aristotle’s Defense of Persuasion 
Theoretical versus practical deliberation 
A significant part of Aristotle’s writing in Rhetoric is concerned with the study of 
passions and possible ways to evoke them in a public discourse. Considering desire as the 
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driving force behind our active response to the environment, Aristotle implies that both reason 
and emotion can prompt desire. Desire and emotion are inseparable and, therefore, the task of a 
rhetorician is to awaken desire by appealing to corresponding emotions.337 If desire could be 
directed by reason, this task should be left to reason alone. However, as in the example with the 
burning building, the woman’s problem is not that she lacks information. Instead, she fears when 
she should not and calculates her actions poorly. She probably realizes on a cognitive level that 
jumping down is best and probably the only option. Nevertheless, she will remain clinging to her 
window until the rescue team attempts to offset her fear of jumping with another emotion like 
love and affection for her family members, who would want her to jump, else they will lose her. 
They can also create a sense of urgency or connect her previous experience and emotional states 
with the present situations, but no rational argument alone will be able to influence her actions. 
Aristotle agrees with this assumption when he says that only reason for the sake of something 
can move one to action while reason as such cannot.338 
Aristotle further claims that emotion is an integral aspect of a practical judgment. He 
describes emotion as “all those feelings that change people so as to alter their judgments and 
[that] are accompanied by distress and pleasure–for example anger, pity, fear, and the like, and 
their opposites.”339 He further notes that when we are pleased and friendly, “our judgments are 
not the same as when we are pained and hostile,”340 since our affective orientation to a situation 
can “make things appear altogether different, or different in a degree.”341 Therefore, emotions are 
not only integral to a judgment in the sense of influencing specific features of a situation we 
perceive as morally relevant, but emotions are also capable of influencing judgment by forming 
attitudes toward those features we perceive as important. The presence of emotion is what 
distinguishes practical reason from theoretical. Theoretical reason offers a picture of the world 
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toward which an individual may feel nothing. Practical reason paints the world in a way that 
gives one clues as to whether the objects in it are to be pursued or avoided. The presence of 
emotional attitude plays a role in the ability to characterize something as having a moral 
significance. Removing affective disposition from judgment for the sake of objectivity equals 
denying the difference between practical and theoretical reason. Aristotle considers practical 
reason as the one relevant for choice, and this reason ties in emotion and desire together.342  
One can never embark on a decision-making process without having a pre-existing desire 
and, consequently, a corresponding emotion. This antecedent emotion influences what one 
understands along with being part of that understanding. Aristotle agrees that people form their 
judgments about an activity and the risks involved in it based not only on what they think about 
it but also on how they feel about it. An angry person will perceive a situation and judge risks in 
a completely different way from someone who is afraid. They are not merely reacting differently 
to a situation they both understand similarly; their interpretation of the facts is biased due to their 
affective states.343 The woman escaping the burning building may tend to underestimate the risks 
of clinging to her window and overestimate the risks of jumping down. Replacing fear with 
another emotion such as urgency or love and commitment to her family may prompt a more 
appropriate judgment of the situation. It seems obvious that a mistake in judgment not caused by 
flaws in reason and lack of information cannot be corrected by appeals to reason alone. When 
this woman has a strong emotional response to the situation preventing her from making a good 
choice, the needed influence will speak to her emotions. The firefighting team will attempt to put 
her in a state of mind in which she will judge the facts in one way rather than another, but this 
will not be an attempt to prevent her from seeing the facts at all.  
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Persuasion and the voluntary action 
In his defense of persuasion, Aristotle closely links this notion with the understanding of 
voluntary action. He describes a voluntary action as one that is conceived and implemented by 
the individual, as this is the action in which the “initiative lies within ourselves.”344 On the other 
hand, actions can be considered involuntary when “they are done in ignorance; or they are not 
done in ignorance, but they are not up to the agent; or they are done by force. For we also do or 
undergo many of our natural actions and processes, such as growing old and dying, in 
knowledge, but none of them is either voluntary or involuntary.”345 Therefore, if an action is to 
be voluntary, it should have its origin in the agent, and it must be in the agent’s power to 
knowingly perform it. Aristotle later makes a distinction between externally imposed actions and 
internally forced actions. The difference between these two notions is important for 
understanding the link between voluntary and persuasion. Persuasion reshapes desire rather than 
creates it, and, thus, it limits the scope of influence to only those things that are in line with the 
desires and character of the audience. The persuader always finds his audience already, to some 
extent, disposed to respond to his appeals.346 Aristotle explains: “Nobody encourages us to 
perform what is not within our power and what is not voluntary; there would be no point in 
trying to persuade man not to feel hot, in pain, or hungry and so forth, because he will go on 
feeling these conditions no less for that.”347  
In this passage, Aristotle presumably ascribes a participatory feature to persuasion. In 
order for the influence to take place, there should be some reciprocity, as the persuader intends to 
co-opt rather than coerce others into believing and acting. This participation is undermined by 
the modern understanding of emotion being passive in its core. Anyone able to evoke an emotion 
automatically determines one’s actions. The persuadee is thought to act mindlessly on the basis 
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of what the persuader can make him feel. He is driven into action by his feelings being subtly 
manipulated by the persuader. Such understanding is built on the presumption that emotions are 
not fully under one’s control. However, in his discussion of involuntary action, Aristotle goes to 
great lengths to show that acting from emotions does not equate to acting under duress.348 If 
reason is the precondition of voluntariness, an individual is then responsible for the emotions he 
is prone to experience as well as for the desires he tends to act upon.349 Aristotle points out that 
while a person may not be responsible for a momentary emotion, his choices will influence 
recurrence of this emotion. Therefore, the ability to persuade someone is constrained by the 
affective states of the given audience.  
It has been shown that persuasion satisfies two out of three criteria for voluntariness 
proposed by Aristotle: namely it is up to the agent and is not done by force. The one who is 
persuaded is responsible for his emotion and consequently his acts will be internally forced 
rather than externally imposed. The third criterion requires absence of ignorance from the one 
who is persuaded in order to render his actions voluntary. There is no doubt that the one 
persuaded acts on the basis of what the persuader makes him feel. However, according to 
Aristotelian reasoning, the important information about a particular situation always includes the 
significance of the circumstances. Influencing those who are persuaded to reach a particular 
affective state can make the relevant information clearer rather than obscuring it. This can be 
demonstrated in the previously used example of the fearful woman and Aristotle’s discussion of 
fear. Aristotle claims that what makes a person fearful is a number of reflections and beliefs 
“since fear is with the expectation that one will suffer some destructive affect, it is evident that 
nobody is afraid who thinks that he can suffer nothing”350 These beliefs are necessary conditions 
for this emotion. Fear can be increased by the belief that the future damage will be irreparable,351 
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and no assistance will be offered. Given the connection between emotions and beliefs, one can 
argue that modification of emotion may lead to the modification of belief, while the absence of 
an appropriate emotion may signify bad judgment of the situation. When the escaping woman 
has no fear of immediately jumping out of her window, without even looking down to make sure 
the safety net is there, it is possible to assume that she misunderstands the situation.  
Emotions and judgments of value 
In his discourse on the role of emotions in normative judgments, Aristotle famously links 
emotion with virtue. He claims that “It is moral virtue that is concerned with emotions and 
actions, and it is in emotions and actions that excess, deficiency and the median are found. Thus, 
we can experience fear, confidence, desire, anger, pity, and generally any kind of pleasure and 
pain either too much or too little, and in either case not properly. But to experience this at the 
right time, toward the right object, toward the right people, for the right reason, and in the right 
manner –that is the median and the best course, the course that is the mark of virtue.”352 Aristotle 
further explains his point using the example of anger. It is not appropriate to observe an act of 
moral injustice without experiencing anger. He writes, “those who do not show anger at things 
that ought to arouse anger are regarded as fools; so, too, if they do not show anger in the right 
way, at the right time, or at the right person.”353 Therefore, anger is not just a mindless bodily 
reaction, and its absence in the situation of injustice seems problematic because it involves 
misevaluation of the object of anger. As Aristotle points out, in order to describe anger, one 
should mention the object it is directed at and the reasons for anger. In order to do so, one must 
evaluate the object as it is perceived by the one who is experiencing anger. This anger will 
represent some sort of discernment about the objects and will be based on a number of beliefs 
and judgments.354  
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The connection between belief and emotion can be found in this example of anger. The 
person experiencing anger against injustice may change her beliefs about what constitutes 
injustice in the given situation. This change of beliefs will likely cause the anger to disappear. As 
has been shown earlier, this connection can also be traced in the example of fear. What makes 
the escaping woman fearful is a number of beliefs and judgments about the situation. While 
designing a persuasive strategy, the firefighting team may think something along the lines of 
“She will not fear if…” or “She fears because…” These statements demonstrate that preexisting 
beliefs are the necessary conditions of the fear. On the other hand, presence of emotion is a 
necessary condition for a correct understanding of the circumstances. Taking the analogy with 
the burning building one step further, let us imagine that the woman escaped only to find out that 
some of her relatives perished, trapped in that building. If she would have no emotional response 
to such news, one could doubt her understanding of the tragedy. Furthermore, in complex 
situations, emotions help one to frame the problem by directing attention to certain features of 
the environment that are most relevant. The escaping woman may not be concerned with the 
direction of the wind or the outside temperature when considering jumping down. Her fear has 
narrowed the scope of information, muting the unimportant and emphasizing the important.  
Given the strong connection between emotions and understanding on one hand, and 
emotions and beliefs on the other, it is possible to conclude that emotions are relative to virtue 
and virtuous living. Virtue by definition cannot be unintelligent, and it has been shown that 
emotions are necessary for the possession of appropriate knowledge. While not all situations and 
knowledge should be emotionally framed, in many cases the absence of a corresponding emotion 
will hinder understanding and resulting action. Discussion of virtue in Aristotelian ethics is 
always connected to the parallel discussion of eudaimonia – wellbeing, good life or human 
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flourishing. For Aristotle, eudaimonia is activity in agreement with virtue in a full life,355 or, in 
other words, it is the life of a virtuous person. A few passages further, Aristotle explains that 
virtues are established tendencies to feel and act rightly.356 Eudaimonia precludes not only 
achieving certain ends but also having the right ends. Having the right ends is linked to one’s 
emotional life, since the virtuous person cares for the right things in the right way. This claim 
can be supported by the story of Phineas Gage, the most famous neuroscience patient of the 19th 
century, whose frontal lobe was destroyed because of an accident, making him unable to 
experience emotions while not affecting his intelligence. This lack of emotions significantly 
affected his life, rendering him unable to learn, follow schedules, make simple decisions, and 
understand the significance of things. Later, a similar patient was followed and described by Dr. 
Damasio. In both cases, patients were perfectly normal in terms of their personality and cognitive 
ability. Lack of emotions precluded them from having a good life.357  
Ethics of Care and Persuasion Within a Relationship 
Relational autonomy 
The concept of care was first introduced to the field of moral philosophy in 1982 through 
the work of moral psychologist Carol Gilligan. According to her investigation, the “justice view” 
of morality fails to capture the distinctive feminine way of moral reasoning, grounded in care. 
She argues that the psychological reality of care in feminine ethical thought has been ignored and 
that the normative importance of care has also been overlooked.358 The ethics of care starts not 
with impartiality but with the recognition of interconnectedness through ongoing relationships. 
This view seeks to maintain such connections and bonds rather than equality and independence. 
While justice ethics tend to be neutral with respect to context, ethics of care remains contextual, 
refusing to generalize. The traditional medical ethics regards a patient as an independent, 
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autonomous, rational individual. Non-interference and self-determination are given priority. The 
care ethics recognizes the reality of human dependence, portraying individuals as shaped by their 
connections to others. The idea of an isolated, independent individual is rejected since, by 
definition, we are social beings not designed to live in a relational vacuum.359 
Relational autonomy is the foundational concept of care ethics built on the premise “that 
persons are socially embedded and that agents’ identities are formed within the context of social 
relationships and shaped by a complex of intersecting social determinants, such as race, class, 
gender and ethnicity.”360 Care ethicists distinguish between autonomy and independence and 
criticize the idea of self-sufficiency as a helpful construct in describing autonomy. The ideas of 
independence and self-sufficiency grounded in the assumption that a person needs no outside 
help in making and carrying out life goals are replaced with the idea of interdependence. 
Interestingly, this idea of interdependence is also present in the earlier discussed concept of 
eudaimonia. In his writings, Aristotle argues not for independence but for eudaimonia as a 
certain quality of life for the whole community rather than for a separate individual. The nature 
of eudaimonia is common rather than private, and the pursuit of this excellence requires 
communities and friendships that define this good life. When an individual makes mistakes in 
attaining his own good, someone else can help him correct those errors because the human good 
is an object of deliberation.361 An individual pursuit of eudaimonia affects others not only when 
different efforts to attain personal goods overlap. Personal good is integral to that of others, 
because those who care take pleasure in another’s flourishing as much as they do in their own. 
According to Aristotle, personal autonomy frees one from natural necessity but not from human 
community.362 
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Therefore, this relational understanding of autonomy leaves enough space for an active 
intervention from outside the agent to support his autonomy. Relational autonomy is more than 
simply non-interfering. It is not merely offering information and waiting for consent. Those 
acting under this relational paradigm will be more concerned with dangers of abandonment 
rather than with dangers of interfering. According to Moody, care is a process of negotiation and 
finding a common ground. He proposes the term “negotiated consent,” where instead of 
presenting the risks and waiting for a decision, a provider will attempt to encourage the patient to 
handle risks in a responsible way.363 Verkerk calls this “compassionate interference,” pointing 
out that the care perspective is informed by the understanding of responsibilities rather than of 
rights. Instead of being concerned with the right for non-interference, a provider frames his 
relationship with the patient as a caring relationship in which he is responsible for the needs of 
the patient, and the patient is responsible for being responsive to the provided care. In such a 
relationship, any intervention proven to be in the interest of the other party can be seen as an 
intervention to support rather than to threaten her autonomy.364  
Is there a duty to persuade? 
Patients often make irrational decisions, giving preference to a choice involving inaction 
even though this choice may cause greater harm than adopting a particular course of action. At 
times, patients prioritize short-term benefits over long-term consequences, refusing care out of 
fear even when the consequences can be serious. A good decision, especially in the context of 
critical care, assumes provision and understanding of relevant information. The type of 
information most often communicated in the ICU setting is risk information. Comprehension of 
this information is a precondition of a rational and informed decision. Because of the inherent 
uncertainty of the medical practice, this risk information is often needed to be expressed in 
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numbers and percentages. However, most of the patients and families exposed to this kind of 
information will not have the necessary skills to understand risk-benefit ratios.365 For instance, 
dealing with percentages, they may perceive a 50% chance as simply lack of certainty (“might 
happen, might not happen”). They would disregard small percentages (up to 10%) which 
characterize many risks of serious complications or death. This is the cause of overestimation of 
small risks.366 On the other hand, when risk is presented in fraction form (i.e., 9 of 100 patients 
die from this procedure), families would tend to focus on the 9 people who die rather than on the 
91 who do not, thus making the risks something larger than the reality is.367 Therefore, most of 
the important risk information is misunderstood. 
Is there a duty to persuade patients in cases when they clearly misunderstand risks or 
make decisions that contradict their long-term goals? When patients make irrational choices 
about a course of treatment that will not maximize their well-being, the values or respect for their 
self-determination and the duty to protect their well-being are in conflict. Furthermore, it is 
difficult to distinguish between truly irrational and unconventional choices. However, based on 
the previous considerations of relational autonomy, one can claim that the duty to persuade exists 
in situations where there is clearly only one medically beneficial choice. After all, a physician is 
in a much better position than a patient to evaluate different care choices. Therefore, to withhold 
this special knowledge and skills from a patient by merely presenting options without an attempt 
to persuade, would be unfair and would deprive patients from relevant knowledge, making them 
unable to consent.368   
Some scholars recognize this duty. For instance, Faden and Beauchamp write: 
“Frequently in clinical situations, professionals would be morally blameworthy if they did not 
attempt to persuade their patients to consent to interventions that are medically necessitated. 
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Reasoned argument in defense of an option is itself information and as such is no less important 
in ensuring understanding than provision of acts.”369 Culver and Gert agree with the necessity of 
persuasion: “We think that sometimes it is morally praiseworthy for a physician to put pressure 
on a patient during the consent process.”370 This influence will be less ethically justifiable in 
cases where there is no certainty about the best course of action. Under clinical equipoise, a 
physician might be advised to make patients aware of various ways in which their judgments can 
be clouded by biases and heuristics and negotiate available options. In their recent JAMA article, 
Shaw and Elger consider removal of biases the most important form of persuasion. They provide 
a number of characteristics for ethical persuasion in a medical context such as: provision of 
relevant information mixed with the physicians’ beliefs and views regarding the best choice; use 
of reason but appealing to patients’ emotions to counterbalance their existing emotional 
responses; avoidance of creating new biases, removal of existing ones, and sensitivity to the 
patient’s changing preferences. 371 
Would the instance of influence damage the relationship? 
In their recent study of persuasive communication within the context of shared decision-
making in pediatric critical care, Karnielli-Miller and Eisikovits describe persuasion as 
something that precludes partnership between a patient and physician. They describe “these 
(treatment) decisions” as “the result of partnership or of persuasive tactics based on power and 
hierarchical relationships.”372 This binary understanding of persuasion is prevalent within 
biomedical literature. As has been mentioned earlier, the nature of context, and consequently the 
nature of the relationship, determines the moral appropriateness of persuasive communication. 
Specifically, in the context of a patient-provider relationship built on trust, transparency, and 
beneficent concern for the other party, instances of persuasion may violate trust and lead to some 
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changes that are not sustainable. Patients may feel that persuasion or affective communication is 
nothing but a play on their weaknesses, an attempt to circumvent their reasoning, and a lack of 
respect. 
Here it is appropriate to mention the framing effect that is often present in physician 
communication. One recent study empirically documented this by demonstrating that decisions 
to withdraw life-sustaining treatments are strongly related to the characteristics of the physician 
rather than the medical conditions of the patient. The statistical association between individual 
physicians and the decisions made by surrogates to limit the use of life support measures was 
demonstrated by the 15 fold range increase in hazard ratios associated with individual 
intensivists.373 This framing effect occurs when decision-makers respond differently to different 
but objectively equivalent descriptions of the same problem.374 Levin et al. identified three 
possible types of framing in various domains. One is risk choice framing, where the difference 
between options is made based on whether the option was described in positive terms (i.e., lives 
saved) or in negative terms (i.e., lives lost). Another is attribute framing, when some 
characteristics of an object or event are used as the focus of framing. Finally, there is goal 
framing, in which the goal of an action is framed.375 Given the prevalence of framing in clinical 
decision-making when physicians’ preferences are conveyed subtly, this type of influence can be 
even more detrimental for trust between patient and provider than open persuasion. 
Keeping in mind that physicians persuade patients even unconsciously, what kind of 
obligations may they have toward their patients in an attempt to promote the best choice of 
actions? Blumenthal-Barby describes three instances when persuasion can be detrimental to the 
patient-provider relationship. First, when the patient feels that the instance of persuasion amounts 
to a failure on the part of the physician to treat him or her in a respectful manner - not as lesser, 
  
144 
 
not capable, and not equal. Second, when persuasion is dismissive of the patient’s views and 
judgments. Third, when the patient feels that the physician is exploiting her weakness.376 Going 
back to the analogy with the escaping woman, it would be wrong for a firefighter to start 
persuading her without acknowledging her fears, or treating her like a mentally-challenged 
person who would not understand or appreciate the reasons to jump. The same persuasive tactic 
used in this context can be interpreted as being supportive or damaging to the relationship and 
trust between the firefighter and the woman.  
Examples of Persuasion in Critical Care 
Use of analogies 
Physicians often use analogical reasoning in order to help patients and their families 
navigate the complexity of decisions in critical care. Analogies are conducive for bringing order 
into a disordered situation by augmenting one’s understanding, improving communication, and 
helping to bridge what is known with what is unknown. In their groundbreaking work on 
metaphorical and analogous reasoning, Lakoff and Johnson showed that the human conceptual 
system is designed to operate analogously. In other words, many abstract and complex ideas are 
often understood in terms of other, more familiar concepts.377 Furthermore, as one oncology 
study points out, analogous language in medicine is not only used to describe similarities but also 
to create them.378 Intensivists often use analogies to describe the proposed course of treatment 
and its possible effects. They may describe treatment in martial terms (“The treatment is like a 
bullet that we’ll aim at that target.”) or they may use a language of travelling (“We have a bumpy 
road ahead,” or “This treatment is not a sprint, but rather a marathon, so brace yourself.”), or 
they may use analogies of dance, drama, a chess match, etc.379  
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Analogies can be used as an effective persuasive device. Thus, Aristotle writes that when 
analogies are used with enthymemes, or syllogisms with an implied premise, analogies can 
complement and confirm the argument. They function as witnesses, and there is always a 
tendency to believe witnesses.380 In his other work Poetics, Aristotle claims that to use analogies 
correctly is a skill and, “in itself, a sign of genius.”381 Therefore, the use of analogies often adds 
credibility for the physician who uses them. Analogies also function as a tool to stimulate 
thoughts and feelings in the recipient. Aristotle states that analogies give vivid expression to 
one’s thoughts.382 This vividness is possible through explaining things in a “state or sense of 
activity.”383 Consequently, analogies have the ability to evoke emotions and stimulate thoughts. 
Some scholars have mentioned the potential of analogies to stimulate not only thoughts about the 
subject but also a particular response to the party making the analogy. Analogies can be a 
motivational device used to increase audience responsiveness.384 
Use of empathy induced messages 
As has been mentioned earlier, in the Rhetoric, Aristotle distinguished three kinds of 
arguments: those from logic, those from authority, and those from pathos. The argument from 
pathos is used to induce empathy in the audience. The persuader may seek to affect sympathy in 
order to influence his audience to accept the argument. Burke, in his influential work on 
persuasion, writes that “You persuade a man only insofar as you can talk his language by speech, 
gesture, tonality, order, image, idea, identifying your ways with his.”385 He also quotes St. 
Augustine who said that “a man is persuaded if he likes what you promise, fears what you say is 
imminent, hates what you censure, embraces what you commend.”386 This idea of identification 
with the recipient and empathic persuasion is reflected in Aristotle’s writings about mimesis, or 
acts of imitation and resembling in persuasion. He points out that it is only through simulated 
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representation, or mimesis, that the audience responds to a message. It is the task of the 
persuader to design his message in such a way that his audience will empathize with him and the 
content.  
Empathy induced messages are often used in critical care to persuade families. One may 
consider the difference in framing end-of-life options. For instance, when a provider strongly 
feels that DNR is a preferable option, he may attempt to frame the process of resuscitation as a 
very invasive procedure involving chest compression and broken ribs, electrical shocks, and 
painful intubation. He may remind the family about how weak the patient is and that, at her 
advanced age, they may reconsider the use of “heroic measures” that will result in “unnecessary 
suffering.” He may attempt to discuss the concept of “the good death and nature taking its 
course.” This language is loaded with emotional appeals intended to evoke empathy in family 
members in order to forego the invasive treatment. The design of such empathic messages 
intended to persuade decision-makers usually includes identification with another person or the 
ability to take another’s perspective, empathic understanding of the context, and appeals to 
concern for the other.387  
Use of visuals 
The power of vivid messages in persuasive communication is well known and 
researched. Vividness strategies are commonly used in all kinds of marketing communication 
and promotion due to their ability to arouse emotion. The emotive impact of visual material has 
been demonstrated in a number of studies. For example, Iyer and Oldmeadow discovered that 
people felt more fear when shown video materials about kidnapping than when reading about it 
from a newspaper.388 Vivid material is also processed differently than verbal, being more easily 
absorbed because the viewer is not provoked to reflect or deconstruct the content. Furthermore, 
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vivid information is more likely to be stored and remembered than other kinds of information. 
Information that is easily remembered is more likely to be retrieved at the time of decision-
making. According to dual-coding theory, information encoded in both verbal and imagery codes 
is more likely to be retrieved. Visual information has the power to attract and hold a viewer’s 
attention and to excite the imagination. This increases the valence of information affecting the 
extent to which people will engage in favorable cognitive elaboration.389  
 A novel approach to communicating end-of-life information suggests the use of video 
materials rather than verbal communication to facilitate end-of-life decisions. Dr. Volandes 
pioneered this approach at Massachusetts General Hospital. He claims that the use of visual 
materials in addition to verbal communication will lead to more informed advance care planning 
by helping patients and their families imagine a hypothetical health state. According to his 
multiple published studies on this subject, video materials are associated with a significant and 
dramatic change in subjects’ preferences for medical care and improved understanding of 
disease.390 When used in surrogate decision-making, video consent leads to more accurate 
surrogate predictions that are more congruent with patient preferences. However, as one of the 
studies mentions, “criteria regarding the necessary content and editing of each video portrayal 
must be carefully considered before clinical application of these videos.”391 These criteria are 
needed because, by its nature, visual consent is highly persuasive.  
Conclusion 
Persuasion is a key component of medical communication. Patients may have to persuade 
a provider that they are in need of care; physicians may have to persuade patients to adhere to a 
specific treatment; public officials may try to persuade us to live healthier; and pharmaceutical 
companies constantly persuade both providers and the public to use their products. Moreover, the 
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language used in medical communication can be inherently persuasive. The term ADHD 
persuades parents of a hyperactive child to seek treatment and the phrase “fighting illness” 
induces guilt in those who fail to do so. The symptoms and solutions are framed in a certain way, 
and it often seems that the persuasive element is an inseparable part of the discourse of health 
and medicine. This chapter intends to identify some of the strategies of influence in medical 
communication and to discuss their moral appropriateness. In order to do so, it is important to 
outline first what instances of communication can be considered as persuasion. The opening 
sections of this chapter surveyed a number of definitions found in relevant literature and outlined 
some of the concepts that a working definition of the notion should include. This definition helps 
to distinguish instances of persuasion from cases of manipulation, coercion, and deception.  
After the concept is clarified, the essay proceeds to discuss some of the reasons for the 
modern suspicion of persuasive communication. Modern philosophers consider persuasion 
incompatible with autonomous choice. They foresee a potential for harm resulting from attempts 
to influence one’s choice, since the act of choosing is, in itself, the locus of human good. 
Furthermore, they point out that persuasion affects one’s desire and this fact alone renders it 
morally questionable. Emotional appeals may cloud one’s reasoning, preventing the person being 
influenced from interpreting the real facts of the situation and having a sound reasoning. This 
understanding is further contrasted with the famous defense of persuasion in Aristotle’s Rhetoric. 
There, Aristotle contrasts theoretical and practical deliberation, claiming that emotion is an 
integral aspect of a practical judgment. He points out that only reason for the sake of something 
can move one to action, while reason as such cannot. Aristotle links persuasion with the notion 
of voluntary action and also with the notion of virtue. He uses examples of fear and anger to 
demonstrate that emotions are not merely bodily reactions but that they involve some judgment 
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and evaluation. The presence of emotion is often a condition of understanding, and part of the 
understanding.  Therefore, appealing only to reason precludes complete judgment and 
understanding of a situation.  
In order to consider the ethical permissibility of persuasion in a medical context, one 
should describe the nature of the patient-provider relationship and outline duties this relationship 
may imply. In the last sections of this essay, the moral aspects of this relationship are described 
through the prism of care ethics. Ethics of care provide a framework that can evaluate and 
accommodate some of the instances of persuasion. Within this framework, the ideas of 
independence and self-sufficiency, grounded in the assumption that a person needs no outside 
help in making and carrying out life goals, are replaced with the idea of interdependence. 
Consequently, in some instances where there is only one medically beneficial choice, a provider 
may have a duty to persuade, and this persuasion will not be damaging to the ongoing 
relationship with the patient. The final part of the essay provides some examples of persuasion in 
critical care such as the use of analogies, empathy induced messages, and video consent forms.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
AUTONOMY 
Introduction 
Advances in medical science and the increasing number of healthcare choices related to 
emerging medical technologies make the preservation of end-of-life autonomy a growing 
concern for both patients and clinicians. These concerns have resulted in a number of measures 
aimed at securing the individual autonomy of patients in order to ensure that they receive care 
consistent with their preferences. The goal of this chapter is to analyze the concept of autonomy 
as it pertains to end-of-life decision-making in the ICU context.  
Since its early beginnings, one of the concerns of medical ethics was to define the 
balance between several important concepts – the patient’s best interest, both medical and 
psychosocial; the legal rights of the patient; the authenticity of the patient’s decisions or the 
concern that the patient’s choice reflects his values; and the obligations of a physician. Some of 
these concepts may come in conflict with each other. For instance, the physician may want to do 
what she believes is best for the patient while, at the same time, acknowledging the patient’s own 
preferences about treatment. Similar conflicts have received substantial attention in  bioethics 
literature, but it is generally accepted that respect for patient autonomy takes precedence in such 
cases. Many regard autonomy as a deontological norm or an absolute right and duty. Some 
would consider autonomy as a prima facie duty. Prima facie (from Latin “apparently correct”) 
is a duty that is binding (obligatory), other things equal, unless it is overridden or trumped by 
another duty or duties.392 The value and moral weight of autonomy is generally understood as 
being a priori – it is not contingently valuable or worthy simply as a means to some other end.  
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It is difficult to determine what is an autonomous choice in the context of end-of-life 
decision-making and which autonomous choices should be respected. Mark Siegler illustrates 
this difficulty in his narrative about Mr. D,393 a previously healthy sixty-six-year-old black man, 
who came to a university hospital emergency room and described a three-day history of sore 
throat, muscle aches, fevers, chills, and cough. The patient was acutely ill with a high fever, 
shortness of breath, and a limited attention span. A chest X ray demonstrated a generalized 
pneumonia in both lungs. The clinical impression was that Mr. D was critically ill, that the cause 
of his lung disease was obscure, and that a low platelet count and blood in the urine were 
ominous signs. He was treated aggressively with three antibiotics in an effort to cure his 
pneumonia.  
The next day, Mr. D’s condition worsened. After reviewing the available clinical and 
laboratory data, the physicians caring for this man recommended that two uncomfortable but 
relatively routine diagnostic procedures be performed: a bronchial brushing to obtain a small 
sample of lung tissue to determine the cause of the pneumonia and a bone marrow examination 
to determine whether an infection or cancer was invading the bone marrow. The patient refused 
these diagnostic procedures. Separately, and together, the intern, resident, attending physician, 
and chaplain explained that these diagnostic tests were necessary to help the physicians 
formulate rational treatment plans. Mr. D became angry and agitated by this prolonged pressure 
and subsequently began refusing even routine blood tests and X-rays. A psychiatric consult was 
called, and the conclusion was that while obviously ill and having impaired memory, Mr. D was 
not mentally incompetent. According to the psychiatrist’s note, Mr. D was able to understand the 
severity of his illness and the reasons the physicians were recommending certain tests. He was 
still making a rational choice in refusing the tests.  
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Twenty-four hours later, Mr. D was approaching demise. Dr. Siegler was the attending 
physician, and he attempted to place Mr. D on a respirator with hopes to win some time for the 
treatment to become effective. Mr. D refused. The ICU team was divided on whether Mr. D was 
sufficiently rational to refuse a potentially life-saving treatment. In an effort to resolve this 
controversy, Dr. Siegler spent two 45-minute periods talking to Mr. D and explaining the reasons 
for these recommendations. He explained that if Mr. D survived the crisis, he would be able to 
return to a normal life with no disability. However, every reply from Mr. D was convincing Dr. 
Siegler that the patient understood the gravity of his situation. When Dr. Siegler told Mr. D that 
he was dying, Mr. D replied: "Everyone has to die. If I die now, I am ready." When Dr. Siegler 
asked Mr. D if he came to the hospital to be helped, he stated, "I want to be helped. I want you to 
treat me with whatever medicine you think I need. I don't want any more tests, and I don't want 
the breathing machine."  
Dr. Siegler became convinced that despite the severity of his illness and his high fever, 
Mr. D was making a conscious, rational decision to selectively refuse a particular kind of 
treatment. Despite vigorous attempts by social workers, neither Mr. D’s wife nor children could 
be located. Mr. D soon became semi-conscious and had a cardio-respiratory arrest. Dr. Siegler 
did not attempt to resuscitate him, and Mr. D died. In his narrative, Dr. Siegler asks whether it 
was appropriate for this critically ill patient to establish diagnostic or therapeutic limits on the 
care he wished to receive. What were some morally relevant factors that would encourage 
physicians to either support or deny the wishes of Mr. D? Are there limits to autonomy and 
autonomous choices in the context of critical care, especially in light of many recent 
developments in the science of human cognition and decision-making? This chapter will attempt 
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to answer these questions and will focus on understanding what autonomy means (and what it 
does not mean) and how it functions in the clinical setting. 
Importance of Autonomy 
Mr. D’s case is an example of a classical issues in bioethics – the ability to forgo medical 
treatment is the most common and accessible example of medical ethics to the general public. A 
patient’s ability to act autonomously is rightly praised. Individual liberty is highly valued in 
Western society, and if one’s ability to act autonomously is going to be limited, there is a need 
for a significant level of justification. This relatively recent transition of control in medical 
decision-making from paternalism, in which the physician had more ability to direct the 
decision-making process, to the current triumph of patient self-determination has caused many 
bioethicists to step back and reexamine the concept of autonomy and the role it plays in medical 
decision-making. Nowadays, patients are presented with a vast variety of options regarding 
various types of treatment, making for more complicated decisions that need to be made at the 
end of life. Providers recognize patients’ values as an essential element in decisions about how 
long and under what conditions life should be and expect active participation from their patients 
in all aspects of decision-making. This has not been the case in the not so distant past when 
paternalism, or “the overriding or restricting of rights or freedoms of the individual for their own 
good,”394 was the dominant model of decision-making. The physician was the one who had 
medical knowledge and experience and was, therefore, perceived to be better suited to make the 
medical decisions. The patient had little voice in the medical context and simply hoped that the 
physician’s knowledge would be the best guide in navigating the foreign land of medical 
information.  
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The recent shift from paternalism to patient autonomy did not happen by chance. It has 
begun with a growing public awareness of the inappropriate and unethical incidents within 
medicine, especially within clinical research. A growing distrust of medical research then began 
to spill over into the clinical setting. This distrust served to exacerbate the increasing distance 
within the physician-patient relationship. As the number of specialists increased and the amount 
of primary care providers decreased, patients were likely to encounter a greater number of 
doctors, many of whom they had never met. Given these transitions in care, physicians rarely 
feel that they have ownership of care over their patients. When health maintenance organizations 
(HMOs) appeared in the mid-seventies, the ever-increasing number of physicians and healthcare 
providers made the traditional intimate and long-term physician-patient relationship almost 
obsolete. Additionally, the tying of health insurance to employment meant that a person’s 
physician was likely to change with his job.  
Alongside changes in medical context, there were changes occurring in the social realm. 
Siegler describes them as follows: “The modern medical era, which began triumphantly after 
WWII… might be called the Age of Autonomy. This emphasis on autonomy was sparked by 
widespread political and social movements to gain entitlements and rights, and to achieve equity 
and equality in the distribution of services.”395 Some of these movements were the women’s 
liberation and civil rights movements in the 1960s and 1970s. People wanted to have their 
autonomy respected in every area of their lives, including healthcare. They wanted to be 
informed of pertinent details which could influence their decisions so as to be able to play an 
active, informed role and have their values respected. Such a role had been withheld from people 
for too long, especially within healthcare. Empowering patients and giving more weight to 
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patient autonomy was heralded as the means by which patients would be guaranteed a role in the 
decision-making process.396  
In 1979, Beauchamp and Childress published the first edition of Principles of Biomedical 
Ethics, in which they codified the phrase “patient autonomy” as one of the four principles of 
biomedical ethics. They define autonomy as “a form of personal liberty of action where the 
individual determines her own course of action in accordance with a plan chosen by himself or 
herself… A person’s autonomy is her independence, self-reliance, and self-contained ability to 
decide.”397 They then explain that the understanding of autonomy is based on the work of 
philosophers Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill. Later in the book, they comment on cases 
similar to the case of Mr. D and conclude that “if a suicide were genuinely autonomous and there 
were no powerful utilitarian reasons or reasons of human worth and dignity standing in the way, 
then we ought to allow the person to commit suicide, because we would otherwise be violating 
the person’s autonomy.”398 This shows the importance they assign to the principle of autonomy.  
The Concept of Autonomy 
In order to align the science of decision-making with the concept of autonomy, it is 
important to outline a conceptual framework for thinking about autonomous decision-making. 
The term “autonomy” has been used in a variety of ways and in many different contexts. The 
variety of contexts in which the concept of autonomy is used suggests that there are a number of 
different conceptual accounts of autonomy. For instance, Joel Feinberg identifies four meanings 
of the term: the capacity to govern oneself and make one’s own decisions, the actual condition of 
self-government, a personal ideal, and the right to govern one’s self.399 Nomy Arpaly discusses 
eight senses in which the term is used: agent autonomy concerns the relationship that an agent 
has to his motivational states; autonomy as personal efficacy concerns physical independence 
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and not relying on others; autonomy as independence of mind concerns not blindly accepting the 
views of others; normative autonomy concerns one’s moral right to have his decisions respected; 
autonomy as authenticity concerns the absence of external desires and values; heroic autonomy 
concerns an ideal condition that a great majority of persons do not have; and autonomy as acting 
rationally concerns the ability to respond to reasons.400 
In the context of clinical decision-making, most bioethicists would agree that an 
autonomous medical decision can only be made by a competent patient. We usually consider a 
patient competent to make a medical decision when she has the basic abilities to understand and 
to communicate, and does not make gross logical mistakes. However, a competent person in this 
strictly medical sense may still lack autonomy. First, the patient may lack information about her 
disease or treatments (including the nature, outcomes, or side-effects). A decision that is based 
on insufficient information is irrational and, therefore, non-autonomous. In her decision-making, 
a competent patient may be influenced by her provider or her relatives. The presence of influence 
would render her decision as non-autonomous. Finally, a decision can be made on the spur of the 
moment without sufficient planning or deliberation. Such unintentional decision can be 
considered non-autonomous.  
One might argue that the main thread going through these discussions of autonomy is a 
conception of the person able to act, reflect, and choose on the basis of factors that are somehow 
her own (authentic in some sense). In other words, to be autonomous is to be true to self, to be 
directed by desires and considerations that are not imposed externally but are part of what can be 
considered one’s true self. In their influential definition, Faden and Beauchamp consider an 
action autonomous if it is performed intentionally with understanding and without controlling 
influences.401 Similarly, Beauchamp and Childress define this concept as “at a minimum, self-
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rule that is free from both controlling interference by others and from limitations, such as 
inadequate understanding, that prevent meaningful choice.”402 Therefore, an action can be 
considered autonomous when it is intentional or planned and not done by habit or accident. The 
decision-maker should possess full understanding of an action, the nature of the action, and the 
possible consequences of this action. The third condition of autonomous decision or action is that 
actions are free of external control, especially the kind of control or influence that may “rob the 
person of self-directedness.” In what will follow, I will take a closer look at these conditions, 
ways in which they are preserved in decision-making about end-of-life care, and the potential 
influence of heuristics or biases on each of these components.  
It is important to mention that autonomous decisions presuppose rationality. Irrational 
choices may not be fully autonomous because they imply errors in the understanding of relevant 
information or errors in self-determination.  Choosing irrationally is choosing on the basis of an 
error - either of belief grounding the choice or in the intended end of action or in the selection of 
the means to that end – and, thus, is inappropriate grounds for self-determination.403 As has been 
mentioned earlier, relevant information about a particular treatment, its nature, and possible 
outcomes is crucial for an autonomous decision. However, the information itself does not make a 
decision autonomous but, rather, it is how that information is processed and applied as relevant 
to a patient’s goals in seeking treatment. That is important in supporting autonomous decision-
making. Therefore, the importance of information for autonomous decision-making-consists in 
its ability to enhance the process of decision-making. Furthermore, people should make decisions 
that will benefit them. Their decisions and actions should be directed toward their best self-
interest. Over the past several decades, however, research in fields like cognitive psychology, 
behavioral economics, and neuroscience has revealed flaws in this cognitivist picture of 
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autonomy by pointing out critical roles for affect and emotion in decision-making. This research 
shows that people often make predictably irrational decisions and act not in their best self-
interest.  
According to decision-making science, people do not consistently or even regularly make 
rational decisions due to ‘bounded rationality.’ Suggested first by Simon, the bounded rationality 
framework assumes that people attempt to make optimal decisions, but their decisions are 
affected by the conditions under which the decisions are made. These include but are not limited 
to limits on available information, awareness of relevant criteria, time constraints, and limited 
memory.404 Furthermore, because of the robust conclusions demonstrated by decision-making 
science, it is possible to conclude that human decisions are biased - they are biased in predictable 
ways. One of the key concepts for this theory of human decision-making is the idea of a 
heuristic. A heuristic, more fully described in chapters two and three, is a shortcut or rule of 
thumb in a decision-making process. For example, patients may need to make a decision under 
time constraints. They may not have the opportunity to gather all the information that could be 
relevant to a decision they need to make. Instead of randomly choosing between options, they 
use a heuristic. Heuristics facilitate decisions made at a relatively rapid pace, but they also 
increase the likelihood of mistakes. Heuristics are not bad or inefficient—in many cases, they are 
much more efficient than laboriously researching every decision.405 Nonetheless, heuristics open 
up the decision-making process to certain predictable mistakes or biases. 
Bounded Rationality and Autonomy 
Bounded rationality and the presence of heuristics and biases in a decision-making 
process complicates our understanding of autonomy. Ideally, an autonomous decision is that 
made by a mentally competent, fully informed patient, arrived at through a process of rational 
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self-deliberation so that the agent’s chosen outcome can be justified and explained by reference 
to reasons which the patient has identified and endorsed. However, many medical decisions are 
influenced by underlying cognitive processes which may interfere with rational judgment. Under 
stressful and uncertain conditions, risk information is often misunderstood, and rational 
judgment can be obscured. According to a growing body of literature, rational decision-making 
in healthcare is bounded by a host of factors, including often faulty intuitions, context 
dependence, and strong risk aversion, which regularly trumps the attraction of an opportunity to 
benefit. Furthermore, a tendency to rely on heuristics in judgment frequently leads patients to 
make choices that are not only deemed irrational and undesirable by external observers or 
healthcare professionals but also would be deemed irrational and undesirable by the patient 
making the decision if she were taking into account all relevant and available information, 
including her own preferences.406 Given this reality, the following three questions need to be 
asked.  
Is it plausible to assume that most of patients’ decisions are autonomous? At the center 
of autonomy argument lies an idea that all people want to make the decisions that shape their 
lives. Few decisions are more consequential than end-of-life decisions. Therefore, patients must 
want to make their own medical decisions. In the reality of ICUs, patients and their families 
often shy away from their predominant role in medical decisions because they recognize that 
such decisions are very difficult, they lack experience with medical science, they recognize their 
difficulty with processing risk information, and they are not able to handle the reality of 
uncertainty present in each medical decision. Beyond cognitive limitations, simply being in the 
hospital can be intellectually disorienting and psychologically debilitating, especially during an 
ICU admission. As one patient puts it: “It is very confusing to be chronically ill. The machine of 
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my body is broken; a delicate poise between body and spirit is disturbed. I have been cut off 
from my past as an athlete, as a member of the work force, as a vital human being. Family 
relationships and friendships have altered. My life has been changed utterly. This is difficulty to 
grasp.”407 Even if the patient is competent, decisions may be altered by fear, by panic, by a 
passing preference for short-term comfort, by pain, by bitterness, by guilt, by depression, or by 
despair.  
One more requirement of an autonomous decision is the need to “provide the values – his 
or her own conception of the good – with which to evaluate alternatives, and to select the one 
that is best for himself or herself.”408 The values needed to make a medical decision raise the 
most imponderable questions people may ask. Because these values are so hard to face, to 
formulate, and to use in decision-making, they are usually unexplored. Patients or their 
surrogates don’t have a set of premediated and neatly-ordered values that would navigate their 
decision-making process. People lack what theorists of autonomy call “a set of preferences 
which are clearly-defined, well-understood, and rank-ordered so that people can make logical 
tradeoffs among them.”409 Additionally, their values and preferences may change with time as 
they learn more information or adjust to living with certain conditions. For instance, a 
longitudinal study asked patients to write advance directives and then questioned participants 
over two years about whether they would want various life-sustaining treatments if they were 
terminally ill. “Instability was substantial during the 2-year period in patients’ preference for a 
given treatment.”410 More specifically: “Of the patients who answered ‘yes’ to any of the 
questions at baseline, only 18% to 43% answered ‘yes’ to the same question at follow-up. 
Patients responding ‘no’ to baseline questions were more consistent, with 66% to 75% still 
answering ‘no’ at follow-up.”411 As another study explained, “Patients may change their wishes 
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for life-sustaining therapy because of their experience with their illness, changes in their 
subjective appreciation of their ‘quality of life,’ or changes in their evaluation of the benefits and 
burdens of life-sustaining measures as they realize the imminence of death.”412  Therefore, 
autonomy in its full understanding is not present in many medical decisions.  
Should autonomy be the guiding value in patient-physician communication? While we 
may acknowledge that patients’ decisions are rarely autonomous in the full sense of the term, 
physicians may still strive to make these choices autonomous based on the assumption that doing 
so has normative value. This assumption is grounded in understanding that patients and 
surrogates find it important to exercise their own autonomy. However, this presumed preference 
for non-interference has been challenged by a number of studies. For instance, a study of 
treatment preferences in the outpatient setting used a 0-100 scale to ascertain preference for 
being the one to make decisions where 0 meant a very low preference for autonomy in decision-
making, 50 was neutral, and 100 was very high. The average score given by patients was 33. The 
study used various treatment scenarios, and the more severe the illness scenario, the less patients 
wanted to make decisions themselves.413 A similar study in the ICU setting involved surrogate 
decision-makers. Of 789 surrogates of ICU patients, only 4 (0.5%) wished to make decisions 
without clinicians’ involvement, whereas 112 (14.8%) wished to leave decisions entirely to 
physicians, and the majority (84.7%) preferred some form of shared decision-making.414 This 
shows that while in other areas of life patients may prefer complete autonomy, when it comes to 
medical decisions. they may prefer not to be left to make decisions themselves.  
Is it possible to remove physicians’ influence? Despite the evidence that many clinical 
decisions may lack autonomy in its full understanding and that patients prefer some involvement 
on the part of their physicians, healthcare providers may still believe that they should not 
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influence decisions made by their patients. During their training, physicians are encouraged to 
remember that not everyone with a particular condition may choose the course of treatment 
which someone else has determined to be the most effective. This is especially true when the 
judgment about effectiveness was made according to a set of criteria defined by clinicians with 
little knowledge of what it is like to live with or have a loved one suffer from the condition. 
Therefore, it is assumed that an active involvement in the decision-making may harm the patient 
or family by inadvertently steering them in a certain direction which reflects a physician’s own 
bias. One may argue that it is impossible for physicians to fully separate their own values from 
the way they communicate with patients. When presenting patients with information regarding 
the risks and benefits of medical and surgical therapies for a particular condition, physicians 
must choose to lead with either the medical options or the surgical options; they must frame 
possible outcomes as chances for benefit, chances for harm, or both; and they must do all of this 
while often having a clear sense of what they would choose were they in the patient’s shoes. 
Inevitably, some choices will be presented first or as the default, and it will steer the preference 
of the physician’s patients in a certain way. The choice of presenting the risk of harms instead of 
the potential for benefit will influence their choices one way or another. Therefore, it is plausible 
to assume that the ethical task of physicians is not in avoiding influence but in avoiding 
restriction of choice. The following sections will take a closer look at the components of 
autonomous choice, namely comprehension, intentionality, and lack of persuasion. Each section 
will attempt to take a closer look at how these components are traditionally preserved in medical 
decision-making, how bounded rationality may pose challenges for each of these components, 
and why the focus on avoiding restriction of choice rather than preservation of autonomy may be 
warranted.  
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Comprehension 
The component of comprehension focuses on the deliberative process that requires 
possession of relevant information and time to consider the advantages and disadvantages of 
each option in order to choose the most valuable one. If a patient fails to comprehend key 
components of a decision or key components of its consequences, then this patient lacks the 
understanding required for autonomy with respect to that decision. In other words, for a decision 
to be autonomous, a patient should be able to understand the nature of the action and the 
foreseeable consequences and possible outcomes that might follow as a result of performing and 
not performing the action. Most of the decisions taking place in the ICU setting can be 
characterized as a tradeoff situation, where an intervention may decrease the likelihood of one 
symptom but increase the probability of others. Therefore, risk communication is a prominent 
part of every discussion between an intensivist and patients or surrogates. Comprehension of this 
information is a precondition of a rational and informed decision. However, due to the inherent 
uncertainty of the medical practice, this risk information often needs to be expressed in numbers. 
Uncertainty exists about the magnitude or severity of possible benefits and risks of an 
intervention. Uncertainty is also present in explaining the strength of current evidence about a 
particular treatment. 
 While this uncertainty and risk information is often conveyed numerically, a large body 
of research demonstrates that people generally have a great deal of difficulty using and 
responding to numerical information.415 Inability to interpret numerical information has the 
potential to negatively affect a variety of important outcomes, ranging from health decision-
making, use of interventions and therapies, adherence to a treatment, to even quality of life and 
mortality.416 Innumeracy is not correlated with educational achievement, and it is present even 
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among well-educated people. For example, Lipkus et al. asked three samples to imagine that the 
chance of getting a viral infection was .0005 and to estimate from this information how many of 
10,000 individuals would get the infection. All three samples were older (mean age 47, 53, and 
62 years), and more than 85% of them had at least some form of secondary education. 
Regardless, only 48.6% answered this item correctly, and when asked to convert a proportion (20 
out of 100) to a percentage, only 70.4% answered correctly.417  
In a healthcare setting, and especially in ICUs, risk is often elicited or presented as a 
frequency in fraction form (e.g., 8 of 100 patients die from this procedure). People often give 
undue weight to the numerator relative to the denominator in such a fraction; in the example 
above, they focus more on the 8 people who die than on the 92 who do not.418 When the 
denominator is increased, it affects risk perception. For instance, in one study, undergraduate 
students were asked to choose between two bowls of jelly beans—one with 1 red jelly bean out 
of 10 and the other with 7 red jelly beans out of 100—and were told they would win a prize if 
they randomly selected a red jelly bean out of the bowl they chose. Many preferred the second 
bowl (despite the lower probability of winning) because they focused on the 7 ways of winning 
compared with the 1 way of winning in the first bowl.419 In many cases, participants 
acknowledged the difference in probability, yet they still preferred the second bowl. This study 
also shows how emotions may influence risk perception.  
In a similar study, Slovic, Monahan, and MacGregor asked experienced forensic 
psychologists and psychiatrists to judge the likelihood that a mental patient would commit an act 
of violence within six months of being discharged. Clinicians who were given an expert’s 
assessment of a patient’s risk of violence framed in terms of relative frequency (“Of every 100 
patients similar to Mr. Jones, 10 are estimated to commit an act of violence.”) labeled Mr. Jones 
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as more dangerous than did clinicians who were shown risk as probability (“Patients similar to 
Mr. Jones are estimated to have a 10% chance of committing an act of violence.”). When 
clinicians were told that “20 out of every 100 patients similar to Mr. Jones are expected to 
commit an act of violence,” 41% refused to discharge the patient, compared to only 21% of 
clinicians who were told that “patients similar to Mr. Jones are estimated to have a 20% chance 
of committing an act of violence.”420 Subsequent studies show that representation of risk in the 
form of frequencies (“1 out of 20”), rather than probabilities, create emotional images of violent 
patients. These emotional images lead to a greater perception of risk.421 
The same group of researchers looked into the popular perception of correlation between 
risks and benefits of various activities. They noticed that while risk and benefit tend to be 
positively correlated (if a stock is riskier, it may offer a higher return), they are negatively 
correlated in people’s minds (herbal medicines perceived as high benefit and low risk).422 They 
concluded that this inverse relationship between perceived risk and perceived benefit of an 
activity is likely to be connected to the strength of positive or negative emotions associated with 
that activity. They called this inverse relationship an “affect heuristic.” This heuristic explains 
that when people feel that an activity is good, they appear to judge risks as low and benefits as 
high; if they feel that it is bad, they may judge the opposite – high risk and low benefit.423 
Finucane et al. explored this correlation further, showing that giving information about benefit 
changes the perception of risk and vice versa. For instance, giving information that benefit is 
high for a technology like nuclear power led to more positive emotion and decreased perceived 
risk.424 The researchers also showed that less deliberation due to time constraints greatly 
increases the inverse relationship between perceived risks and benefits.425  
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It is commonly assumed that in consideration of risk, one should, and does, pay attention 
to the likelihood of important potential consequences. However, emotions can cause decision-
makers to neglect to consider probability.  Loewenstein observed that when consequences carry 
emotionally charged meaning, as is the case with a lottery jackpot or a cancer, differences in 
probability will not mean much. Thus, one’s feelings toward winning the lottery will likely be 
similar whether the probability of winning is 1 in 10 million or 1 in 10 thousand.426 Under the 
uncertainty, people are likely to act in all or none manner, being sensitive to the possibility rather 
than the probability of positive or negative consequences, causing very small probabilities to 
carry great weight. The probability neglect is especially relevant for treatment decision-making. 
For instance, in oncology, the disease will act as an emotional cue that creates insensitivity to its 
relatively low risks of death (e.g., prostate cancer). In case of prostate cancer, the risk is reduced 
through treatment and monitoring but not eliminated and so the fear of cancer will remain, and it 
will cause high-risk perceptions. Further research shows that variations in the way that 
information is framed influences the interpretation and use of that information in medical 
decisions. Emotional processes definitely play a role in determining the strength and direction of 
such framing effects.  
Framing of healthcare information can be a strong predictor of the consecutive choices 
made by patients. Framing effect occurs when decision-makers respond differently to different 
but objectively equivalent descriptions of the same problem. There are many examples in the 
literature that demonstrate the occurrence of framing effects in patient-provider relationship. For 
instance, one study shows that negative messages containing the risk of not undergoing 
mammography (“Women who do not use mammography have a decreased chance of finding 
tumor in the early stages of the disease.”) was more persuasive than the positively-framed 
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message (“Women who use mammography have an increased chance of finding tumor in the 
early stages of the disease.”).427 Another study by McNeil et al. presented respondents with 
information about the outcomes of two treatments for lung cancer. Although the statistics 
presented were identical, they were framed in terms of survival or mortality rates. Even though 
respondents should react similarly to both statistical presentations, the number of those who 
favored radiation therapy over surgery went from 18% for those presented with the survival 
framing to 44% for those presented with the mortality framing.428 Similarly, in the ICU setting, a 
provider may facilitate the decision about treatment withdrawal, focusing on the concept that 
“there is nothing more medically to be done” and invoking the image of abandonment and letting 
one die. They can also present this decision as the optimal level of care at the given stage of the 
patient’s illness, not focusing on what is medically effective but rather what is beneficial.  
In addition to framing, optimism bias is the lens through which surrogate decision makers 
interpret information about potential risks and prognosis. Prognostic information strongly 
influences treatment decisions near the end of life, but there is often a disconnect between the 
information conveyed by the ICU doctor and the way surrogates interpret the meaning. In a 
recent study, researchers surveyed 80 surrogate decision-makers at three ICUs in San Francisco. 
The participants read statements such as “He will definitely survive,” “He has a 90% chance of 
surviving,” “He has a 5% chance of surviving,” and “He will definitely not survive,” and then 
noted their interpretation of the survival odds on a scale marked in 10% intervals from 0 to 
100%. The researchers found that participants accurately interpreted statements when the 
prognosis was generally good. However, that was not the case with poor prognoses: 40% of 
surrogates interpreted the 50% survival chance more optimistically than stated, and nearly two-
thirds interpreted a 5% survival chance more optimistically than stated. When asked to explain 
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overly optimistic expectations, participant responses included: “I hold on to hope strongly,” “We 
are talking about my father in this case, not just any patient,” and “They’re not giving you a real 
figure.”429 This research indicates that in the ICU setting, family members want to see the glass 
as half full, even if it’s really nearly empty. This leads them to misinterpret important 
information.  
In order to secure a better comprehension of information, ICU providers often resort to 
decision aids. A decision aid is a “tool that provides patients with evidence-based, objective 
information on all treatment options for a given condition. Decision aids present the risks and 
benefits of all options and help patients understand how likely it is that those benefits or harms 
will affect them.”430 Decision aids can include written material, Web-based tools, videos, and 
multimedia programs. Some decision aids are designed for patient use, and others are designed 
for clinicians to use with patients. Currently, there are more than 500 decision aid tools available, 
while many organizations such as AHRQ, the NCI, the Informed Medical Decisions Foundation, 
Healthwise, and many others are working on developing new tools.431 Video decision aids have 
been effective in the cancer setting in promoting patients' understanding of end-of-life care 
options. For instance, in a recent study by Dr. Volandes et al., patients with terminal cancer who 
viewed a three-minute video demonstrating cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) were less 
likely to indicate a preference for receiving CPR in the event of an in-hospital cardiac arrest than 
patients who only listened to an oral description of the procedure.432 The use of decision aids 
enhances the procedure of obtaining informed consent for various risky procedures.  
Intentionality 
Intentionality requires that actions are initiated and performed according to a patient’s 
goals and plan. At a minimum, patients should articulate their preferences and then settle on a 
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course of action that implements their preferences. The component of intentionality also requires 
that patients participate in the development of the treatment plan. Faden and Beauchamp write, 
“Whether a given act, X, is intentional, depends on whether in performing X the actor could, 
upon reflection say, ‘I did X as planned,’ and in that sense, ‘I did the X I intended to do.’”433 
Beauchamp and Childress also emphasize the importance of planning to achieve an intended 
outcome. It is not enough to just have a desired outcome in mind to fulfill the condition of 
intentionality. For example, if a cancer patient deciding what course of treatment to pursue only 
intends “to get better,” it is not apparent that they have intended any particular course of 
treatment. Anything from faith healing to invasive surgery might play a part in achieving such an 
end, and by intending only “to get better,” the patient has not made sufficiently clear what they 
are after.434  
Intentionality is not a matter of degree; an action is either intentional or unintentional. 
However, philosophers may disagree on what actions should be called intentional. What happens 
when an intentional action produces an unintentional side effect? In other words, one and the 
same action can be both intentional and unintentional. For example, one may alert the burglar by 
turning on the light. The person may have been intentional under the description “turning on the 
light,” but not under “alerting the burglar.” In this case, we have an intentional action that was 
not intended by the one performing it. A lot of literature on intentionality has focused on several 
ways in which moral considerations can magnify the distinction between intentionality and 
unintentional actions. Most of this literature has focused on the following pair of cases, devised 
by Joshua Knobe: 
Harm Vignette: The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and 
said, “We are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase profits, but it will also 
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harm the environment.” The chairman of the board answered, “I don’t care at all about harming 
the environment. I just want to make as much profit as I can. Let’s start the new program.” They 
started the new program. Sure enough, the environment was harmed. 
Help Vignette: The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and 
said, “We are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase profits, but it will also 
help the environment.” The chairman of the board answered, “I don’t care at all about helping 
the environment. I just want to make as much profit as I can. Let’s start the new program.” They 
started the new program. Sure enough, the environment was helped.  
Knobe reports that 82% of respondents participating in his study describe the chairman as 
having intentionally harmed the environment. But given the previous discussion about side 
effects, the chairman did not intend to harm the environment since he did not desire this result. 
Interestingly, the Help Vignette elicits very different reactions, with only 23% of respondents 
describing the chairman as having intentionally helped the environment.435 This research 
demonstrates how moral considerations regarding the intentionality of an action can be affected 
by emotional considerations. Additionally, some consequences of an action may not necessarily 
be unwanted but just unlikely. Consider the following example: Time is running out in the 
basketball game. Jim has the ball at half-court and, knowing that the only chance for victory is a 
last second shot, throws the ball toward the hoop. Miraculously, the ball goes in. Did Jim hit the 
shot intentionally? Opinions differ, and just like in the example of help and harm vignettes, 
emotions may impact the way we think about the intentionality of an act. Ronald Butler 
demonstrates this in the following example: “If Brown in an ordinary game of dice hopes to 
throw a six and does so, we do not say that he threw the six intentionally. On the other hand, if 
Brown puts one live cartridge into a six-chambered revolver, spins the chamber as he aims it at 
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Smith and pulls the trigger hoping to kill Smith, we would say if he succeeded that he had killed 
Smith intentionally. How can this be so, since in both cases the probability of the desired result is 
the same?”436 
Emotions may impact not only the way we think about the concept of intentionality but 
also the ability to act intentionally in a healthcare context. Given that one of the preconditions of 
intentionality is planning, or the ability for a person to look back on an act or decision and to say 
that she planned to do that, emotions can cause a bypass in the planning stage. Default bias or 
status quo bias is one of the ways in which emotions may interfere with intentionality. Default 
bias suggests that people are much more likely to stick with the status quo than what we might 
expect given the benefits of switching to another option. In studies of retirement savings, for 
example, researchers have found that default bias plays a significant role in determining whether 
or not employees participate in a 401(K) plan. Until recently, the default option for most 401(K) 
plans was non-participation, meaning that employees had to actively choose to participate. 
Changing the default option to participation—with no other changes to the benefits—leads to 
significantly higher participation in the 401(K) plan.437  
Similar preferences for default options are evident in many healthcare decisions. Organ 
donation rates are an often-used example of the power of defaults. European countries such as 
Austria, Belgium, Spain, and others adopted a “presumed consent” organ donation system that 
assumes people want to donate their organs unless they specifically say otherwise. As a result, 
they have 85-99% organ donation participation rates. In other countries, such as Germany, the 
United Kingdom, or the Netherlands with ‘opt in’ systems where people can note their organ 
donation decision on their driver's license and/or sign up to be donors through a state registry, 
participation rates stay between 4-27% only.438 Additionally, in a study of asthma patients, 
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researchers noted a similar “status quo” bias or preference toward current medication even when 
better alternatives were offered. Advance directives can serve as an example of critical care 
choices affected by defaults. It is a well-known fact that most ICU patients value comfort and 
dignity over prolonging of life, but ICU care is often geared toward extending life by all means 
possible. Deviating from this life-extending norm requires that someone actively request or 
suggest doing so. Advance directives are an opportunity to counter this life-extending norm and 
actively choose comfort care. However, the same default preference for life-extending treatment 
exists in the text and structure of this form. Patients have to ‘opt out’ from the unwanted care 
instead of ‘opting in’ and actively select the care they prefer while having comfort care as the 
default. Researchers suggest changing defaults in advance directives forms so that patients’ 
preferences for comfort care and their treatment choices were more aligned.439  
One other way in which emotions may influence intentionality is by negatively impacting 
what the person has decided on and intends to do. The following example shared by Peter Ubel 
can demonstrate how this might occur. He tells the story of a well-educated pregnant physician 
who had given much thought to whether or not to have an amniocentesis to test for certain 
genetic abnormalities. She had weighed the potential consequences of having and not having the 
test and decided to not have the test. However, once in her obstetrician’s office, she saw a young 
boy with a genetic abnormality, fell prey to the availability heuristic (associating the probability 
of an event with the ease with which an occurrence can be brought to mind), and told her 
physician that she wanted the test.440 One can modify this example to demonstrate some other 
ways of emotional interference with intentionality. For instance, this physician could have 
arrived at her obstetrician’s office and discovered that the majority of other women in the office 
were planning to have the test. She then changed her mind and told her physician that she wanted 
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to have the test, finding herself doing something that was not at all what she intended to do 
(bandwagon effect).  
The article “Cure Me Even If It Kills Me: Preferences for Invasive Cancer Treatment” 
demonstrates how emotions may impact intentionality in critical care. In this study, researchers 
found that when faced with a hypothetical cancer diagnosis, many people say they would pursue 
treatment (surgery) even if doing so would increase their chance of death, demonstrating a clear 
commission bias, or a drive to “do something.”441 It is not uncommon to encounter patients who 
weighed pros and cons, decided that surgery was not worth it, and have no intention to pursue it. 
However, later on, they give in to the intensity of this commission bias, undermining their 
intention to forgo treatment. Many treatment choices in the ICU are shrouded with uncertainty. 
Naturally, people have an intense aversion to uncertainty called ‘ambiguity aversion’ bias. 
Affected by ambiguity aversion, people may choose the option that is most certain even if its 
outcome is worse. Such choices have no impact on intentionality. However, in the ICU context, 
patients may have to choose between two options that both involve significant uncertainty, and 
the options may be so adverse that the patient fails to form an intention about which option to 
pursue. For instance, patients needing to make very difficult choices such as death or life on a 
ventilator may be paralyzed by such choices and not able to form an intention.  
Shared decision-making has been described as the most ethical and appropriate approach 
for making important decisions in ICU care. While this concept of sharing the responsibility for 
and control over medical decisions between clinicians and patients has been in existence for at 
least thirty years, in 2004, North American and European critical care societies endorsed it as the 
model of decision-making.442 This model is grounded in a recognition of the limited decision-
making ability of patients and their surrogates and gives the physician an active role in the 
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decision-making process bounded by constraints of respecting autonomy. The way to preserve 
intentionality in this model is by asking physicians to learn of the patient’s values but only to 
assist in matching those values with the medical facts of the situation. In this exchange, the 
physician offers choices and evidence while the surrogates or patients explain their values. Then, 
collaboratively, they search for a solution that is both consistent with the evidence and in 
accordance with patient values. The collaborative nature of this model separates it from 
paternalism, where a physician makes the decision with little input from family, or the informed 
choice model, where a physician provides information but withholds their opinion. There are a 
number of competencies that are required on the part of physicians for the successful 
implementation of this model. Providers should be skilled in eliciting the patient’s preferences 
and values and accommodating his communication to the families’ preferred role in decision-
making. They should also provide complete and consistent medical information as well as their 
assessment of the patient’s prognosis.443  
Lack of Persuasion 
 The early discussions of personal autonomy, attributed to the 1970s works of Harry 
Frankfurt and Gerald Dworkin, were concerned with the kind of individual freedoms that ought 
to be protected. They assumed that everything we do is a response to past and present 
circumstances over which we have no control. It is impossible to govern one’s self without being 
influenced by powers or circumstances over which the subject has no control. Some of these 
external forces that move us to act do not only affect our choice of actions or the way we govern 
ourselves in making these choices. They influence us in a way that may undermine our 
autonomy. What distinguishes autonomy-undermining influences on a person's decision, 
intention, or will from those motivating forces that merely play a role in the self-governing 
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process? Dworkin writes, “It is only when a person identifies with the influences that motivate 
him, assimilates them to himself, views himself as the kind of person who wishes to be moved in 
particular ways, that these influences are to be identified as ‘his.’”444 In other words, our 
decisions are worth protecting if they are rooted in our values and goals. They are not worth 
protecting if they run counter to those values, commitments, and goals. It is not worth protecting 
the decision of a weak-willed person who decides to do something against her better judgment 
and against her conscious desire to do otherwise. On the other hand, it is worth protecting one’s 
decision to pursue an action that aligns with her consciously held values, even if it is not what we 
ourselves would have done. Frankfurt and Dworkin call this hierarchy of desires.445  
 Hierarchy of desires calls us to distinguish between first order desires and second order 
desires. Dworkin explains that a first order desire is a desire for anything other than a desire; a 
second order desire is a desire for a desire. For example, a person might have a first order desire 
to smoke a cigarette and a second order desire that she desire not to smoke a cigarette. A second 
order desire may or may not correspond with a first order desire. For instance, one may want to 
have a desire to give all her money to a charity since she believes that having such a desire 
would make her be an excellent person. Nonetheless, she might not actually want that desire to 
be effective. She might think that giving her money away would be a terrible idea. When a 
person does want the first order desire to be effective, when they want it to be their will, 
Frankfurt calls this a second order desire.446  
Some may lack second order desires altogether. Frankfurt calls such creatures wantons. 
He claims that non-human animals and children are all wantons in this sense. He uses the 
example of a drug addict to contrast wantons with people who have second order desires. In his 
example, he asks readers to consider the difference between a willing and an unwilling drug 
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addict.447 Frankfurt argues that although both are addicted, only the unwilling addict is non-
autonomous wanton. He is a “passive bystander” with respect to the desire to use drugs, whereas 
the willing addict engages and identifies with that desire and, therefore, endorses it. In other 
words, first order desires – such as a desire to inject heroin – are autonomous only when they are 
endorsed by second order desires – such as a desire to desire to inject heroin. In Frankfurt and 
Dworkin’s understanding, the origins of higher order desires are not important. These desires can 
be influenced socially or relationally. The origin of desires does not matter, only the ability of the 
person to identify with them.448  
John Christman develops this account of autonomy that incorporates the means and 
processes by which a person arrives to certain decisions and desires. He argues that if a person is 
brainwashed into having a desire, this person will lack autonomy with respect to that desire and 
resulting action. Therefore, the person is autonomous with respect to a decision or a desire when 
she: (a) did not resist the development of the first order desire when attending to the process of 
development. Or (in cases where she did not attend to the process of development), she would 
not have resisted the development had she attended to the process. (b) And, the lack of resistance 
was not under the influence of factors that might inhibit self-reflection. (c) And, the self-
reflection was “minimally rational” (meaning that it did not involve self-deception or mistakes in 
logical inference). (d) And, the agent is minimally rational with respect to desire at t (where 
minimal rationality demands that an agent experience no manifest conflicts of desires or beliefs 
that significantly affect the agent’s behavior and that are not subsumed under some otherwise 
rational plan of action).449  
Emotions may diminish autonomous agency by acting as controlling or alienating 
influences on decision-making. Controlling influences are ones that are overwhelmingly difficult 
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to resist. Frankfurt’s example of a willing or unwilling addict is a good example of someone who 
is subject to a controlling influence from the inside. It is possible to assume that a person could 
recognize being influenced by heuristics or emotions and try very hard to resist its influence but 
be unsuccessful. The more likely threat is that a person finds emotions and heuristics to be 
alienating influencers on her decision-making. In Christman’s account, an autonomous decision 
involves a person reflecting on the process by which a certain desire or decision was formed and 
not resisting the development of that desire or decision when attending to the process of 
development. If a person feels alienated from her desire or decision in light of the process by 
which it was informed (as if it is not “her”), then autonomy is threatened.450 Christman gives 
examples of someone who was brainwashed, makes a decision under hypnosis, or is a victim of 
over manipulation. It is plausible to assume that a person may feel alienated by her decision 
when she learns that it was influenced by a heuristic or emotion.451 For instance, a patient may 
decide that she wants a course of radiation therapy. As in the example above, this decision could 
have been influenced by framing heuristics. Her oncologist may inform her that her favorable 
decision is the result of his choice framing when he told her about the 90% survival rate instead 
of mentioning the 10% mortality rate. If he would have told her about 10% mortality rate, she 
would have likely decided against radiation therapy. This patient may retrospectively feel as if 
that was not really her decision but just an outcome of emotional influences and framing.  
Atul Gawande, in his book Being Mortal, shares the story of a cancer patient. Her 
husband reflects on pursuing surgeries and treatments that had not made his wife better and may 
have even made her worse or shortened her life. He says, “I’ve often thought, what did that cost 
us? What did we miss out on, or forgo, by consistently pursuing treatment after treatment, which 
made her sicker and sicker? We should have started earlier with the effort to have quality time 
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together. . . chemo had made her so weak she couldn’t even hold [their baby] and that was not 
good outcome for the final months . . . it’s not where we wanted to be.”452 This narrative can 
serve as an illustration of how emotional influence on their choices and decisions resulted in 
feelings of alienation from their decisions and desires, posing a threat to autonomy. Advance 
directives are always perceived as an antidote to these types of regrets and feelings of alienation 
from previous decisions. These forms are not merely an evidence of what will be good for the 
later incompetent patient (which can be altered when more reliable facts come along). Advance 
directives serve as acts of self-determination. These forms demonstrate a congruency between 
first and second order desires in regard to a specific treatment.  
In order to complete an advance directive, patients are asked to think about how well they 
might adjust emotionally to a progressive decline in health. However, the accuracy of their 
predictions about their future well-being, and consequently the role of these predictions in their 
decision-making, is questionable. People usually tend to exaggerate the intensity and duration of 
negative emotions in response to loss. For instance, respondents without a particular disability 
consistently rank their predicted quality of life much lower than those actually living with that 
disability. This leads to the conclusion that people underestimate their psychological defenses 
and coping mechanisms that help them to adjust in a crisis situation. Analogous to the 
physiological immune system that protects the body from unwanted intruders, there is a 
psychological immune system designed to protect emotional systems from potential threats. 
These defense mechanisms and coping skills usually work on an unconscious level that makes it 
more difficult to recognize and rely on them in attempts to predict a future quality of life.453 
Another variable that affects the quality of prediction is the temporal proximity to the event. One 
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tends to be more accurate predicting future feelings in response to an event that is relatively soon 
rather than to one far in the future.  
However, as the name implies, advance directives require making decisions in advance, 
being temporarily removed from the experience and having to parse one’s current affective state 
from an emotional state that might be experienced in the future. This discrepancy between states 
is described by Loewenstein as “cold-to-hot” and “hot-to-cold” empathy gaps.454 In cold-to-hot 
empathy gaps, people in cold emotional states, being relatively healthy, have to make decisions 
about emotionally-charged moments of their lives. For instance, the research done on drug 
addicts in a non-craving state reported the optimism of respondents about the effort needed to 
withstand temptation if they went out with friends several days in the future. This optimism 
stems from a failure to acknowledge that their future emotional state, a state of craving, will be 
overwhelmingly powerful. Similarly, advance directives are often signed in a relatively cold 
affective state, discounting the range of emotions and desires a patient may be feeling near the 
end of life. On the other hand, people often sign advance directives in hot-to-cold states when 
they are emotionally overwhelmed and have to make decisions about a future state without 
taking their current emotional state into account.455 Often, the delivery of bad news (such as the 
presence of malignancy or a very bad test result) is accompanied with the recommendation to 
complete advance directives. Patients, being devastated by this news, may assess their future 
risks and make decisions discounting the acknowledgment of their present state. Remorse and 
regret might be the outcome of these decisions. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that the process of shaping patients’ or surrogates’ 
decisions is an inescapable reality. The way physicians frame their questions or present relevant 
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medical information will inevitably shape surrogates’ or patients’ preferences. Most of the 
solutions proposed so far have been focused on minimizing the influence of heuristics and biases 
by either alerting people about these influences or framing things in a variety of ways to reduce 
the pull of a potential frame. For instance, a physician going through the decision-making and 
consent process with a patient should provide this patient with the frame of both survival and 
mortality. However, this physician should also pair these frames in such a way that survival 
would be first in one set, and, then, mortality would be first in the second set in order to avoid 
anchoring bias. Survival and mortality rates should be presented in both percentages and 
frequencies to avoid the frequency/percentage bias. This list can go on.  
This reality may lead some to argue for the applicability of non-argumentative forms of 
influence in the process of decision-making. Being grounded in the principles of behavioral 
economics, this “soft paternalistic” model makes use of interventions aimed at suggesting one 
choice over another by gently steering individual choices and enhancing directions, yet without 
imposing any significant limit on available choices. This model proposes to organize the context 
in which surrogates make decisions and minimize the negative impact of cognitive biases against 
potentially beneficial choices and outcomes. Physicians should assume responsibility in 
recognizing the previously mentioned contextual influences that may hamper the ability of 
surrogates to achieve their goals. Furthermore, they should modify these contextual factors and 
biases in a way that would assist surrogates in reaching their desired outcomes. In cases where 
there is one treatment that provides a greater measure of comfort or leads to improved clinical 
outcomes, physicians should attempt to influence or steer decision-making processes to help 
surrogates or patients choose that particular intervention. For instance, when a young patient who 
has lost limbs in recovery from sepsis refuses to continue treatment because of not being able to 
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imagine life without the ability to move around, it might be ethically justifiable to persuade him 
to go on with the treatment by focusing his attention on the number of things he will be able to 
do afterward.  
This approach of aiming at influencing choice without restricting it is obviously 
questionable due to a number of considerations. Physicians may influence choices to serve their 
own interests. Their authority in interfering with value-laden decisions can be objectionable. 
Most of the objections pertain to the ideals of clinical autonomy and decision-making, but their 
practical application is plausible under the condition of certainty. However, confidence is not 
achievable in the context of the ICU as none of the factors that may influence surrogates’ 
decisions can be known with certainty. Most of the ICU patients suffer from a number of co-
existing acute and aggressive conditions, making the prognostication efforts extremely difficult. 
Some of them are admitted to the ICU with rare conditions for which there is little known in 
terms of outcomes. Whether the patient’s past experiences of treatment or the clinician’s 
experience of treating other patients with similar symptoms is the basis for judgment about the 
likely effects of an intervention, there is no escape from the reality of uncertainty about the 
outcomes. The uncertainty about utility of most ICU interventions is inevitable. Under the 
conditions of uncertainty, surrogates will take their decisional cues from the attending intensivist. 
This uncertainty will inevitably affect the way intensivists present options and communicate with 
the family.  
This chapter questions the traditional paradigm of using autonomy as the central 
decision-making priority for incapacitated patients in the ICU context. While many clinicians 
may believe that they have a duty to reduce personal influences on their patients’ decisions, this 
chapter suggests that removing clinicians’ influence from the decision-making process is neither 
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possible nor desirable. Knowledge of relevant medical information about risks and benefits is 
believed to foster the rational aspect of surrogate decision-making. This chapter highlighted 
many cognitive difficulties in processing risk information, questioning the ability of surrogates to 
have an operational level of knowledge. Finally, the ability of advance directives to secure the 
intentionality of patients’ decisions and guard them from undue influence was questioned on the 
grounds of research in affective forecasting errors. The concept of shared decision-making and 
the possibility of shaping patients’ decisions were suggested as possible remedies for gaps in 
substituted judgment.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
NUDGES 
Introduction 
Behavioral economics can be defined as the discipline that applies behavioral science 
principles to the studying of economic reasoning. It is often presented as an attempt to anchor 
economics within other social and natural sciences, from psychology to neuroscience.456 This 
field of inquiry emerged as a reaction to the assumption, made by traditional economists, that 
individuals were always rational. Behavioral economists use knowledge from behavioral science 
to study how individuals make decisions which are often non-rational and biased by a series of 
mental shortcuts. For instance, it looks at the role of emotions or social surroundings in the 
decision-making process. Behavioral economics offers a different perspective on behavioral 
change. Its philosophy is that people should not be forced to act in certain ways but, rather, 
gently encouraged to act in ways that are better for them or help them stop bad habits formed 
over time. This idea of a “gentle push” or “nudge” is based on libertarian paternalism and favors 
invitations to change behaviors rather than the introduction of constraints and sanctions to obtain 
behavior change. The discipline emerged with the work of Thaler at the University of Chicago, 
who first suggested that using knowledge from behavioral science could induce soft changes in 
people’s behaviors.  
These “soft paternalistic” approaches make use of interventions aimed at suggesting one 
choice over another by gently steering individual choices and enhancing directions yet without 
imposing a limit on available choices. Nudges propose to organize the context in which people 
make decisions and minimize the negative impact of cognitive biases against healthy behaviors. 
These terms “nudge” and “libertarian paternalism” were first used in Richard Thaler and Cass 
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Sunstein’s book of the same title to describe “any aspect of the choice architecture that alters 
people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing 
their economic incentives.”457 Consider a sample of health-affecting influence attempts labelled 
“nudge” in the Nudge book or its official online companion edited by John Balz, The Nudge 
blog: 
“Cafeteria. A cafeteria manager places healthy food at eye-level at the beginning of the 
food queue. Unhealthy food comes last and is least visible. The customer is then more likely to 
purchase healthy food.”458 
“Deposit Contract. All primary care physicians of a healthcare system offer their patients 
the possibility to voluntarily deposit an agreed-upon sum of money with the physicians. The 
physicians will then return it to the patients in small installments if the latter meet certain agreed-
upon objectives to improve their health (e.g., losing weight, exercising, quitting smoking).”459 
“Generic Medication. Medicare beneficiaries are given generic medication by default but 
are offered the option of getting the brand-name drug.”460  
“HIV-Test Cash Transfer. In Malawi, residents who pick up their HIV-test results receive 
10% of their daily wage in cash.”461 
“Less Than You Think. University campuses in Montana organize an alcohol 
consumption-reduction campaign accurately stating that 81% of Montana college students have 
four or fewer alcoholic drinks each week. The campaign underlines the fact that the majority of 
students binge-drink less often than what most students assume.”462 
“Paternal Competition. In an Indian village, health professionals post children's medical 
test results in a public place, creating competition among fathers to improve their children's 
health.”463 
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Although some of these interventions may preserve freedom of choice, some ethicists 
argue that others do not. For them, preserving freedom of choice requires more than avoiding the 
use of outright coercion, because we also care about the control an individual has over her 
evaluations and choices. This chapter considers potential nudges that may improve 
communication and choices in end-of-life care. In addition to reviewing potential nudges in end-
of-life care, this chapter addresses the ethical aspects of using these strategies in healthcare. 
Given the current aspirations of medical professionals around increasing patient empowerment 
and promoting freedom and fairness, to what extent does nudge support these aims? This chapter 
explores the following questions: Can nudge be empowering, and can it bring about changes that 
are fair and sustainable? Should one be worried about the paternalistic aspect of nudging? What 
are the ethical limits of using nudges in critical care?  
Why Nudges in ICU? 
By the year 2050, the proportion of the US population that is over the age of 65 will 
increase to 20.3%.464 This trend will have a major impact on the organization and delivery of 
healthcare, more specifically with the shift in focus from acute to chronic illnesses. Presently, 
two-thirds of people aged 65 and older suffer from serious, multiple chronic conditions.465 By 
contrast, 31 percent of those aged 45 to 64 and only 6 percent of those aged 18 to 44 were treated 
for two or more chronic conditions in 2009.466 Patients with chronic illness in their last two years 
of life account for about 32% of total Medicare spending, much of it going toward physician and 
hospital fees associated with repeated hospitalizations.467 In fact, almost a third of the US 
population saw ten or more physicians in the last six months of their life.468 According to the 
Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care, more than 80 percent of patients with chronic diseases say they 
want to avoid hospitalization and intensive care when they are dying. However, hospitalizations 
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during the last six months of life are steadily increasing from 1,302 hospital admissions per 1000 
Medicare recipients in 1996 to 1,442 in 2005. These hospitalizations often result in prolonged 
ICU stays. The same report indicates that in 1996, only 10 percent of Medicare recipients spent 
at least a week in an ICU during their last six months of life; by 2005, the number was 14.4 
percent.469  This statistic demonstrates that we have a rapidly growing subset of aging population 
with complex medical needs. Even though most of these people would prefer to avoid repeated 
hospitalizations and ICU admissions in their last months of life, exactly the opposite is 
happening. We spend most of our healthcare budget providing expensive and mostly ineffective 
critical care when people are approaching their end.   
Increased utilization of critical care does not necessarily translate into better health 
outcomes. A recent study shows that more than one in ten patients being treated in ICUs were at 
some point receiving what doctors deemed to be futile care. In those cases, intensivists believed 
patients would never survive outside an ICU or that the burdens of their care “grossly 
outweighed” any benefits. Treating each of those patients costs about $4,000 per day.470 The 
U.S. spends more hospital resources on critical care medicine than any other country, as 
evidenced by it having among the highest ratios of ICU-bed-to-population (20 ICU beds per 
100K) and ICU-to-hospital-bed (9 per 100 hospital beds) in the world.471 While ICU beds 
account for approximately 10 percent of hospital beds, they also attract 20 percent of all 
healthcare costs.472  In addition, nearly 25 percent of healthcare resources are spent on the 6 
percent of people who die in a given year.473 Because approximately 20 percent of deaths in the 
United States occur during or shortly after a stay in the ICU,474 critical care represents an 
important and expensive setting for end-of-life care. Consequently, ICU-based end-of-life care is 
considered the primary target for reducing healthcare costs.  
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The need to decrease overutilization of ICU-based end-of-life care is not driven by purely 
economic considerations. Healthcare policy makers and public health specialists are guided by 
the overarching goal of ensuring that people nearing the end of life are receiving high-quality 
care consistent with their needs and preferences. However, a growing body of research suggests 
a mismatch between the services most readily available to people near the end of life (acute care) 
and what they most often say they want (supportive services).475 Clinical interactions at the end 
of life focus almost exclusively on the possibility of prolonging life, failing to account for other 
patient and family goals such as human interaction, autonomy, dignity, and spirituality. Many 
interventions that patients receive near their end of life are not evidence-based, do not meet 
patients’ needs, and often subject them to harm. For instance, CPR and dialysis are offered to 
patients even when they are likely to be ineffective and burdensome.476 Feeding tubes for the 
delivery of artificial nutrition and hydration continue to be inserted in patients with aspiration 
pneumonia despite strong evidence demonstrating their ineffectiveness in preventing such 
pneumonias.477 The need to travel to the hospital for insertion of such tubes can increase 
agitation and confusion in frail patients. As a matter of fact, research shows that seven out of ten 
Americans say they would prefer to die at home, according to a systematic review of evidence,478 
but according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, only 25 percent actually do.479 
Ending up in the hospital often means aggressive, high-cost treatment at the expense of 
quality of life. A 2010 Dartmouth study of elderly cancer patients nearing death found that 9% 
had a breathing tube, feeding tube, or other life-prolonging procedure in the last month.480 
Feeding tubes can lead to infections while doing little to prolong life in the elderly. A breathing 
tube may extend life but detract from its quality since many patients must be restrained or 
sedated to avoid pulling out these supports. Although palliative care services have been 
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established in many hospitals across the nation, too many patients still experience unacceptable 
levels of pain and discomfort and receive inadequate attention to preventing or ameliorating their 
symptoms in their last days.481 Receiving palliative care sooner rather than later often makes a 
dying person's final days more comfortable. It may also give them more time. A 2007 study 
found that hospice patients lived 29 days longer on average than those who did not receive such 
services. The authors suggest this can be partially attributed to improved monitoring and 
psychosocial support.482 Therefore, there is a mismatch between the values and preferences of 
chronically ill people approaching their last days and the type of care they receive. While they 
prefer to spend their last days at home, they are often hospitalized. Hospitalizations result in 
aggressive and costly treatment that significantly reduces overall quality of life. It also leaves 
families in debt. One study found that out-of-pocket expenses for Medicare recipients during the 
five years before their death averaged about $39,000 for individuals, $51,000 for couples, and up 
to $66,000 for people with long-term illnesses.483 
From the statistics above, it is obvious that the end-of-life process is driven by the 
medical system’s focus on performing aggressive interventions at any cost while forcing many 
people who are dying to not get the care they want. What can be done to solve this problem of 
overutilization of unnecessary and aggressive care at the end of life? The obvious solutions 
would be to have people communicate their wishes and preferences for their last months of life. 
The problem with this communication, often resulting in a completed advance directive, is that 
people prefer not to talk about death. They don’t like to prepare for the inevitability of death 
when they are healthy or to acknowledge its proximity when a family member is terminally ill. 
According to a California Healthcare Foundation survey, six out of ten people say they don’t 
want their family burdened by end-of-life decisions. However, nearly as many, 56 percent, have 
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not communicated their preferences.484 Another review of studies conducted between 2011 and 
2016 suggests that only one-third of US adults have some kind of advance directive. The study 
included data on nearly 800,000 people, and only 36% had an advance directive. The rates of 
completion were close between adults with chronic conditions (about 38%) and otherwise 
healthy patients (about 33%).485   
In 2012, the CDC classified the lack of advance directives and planning for end-of-life 
care as a public health issue.486 Not only does advance care planning have the ability to prevent 
unnecessary suffering and improve quality of care, but this planning can also lead to cost-
effective care for the millions of individuals who die each year. Furthermore, end-of-life 
planning completed before dire circumstances exist will both reinforce patient autonomy and 
dignity, and will aid surrogates and family members in making difficult decisions. The irrational 
fear of advance care planning not only deters individuals from talking to their families about 
their wishes, but it also prevents systemic changes from being implemented to encourage these 
conversations to happen more often in hospital settings. In 2009, early drafts of President 
Obama’s healthcare proposal included a provision to pay for voluntary end-of-life conversations 
between providers and patients. Republicans claimed this idea amounted to creating “death 
panels,” believing it would allow government officials to decide whether sick people get to live. 
Vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin described her understanding of this proposal as follows: 
“The America I know and love is not one in which my parents or my baby with Down Syndrome 
will have to stand in front of Obama's 'death panel' so his bureaucrats can decide, based on a 
subjective judgment of their 'level of productivity in society,' whether they are worthy of health 
care.”487 
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 A number of personal and systemic factors are responsible for the failure to ensure that 
the wishes of chronically ill patients are known and respected. Systemic changes were prevented 
from taking place because of irrational fears of “death panels.” Fear of death leads to the 
reluctance of patients, families, and clinicians to explore end-of-life issues. The delivery of 
healthcare is naturally geared towards aggressive care. Moreover, in the fragmented care system, 
it is easy for providers to make the discussion of end-of-life preferences “someone else’s 
problem.” When conversations about end-of-life issues take place, they are happening too late, 
often days before death. These crucial conversations are often held in hurried or crisis situations. 
These conversations need to be ongoing and revisited often since caring for critically ill patients 
requires nearly constant decision-making. Ideally, families should be able to carefully consider 
the risks and benefits of each choice before settling on the option that maximizes the patient’s 
well-being. However, the emotions and time pressures of the ICU may exacerbate social and 
contextual barriers to rational choice.  
Given the fact that so many irrational forces are driving choices and decisions about end-
of-life care or preclude conversations from happening altogether, many experts have turned to 
behavioral science in their search for solutions. It is obvious that educational campaigns and 
policies that assume rationality of stakeholders may only have moderate success. Recognizing 
the limitations of educational and informational interventions, policymakers are turning to 
insights from behavioral economics and social psychology in order to improve end-of-life care. 
Behavioral economics is a branch of economics that challenges the fundamental assumption that 
humans behave as fully informed and rational actors seeking to make themselves better off. 
Rather, behavioral economics, as a discipline, combines the basics of economic theory with 
insights from psychology about the common biases that influence decision-making.488 Most of 
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the programs aiming to improve delivery of healthcare are based on the presumption that people 
want to make themselves better off. These programs penalize consumers for doing the wrong 
thing (i.e., raising co-payments or deductibles) or rewarding consumers for doing the right thing 
(i.e., financial incentives). However, according to insights from behavioral economics, people 
don’t always act in their own self-interest. People make decisions that seem out of touch with 
their goals – for example, becoming a smoker, not wearing a seatbelt, or making end-of-life 
choices that contradict their goals of receiving support care and dying at home.489  
The field of behavioral economics starts with the observation that people are often 
irrational. However, the real value of behavioral economics is that we tend to be irrational in 
highly predictable ways. A number of industries exploit these irrational patterns in choice. For 
instance, credit card companies and car dealerships attract new customers with “zero down” and 
“zero percent interest,” playing on people’s tendency to focus on the present rather than the 
future. However, the same predictable errors in decision-making that are often used against 
consumers can also be used in their favor. The promise of behavioral economics for health-
related decisions is that the same forces driving patients to make decisions that contradict their 
overall goals can be redirected to improve their choices and well-being. Health policies are more 
likely to be successful if designed not based on how perfectly rational patients ought to make 
health decisions but on how patients actually make them. A lot of efforts directed to improve 
healthcare delivery rely on helping people understand the health consequences of their decisions 
with the hope they will thereby make better ones. While it is important to promote a health-
informed public, so many of patients’ decisions are made without thinking. Therefore, rather 
than rely on education to promote change, behavioral economic approaches use the ways people 
already make decisions to improve their choices.490  
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What is Nudge? 
While behavioral economics has a wide range of applications, the most well-known and 
increasingly popular among social scientists is referred to as nudging. The idea of nudge was 
introduced in Thaler and Sunstein’s infamous 2008 book entitled Nudge: Improving Decisions 
About Health, Wealth and Happiness. According to the authors, a nudge is “an aspect of choice 
architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or 
significantly changing their economic incentives.” 491 This might be a somewhat helpful 
definition of the concept. However, the idea of nudge is best understood by reference to specific 
examples. For instance, one of Nudge’s most frequently cited examples is the placement of the 
image of a fly inside the men’s room urinals at Amsterdam’s Schiphol Airport. The goal of the 
fly image was to “improve the aim.” Apparently, the fly picture was able to reduce spillage by 
80%.492 The book offers many other examples of nudges, including the food arrangement in a 
cafeteria so that the healthy items are placed at eye level while fattier and less healthy options are 
placed further back in line in order to encourage customers to choose the healthy options. Thaler 
and Sunstein discuss the importance of automatic enrollment of new hires into 401K plans which 
helps them to move future salary increases into a retirement savings plan.493 They also provide 
the example of white stripes on road bends being painted more closely together at the most 
dangerous points to create the illusion of the car going faster. This would hopefully prompt the 
driver to brake before reaching the dangerous point of the curve.494  
According to Thaler and Sunstein, the most important feature of nudge policies is their 
reliance upon “choice architecture.” Choice architecture is another concept coined by these 
authors. It is meant to describe conscious and deliberate attempts to shape the context in which 
people make decisions, rather than altering or extending the available range of choices. 
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According to Thaler and Sunstein, choice architects are those responsible for organizing the 
contexts in which decisions are made, including doctors who describe alternative treatments 
available to patients or the food services director of a cafeteria who is responsible for the layout 
of food items.495 By using the term choice architect, the authors are making allusion to the way 
in which building architects design spaces to maximize beneficial effects. For instance, open 
stairwells in a large industrial building may lead to more interactions between employees and  
promote walking. Similarly, the food services director of a cafeteria can choose a certain type of 
food arrangement that is likely to influence what people will eat. By drawing on findings from 
the fields of decision-making science and cognitive psychology regarding ways in which people 
make decisions, choice architecture offers a set of tools to influence behavior by seeking to 
nudge people to make decisions that the choice architect deems desirable. 
Thaler and Sunstein illustrate this use of psychology with the example of a school 
cafeteria. The cafeteria manager must decide how the food should be displayed to the students 
who pass through the line. Placing healthier foods at eye level and less healthy foods in more 
difficult to see or reach locations makes it more likely that the students will select the healthier 
foods. By arranging the food in this way, the manager can nudge the students into making 
healthier selections without prohibiting any of the students’ choices. Such use of psychological 
knowledge to influence choices or to nudge is described by authors as “libertarian paternalism.” 
Nudging is paternalistic because its end is to enhance the welfare of the people whose behavior is 
being influenced. The school cafeteria manager is acting to improve the diets of the students 
making the choices. It is libertarian because the means it uses to influence behavior are not 
coercive. The students are still free to eat anything they want. As Thaler and Sunstein explain it, 
“The libertarian aspect of our strategies lies in the straightforward insistence that, in general, 
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people should be free to do what they like—and to opt out of undesirable arrangements if they 
want to do so.... The paternalistic aspect lies in the claim that it is legitimate for choice architects 
to try to influence people’s behavior in order to make their lives longer, healthier, and better.”496  
Libertarian paternalism, therefore, is a strategy designed to help people overcome the 
cognitive biases that interfere with their ability to make choices that maximize their own welfare. 
This strategy relies on the type of choice architecture that an individual would willingly accept, if 
she was aware of the cognitive biases at play. The classic example of libertarian paternalism is 
Ulysses tying himself to the mast so that he can listen to the Sirens’ songs without being drawn 
to his own demise. Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein originally introduced the concept of 
libertarian paternalism in their 2003 essay of the same name published in “The American 
Economic Review.” In that article, they defined a policy as “paternalistic” “if it is selected with 
the goal of influencing the choices of affected parties in a way that will make those parties better 
off,” where they intend by “better off” that this be “measured as objectively as possible.”497 
According to Thaler and Sunstein, while many economists believe the term paternalistic to be 
derogatory because they think paternalism always involves some kind of coercion, this is not 
necessarily the case. Policies may be selected with the goal of influencing the choices of affected 
parties in a way that will make those parties better off but where there is no coercion involved. 
They refer to this kind of paternalism as libertarian paternalism and define it as “… an approach 
that preserves freedom of choice but authorizes both private and public institutions to steer 
people indirections that will promote their welfare.”498  
Many critics have pointed out that Thaler and Sunstein’s notion of libertarian paternalism 
is neither truly “libertarian” nor truly “paternalistic,” and that it is a contradiction in terms.499 In 
Nudge, the notion of libertarian paternalism is further refined. The authors describe it as a 
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“strategy” in which the libertarian aspect lies in “the straightforward insistence that, in general, 
people should be free to do what they like – and to opt out of undesirable arrangements if they 
want to do so.”500 Thaler and Sunstein write that “libertarian paternalists urge that people should 
be ‘free to choose’” and strive to “design policies that maintain or increase freedom of choice.” 
In particular, the authors say that by adding the “libertarian” prefix to the term “paternalism,” 
they wanted to underscore the fact that this strategy is liberty preserving, adding that “libertarian 
paternalists want to make it easy for people to go their own way; they do not want to burden 
those who want to exercise their freedom.”501 Consequently, policy makers and public 
institutions need “to steer people’s choices in directions that will improve their lives.” According 
to Thaler and Sunstein “libertarian paternalism is a relatively weak, soft, and nonintrusive type of 
paternalism because choices are not blocked, fenced off, or significantly burdened.”502 However, 
it can still be considered as paternalism, or “soft paternalism,” because “private and public 
choice architects are not merely trying to track or to implement people’s anticipated choices. 
Rather, they are self-consciously attempting to move people in directions that will make their 
lives better.” 503 Thaler and Sunstein write that by doing this, “they nudge.” 
  Nudges are often compared to navigation systems. As the goal of GPS is to make it easier 
for people to get to their final destination, so are nudges making it easier for people to reach their 
goals. Nudges stem from an understanding that life can be simple or difficult to navigate, and the 
goal of nudges is to promote simpler navigation. A GPS tells people how they can best get to 
their final destination, but it does not punish them when they choose an alternative route. 
Furthermore, GPS can be useful even for people who are familiar with the road and can navigate 
it on their own. Similarly, nudges do not impose any sanctions or costs when people refuse to be 
influenced. Nudges can be useful even for people who do not suffer from cognitive biases. Some 
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nudges work because they inform people; other nudges work because they make certain choices 
easier; still other nudges work because of the power of inertia and procrastination. In order to 
call an intervention a nudge, it should not impose significant material incentives or disincentives. 
A tax or a fine is not a nudge. An intervention must fully preserve freedom of choice in order to 
count as nudge.  
 There are two realities that make nudging or choice architecture important for healthcare 
professionals. Quite often physicians define their role in medical decision-making around the 
provision of relevant medical information that will enable patients to make an informed decision. 
It is often assumed that physicians’ non-involvement is possible and even desired to preserve 
intentionality and autonomy in decision-making. Physicians may think that as long as their 
patients have accurate information on the benefits and risks of a treatment, they will be able to 
make the best decision for themselves, the one that reflects their preferences and intentions. 
Following this train of thought, the duty of the intensivist is to offer families the best data 
available, free of her own biases or feelings, and let patients plug this data into their value 
systems. Any resulting choice of treatment will be made by the patients, who will have to live 
with its consequences. However, removing physicians’ influence is not always possible or 
desirable.504 For instance, when physicians explain to their patients the risks and benefits of 
medical and surgical therapies for a specific condition, physicians must choose to lead with 
either the medical option or the surgical option. Their choice will result in anchoring the choices 
of their patients. Furthermore, when explaining the risks, they must frame possible outcomes as 
chances for benefit, chances for harm, or both. This framing will sway patients’ choices one way 
or the other. Finally, physicians will always have a sense of what they would choose were they in 
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the patient’s shoes. Therefore, some choices will be presented first, inadvertently emphasized, 
and framed to look more advantageous.  
 The second reality that may warrant choice architecture is the fact that patients don’t have 
a list of well-established preferences. Their preferences tend to be made up on the spot. Even if it 
would be possible to avoid influence coming from physicians, doing so may not result in better 
choices that are aligned more closely with patients’ values. Patients may be swayed by forces 
that are already present in the choice environment, nudging them to make suboptimal choices.505 
Thaler and Sunstein argue that our social environment is already manipulated by the private 
sector to promote unhealthy choices and behavior. For instance, the “upsizing” of fast-food 
meals, discounts for purchasing large quantities of soda, happy hours in bars and pubs – these are 
some of the incentives promoting unhealthy choices. Food placement in supermarkets can be 
another example. Everyday products such as milk and bread are placed at the back of the store so 
that customers must walk past more discretionary food items, increasing the chances of 
purchasing them, while items high in sugar and fat are located at the checkout to promote 
impulse buying. One can find similar examples in clinical setting, where defaults are set for more 
aggressive care and where the environment is shaped in a way to promote less-optimal choices 
for patients. Therefore, debates about the appropriateness of influence coming from physicians 
should encompass all forms of nudges and influences that may affect patient choices. 
Considering the existing forces that may promote suboptimal choices by inertia, one may 
consider the use of nudges ethical and desirable.   
Benefits of Using Nudges 
Consider a provider who is deciding whether to recommend a default treatment for an 
ICU patient or to instead describe a number of options for that patient, trying to present them in a 
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neutral way so that the patient may choose for himself. Some may consider the act of active 
choosing as more ethical or beneficial than setting up a default. By encouraging a patient to 
decide on a treatment among a variety of options, the provider promotes that patient’s self-
determination which supposedly leads to higher satisfaction with decisions. However, many 
times this insistence on the act of choosing can be paternalistic in itself.506 When faced with 
difficult decisions involving choice of treatment or intervention, patients or families may be 
aware of their lack of information. They can be afraid to make a wrong decision because the 
amount of information coming at them is often confusing and the choices presented to them can 
be painful. They may not want to take responsibility for potentially bad outcomes for themselves. 
They may be under stress, lack the capacity to process the required amount of information, and, 
therefore, would prefer some kind of default choice or strong suggestion.  
 Even when patients prefer not to choose, providers and healthcare teams will insist on 
active choosing. While this insistence is done in the name of autonomy, ironically the same act 
often overrides it. When patients prefer not to choose, required choosing can be a form of 
coercion, especially in situations when choosing will likely lead to costly errors. In the context of 
critical care, patient and families are faced with many difficult choices and often avoid choosing. 
Overutilization of futile critical care and length of stay in ICUs can serve as an example of such 
choice avoidance. Alternatively, patients and families can be asked whether they want to choose 
and be given an opportunity to opt out of active choosing in favor of a default rule. This would 
be a form of libertarian paternalism that would preserve freedom while helping people to make 
difficult choices. For instance, a physician may ask his patient whether he wants to make a 
choice among treatments, or instead to have a standard approach that seems to work best for 
patients like him. In some instances, patients may decide in favor of a default because they may 
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not trust their own judgement, the topic of choice will make them anxious, or they will not be 
able to handle the amount of information required to make the choice.507  
 In addition to choice avoidance, nudging often addresses the problem of irrationality in 
health decisions. The concept of choice architecture is motivated by findings from behavioral 
science that people often make choices that are inconsistent with their long-term interests. For 
example, people may overweigh near-term costs and benefits while underestimating delayed 
costs and benefits. Thus, some may choose to smoke even though they know that their future 
selves will regret the decision.508 Similarly, in the context of critical care, patients may be 
impacted by affective forecasting errors. What if a patient who was involved in an accident that 
crushed his spine and left him paralyzed requests that life-sustaining treatment be withdrawn 
because he believes that life as a paraplegic would be worse than death for him? It is not 
uncommon for patients who become paralyzed to initially see this condition as a fate worse than 
death, but many of these patients adapt over time. While providers may not want to force life-
sustaining treatment on those who really would rather die than live in their conditions, they also 
would not want patients to go without life-sustaining treatment due to an irrational belief about 
what life will be like for them in their conditions.509 In such situations, the role of choice 
architecture is not only to respond to or correct irrational behavior. Insights from behavioral 
science can predict, reduce, or even overcome these irrational choices by adjusting choice 
context and steering patients’ attention to specific factors that can promote better choices.  
 Nudges are preferable to the traditional ways of changing health behavior. For instance, 
physicians often prescribe expensive and patented drugs even when cheaper generic treatment 
would be just as effective. The traditional way to address this (and many other similar) problem 
would be to impose liability on physicians who prescribe suboptimally or incentivize them by 
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paying bonuses for optimal prescribing. While this “carrot or stick” approach can be effective, it 
may often create normative problems. For instance, in the example above, there is a potential for 
intrusion on physician professional discretion. Conflicts of interests and infringements on access 
to healthcare can be among unfortunate outcomes as well. Both penalties and incentives may 
have some unexpected effects.510 One famous example of an unexpected effect of penalties 
comes from day care centers in Israel. The traditional economic theory suggests that offering 
incentives for good behavior is likely to produce more of it, while penalties are likely to deter 
bad behavior. However, this is often not the case. In Israel, day care centers almost uniformly 
closed at 4pm and depended on the good intentions of parents to pick up their kids on time. This 
strategy has worked for a while and rarely, if ever, a parent would come after 4:30pm. When 
parents started to show up late, some day cares introduced a small fine for parents who showed 
up more than 10 minutes late. In day cares where the fine was introduced, parents immediately 
started showing up late, with tardiness levels eventually leveling out at about twice the pre-fine 
level. Before the fine was introduced, parents felt guilty about being late, and their guilt 
compelled them to be more prompt in picking up their kids in the future. Social norms were 
strong. However, once the fine was imposed, this social norm was replaced with market norms, 
and parents felt they were paying for their tardiness.511  
 Incentives have a similar tendency to backfire in certain scenarios. The literature on 
blood donation has served as the source for the concept of motivational crowding out.512 In order 
to understand this concept, one should distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. 
Extrinsic or instrumental motivation refers to a desire for a result that is separable from the 
action itself, such as obtaining financial benefit or avoiding a penalty. In contrast, intrinsic 
motivation includes all other motives, such as enjoyment, morality, reciprocity, and social 
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contract. Adding incentives to a health task promotes one choice over the other by adding to its 
extrinsic motivation. In the blood donation example, public health officials assume that paying 
people to donate blood will increase their overall motivation to donate. However, the literature 
shows that incentives for donation may crowd out willingness to donate among women but not 
among men. Scholars explain that women are more motivated by prosocial concerns. On one 
hand, people may view payment for donation as compensation for the risks of donating. When 
payments are high, risk-averse individuals may stop donating because they believe that the risks 
of donation are higher than normal. On the other hand, small donations may reduce intrinsic 
motivation by signaling that the task is not important enough.513  
 The benefit of choice architecture and nudges is in the fact that they work to achieve a 
desired effect. Nudges are often inspired by laboratory experiments with human subjects, using 
vignettes or games to identify motivational aspects and underlying aspects of a specific behavior. 
These experiments can be predictive for how people will make health-related decisions in the 
real world. Ideally, these laboratory experiments will lead to some large-scale randomized trials 
to confirm findings in a hospital setting. In this way, choice architects are experimentalists, and 
they base their nudges on empirical evidence. They are better positioned to modify these nudges 
as necessary whenever the new evidence is available.514 Furthermore, nudges rely on a different 
concept or theory than these traditional “carrot and stick” approaches. “Carrot and sticks” 
assume that people predictably behave in ways that maximize their own personal interests. This 
assumption depicts human choice as a comparison of the costs versus benefits, where the chooser 
selects the option that will maximize net benefit to himself or herself. This is the reason why the 
“carrot and sticks” approach has been so popular – they simply manipulate the relative costs and 
benefits of any option, making good behavior less expensive than bad behavior to the actor. 
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Choice architecture relies on empirical data that shows systematic departures from this rational 
model of human behavior. As has been shown earlier in this and previous chapters, people often 
make choices that contradict their long-term interests. While making complicated healthcare 
choices, people tend to rely on heuristics, or rules of thumb. Choice architecture uses this 
knowledge about the way people make decisions to steer their choices in a way that would 
benefit patients the most.515  
 Finally, cost-effectiveness of nudge interventions is often cited as the main reason to 
implement these strategies. Nudge interventions have been implemented by government agencies 
in the United Kingdom (Nudge Unit), Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, Singapore, and the 
United States. Recently, a group of researchers examined existing studies to evaluate the relative 
cost-effectiveness of nudges and other policy interventions.516 Looking at the 2015 reports from 
these government agencies, the researchers developed a list of relevant policy areas and 
identified one behavior as the outcome of interest within each area. They then searched relevant 
literature for original research published from 2000 to mid-2015 that directly examined 
interventions targeting these outcomes. The team compared the effectiveness of nudge strategies 
with more standard policy interventions, calculating the ratio between an intervention's causal 
effect and its implementation cost. In each of the domains that the researchers examined, nudges 
were highly cost-effective, often more so than the traditional policy interventions. 
 In the case of retirement savings, for example, a nudge that prompted new employees to 
indicate their preferred contribution rate to a workplace retirement-savings plan yielded a $100 
increase in employee contributions per $1 spent on implementing the program; the next most 
cost-effective strategy, offering monetary incentives for employees who attended a benefits fair, 
yielded only a $14.58 increase in employee contributions per $1 spent on the program. Similarly, 
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a nudge-based mailing that prompted employees to write down when and how they planned on 
getting their flu shot led to about 13 additional people getting vaccinated per $100 spent on the 
mailing. By contrast, an education campaign on the benefits of the flu vaccine led to only about 
nine additional employees at a health care facility getting vaccinated per every $100 spent on the 
campaign. The researchers acknowledge that their analyses do not offer an exhaustive review of 
the comparative effectiveness of nudges and traditional policy tools. Furthermore, there are many 
cases in which traditional tools, “carrot and stick” strategies, are essential for achieving specific 
policy objectives, and nudges might not be of value.517 Nevertheless, the new findings show that 
nudges offer a useful, low-cost approach to promoting behaviors tied to a variety of important 
outcomes. The cost-effectiveness of nudging can be 100, and even 1,000, times greater than 
more traditional interventions.  
Ethics of Nudging 
The discussion of ethical aspects of nudge strategies needs to be placed in the context of 
healthcare. It is possible to assume that nudges are less problematic in the case of health 
decision-making than in other areas of individual choice. Sustaining and promoting health is very 
important to everyone, so nudges designed to accomplish these goals are unlikely to impose 
unwanted or external goals on people. Furthermore, health-related decisions are more complex 
and emotional than most. This fact may justify the use of nudges to help overcome cognitive 
heuristics and biases. Health-related decisions often involve advanced medical science, which 
develops and changes rapidly, requiring outside expertise to intervene in the process of decision-
making. These decisions are very personal and emotional, thus complicating the processing of 
the complex medical information involved.518 For instance, in order to decide on an intervention 
in the ICU, people need to compare and weigh against each other probabilities of outcomes. 
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Most people are not good at performing this task even under ideal conditions, less so when they 
are in an emotionally “hot” state. Some treatments also involve the performance of tasks over 
time (adherence to drug regimens), which requires self-control, a thing many people lack.   
 However, critics may point out that we often take it for granted that health is the most 
important interest relevant to the decision-making process of patients. It is almost implied that 
enhancing a patient’s capacity to pursue health has intrinsic value in itself. This may not be the 
most important interest for everyone, and it is definitely not a simplistic interest. Some may 
argue that even though we give health a lot of importance, we still eat more than we should or sit 
around more than we should for a number of reasons, including relaxation, celebration, or 
socialization. We value health but also our relationships, happiness, or work, and we constantly 
balance these interests when making a decision. Nudging for health promotion in this context can 
be compared to nudging to increase savings by employers. While retirement savings may be an 
interest of many if not most people, there is no reason to assume that it is their main interest 
when it comes to financial planning. New employees who do not sign up for a retirement 
program may have fallen prey to irrational biases, but they also may have other uses for the extra 
money, such as making a down payment on a new home or saving for the arrival of a new child. 
Therefore, one ethical concern stems from the idea that people may have their own interests 
when it comes to health or financial planning, and choice architects may override those interests 
with their own understanding of those interests.519  
 Furthermore, some may argue that even if we assume that health is the most important 
value in the context of treatment decisions, each patient’s conception of health might vary. 
Similar to happiness, health is a broad concept and may signify something different for each 
patient. In the context of the ICU, some may value the absence of pain above all else; for some, it 
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is important to maintain vital functions regardless of the costs involved, while some may be 
solely concerned with mental capacity. In the context of health promotion, some people focus on 
their weight, others on cardiovascular fitness, yet others on strength or endurance – or any 
combination thereof. A nudge strategy designed to promote a particular aspect of health may fail 
to correspond to how a patient incorporates health into his overall interests as well as that 
patient’s specific health goals.520 This leads to the ethical problem related to individual 
autonomy. Traditional conceptions of autonomy, described in earlier chapters, maintain that 
people should have the right to live their lives as they choose, free from judgment or interference 
from others. However, based on the earlier discussion, choice architects may use nudges to steer 
patients’ decisions in the direction of interests that are not necessarily their own but rather the 
architects’ idea of those interests. Furthermore, because nudges often rely on the same cognitive 
heuristics that motivated their use, the decision based on a nudge is no easier to avoid than the 
one the nudge is designed to change.  
 Thaler and Sunstein, in their seminal work, address this ethical concern by suggesting 
that nudges should “influence choices in a way that will make choosers better off, as judged by 
themselves.”521 They argue that the “judged by themselves” standard can be easily applied to 
most nudge strategies.  If a choice architect is genuinely concerned with making patients better 
off as judged by themselves, he might want to see what these patients do when they are well-
informed, when they choose actively, when their judgments are well thought-through, and when 
they are not impulsive. In most situations, the “as judged by themselves” standard raises no 
issues. As in the GPS example, if it steers people toward a destination that is not their own, it is 
not working well. If it offers them a longer and less convenient route, it will not make choosers 
better off as judged by themselves. Nudges that increase “navigability” by making social 
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situations easier to manage easily satisfy the standard.522 It is important to remember that some 
nudges work precisely because they inform people. Some others work because they make certain 
choices easier, and people often choose the path of least resistance. Some such nudges, like 
defaults, work because of the power of inertia and procrastination. Some nudges work because 
they make some fact or option or risk salient when it previously was not (i.e., reminders to take 
medications). In many other situations, when it is not clear what patients would judge as a good 
outcome, there are ways to distinguish it by applying proper design and evaluation techniques. 
For instance, it is possible to set up two default options with two different opt-out strategies. If 
more people are opting out in one case, while less people are opting out in the other case, it is 
plausible that the latter is what people actually prefer.  
 The previous concern, somewhat related to the “judged by themselves” standard, namely 
the issue of tradeoffs among various conceptions of health, can be addressed using means-end 
logic. This logic suggests that people are not only the best judges of their end goals but also the 
means by which they are reaching those goals. People may reject the GPS route because they 
prefer the scenic alternative, or, as it was mentioned above, people may reject retirement savings 
because they have a better use for those funds. It is important to keep in mind that when 
described in great detail, means become ends in itself. If we consider eating that brownie or 
having that afternoon nap instead of going to the gym – that brownie and that nap is exactly what 
people want at the given moment. However, if we consider means and ends in a more global 
way, nudges often help identify the best means for achieving preferred ends.523 For instance, if 
some characteristics of a treatment are not easily distinguishable, and the nudge helps patients to 
see the treatment for what it is, it may not take away from ends (preserving health) or means 
(choosing best treatment). Alternatively, when people fall prey to the availability heuristic, a 
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nudge that corrects their mistake can help them to achieve their ends as well as decide on the 
means. Should we consider a nudge strategy impermissible in the example of a person who 
refuses beneficial interventions because he can’t imagine his life as a quadriplegic? When such a 
nudge helps this patient to focus on his long-term interests, it may redistribute the overall well-
being between earlier and later versions of this patient to make sure that his future self gains 
more than the present self loses. It is possible to argue that in this case we may undermine the 
ends of this patient at the time of choice.524 
 The discussion of autonomy in the context of nudging should mention one important 
aspect of choices influenced by cognitive heuristics. It is plausible to consider actions driven by 
cognitive heuristics as less than autonomous, while nudges as tools that help us to restore this 
autonomy. Luc Bovens famously argued that “there is something less than fully autonomous 
about the patterns of decision-making that nudge taps into. When we are subject to these 
mechanisms (heuristics), then we are not fully in control of our actions… these are cases of not 
letting my actions be guided by principles that I can underwrite. And in as much, these actions 
are non-autonomous.”525 By definition, autonomy requires informed choices. If a patient signs up 
for a costly and complicated treatment without a sense of what it would entail, it is fair to 
question whether this patient has acted autonomously. On the other hand, if this patient received 
assistance in the form of nudging (framing of options, making some features more salient), it 
would be difficult to argue that this patient’s autonomy has been reduced. Many nudges are 
specifically designed to ensure that choices are informed and that relevant information is salient 
and easy to process. It is also important to notice that autonomy does not require choices to be 
made about every single feature of a treatment. There is a relationship between time management 
and autonomy, especially in the context of critical care. Patients should be allowed to devote 
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their attention to what is really important for them. Defaults may relieve them of unwanted 
burdens and, by doing so, increase their autonomy.526  
 This example of defaults brings about one argument often used in the defense of nudge 
policies. Even in the context of important decisions about health that should be made 
autonomously, nudges or defaults are often a necessity. There is no possible way to avoid them. 
For instance, deciding whether to become an organ donor is a decision that many would consider 
an important one, one people ought to make autonomously and after some thinking and 
deliberation. However, how should a decision be made about the organs of someone who has not 
made a decision about becoming a donor? In such case, a default rule is inevitable. The decision 
is really about whether this default should be set so that people are organ donors or so that they 
are not. Furthermore, given what we know about decision-making and cognitive heuristics, it is 
possible that many people will stick with the default rule for organ donation, regardless of the 
chosen default. What rationale could there be for setting the default at not being a donor if being 
a donor is what most people would prefer if they did, in fact, give serious consideration to the 
question of whether to be an organ donor? It seems that even the fact that a nudge has the 
potential to make a particular outcome to a particular important decision more likely (other than 
by rational persuasion) is not, by itself, reason to be suspicious of nudges.527  
 The possibility of manipulation is a concern often mentioned in the discussion of nudge 
policies. Given the fact that nudges work best when people are not aware of them and the fact 
that nudges are not designed to rely on deliberative reasoning, some consider these strategies as 
manipulative.528 While discussing manipulation in the context of nudges, it is important to keep 
in mind that not all attempts to influence someone’s behavior count as manipulation. Reminding 
someone that their bill is due or posting calorie content on foods is not manipulation. 
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Additionally, most of the choices people make on a daily basis do not involve deliberation and 
reflection. Minor facts that escape our awareness can influence our decisions – a smile or a 
frown from a provider, the fact that the provider is male or female, etc. Furthermore, 
manipulation can occur in cases of complexity (i.e., needing to complete a long consent form). 
Complexity can be manipulative if it breeds confusion and there is a lot of it present in 
healthcare. Given the fact that manipulation is encountered in many instances of our daily lives, 
most of its forms can be considered ethically neutral unless the manipulator’s goals are self-
interested or sinister and when the act of manipulation subverts the chooser’s deliberative 
capacities.529 
 Some may argue that lack of transparency is what makes manipulation unethical. Choice 
architects may not be transparent about potential nudges designed to influence a chooser’s 
behavior. Would this render nudges unethical? In order to answer this question, one should 
decide whether there is a moral obligation to be transparent about psychological mechanisms that 
make some information more effective than other. For instance, healthcare providers may offer 
risk information about certain procedures or health behaviors. However, this provider is not 
disclosing psychological mechanisms that make this information effective. Public health officials 
don’t provider a disclaimer that “we are using risk information because we want you to change, 
and we know that if we say that your mortality risk will be tripled, you are more likely to change. 
It is also true that even if you do not change, your mortality risk will remain very low.”530 Is it 
manipulative not to be transparent about the psychological mechanisms that make influences 
work? If the act is itself transparent, and if deliberative capacities are sufficiently involved, then 
a failure to tell people about the underlying psychological mechanisms does not mean that 
manipulation is necessarily involved.  
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This discussion on ethics of using influence strategies in healthcare can be best 
summarized by referencing four ethical factors outlined by Blumenthal-Barby and Burroughs:531 
1.) The greater the patient’s capacity to make an autonomous choice, the less the health 
professional should attempt to influence the patient; 2.) The less evidence concerning the 
efficacy or a treatment or recommendation, the less the justification for influencing the patient’s 
decision; 3.) Respect for the patient’s autonomy requires that the less evidence concerning a 
patient’s long-standing values, beliefs, and goals, the less the justification for influencing a 
patient’s decision; and 4.) The greater the potential magnitude of harm relative to benefit from 
the attempt to influence, the less the justification for the attempt. As has been discussed in this 
section, oftentimes, nudges are inevitable, and there is no way to avoid some kind of choice 
architecture. Therefore, ethical objections can be addressed toward particular forms of nudges 
but not to the concept as a whole. If we are guided by the principle of maximizing the welfare of 
patients, then most nudges are actually required on ethical grounds. A failure to nudge might be 
ethically problematic. It is usually unacceptable not to warn people before they accept some 
serious risks. A failure to warn is a failure to nudge. Similar problems can be raised when we fail 
to set an appropriate default. A failure to nudge might compromise autonomy.  
Potential nudges for End-of-life Care: Providers 
Incentivizing end-of-life conversations  
In a 2014 report titled “Dying in America,” the Institute of Medicine (IOM) 
recommended extensive changes in end-of-life care, including clinician reimbursement for 
advance care planning discussions.532 The idea of letting Medicare reimburse such conversations 
was first introduced in 2009 during debate on the Affordable Care Act.533 The issue quickly 
fueled allegations by some conservative politicians, such as former Republican Vice-
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Presidential candidate Sarah Palin and Presidential candidate John McCain, that they would lead 
to “death panels” that could disrupt care for elderly and disabled patients. The idea was dropped 
in fears of a public outcry, but it has reemerged a few years later as a response to the 2014 IOM 
report and a number of studies documenting the lack of advanced care planning. For instance, 
a 2015 Kaiser Family Foundation poll found that 89 percent of people surveyed said healthcare 
providers should discuss end-of-life issues with patients, but only 17 percent had had those talks 
themselves.534 These studies and reports show that physicians are not trained to have advance 
care planning discussions and find them difficult to initiate. Providers know that patients and 
families come to them looking to be cured, looking for hope. It is difficult to have a conversation 
about what happens when cure is no longer a possibility. Additionally, a number of incentives in 
the healthcare system nudge providers to adopt the “do all” approach. Although no physician 
feels she is providing care near the end of life for financial gain, one must consider evidence that 
healthcare spending in the last weeks of life is linked to how physician and hospitals are 
compensated for that care.  
In order to reduce the impact of these negative incentives and to increase the rates of 
advance care planning conversations, several US Congressmen have proposed several bipartisan 
bills. These include the Personalize Your Care Act of 2013, primarily sponsored by 
Representative Blumenhauer (D– Oregon)535 and the Care Planning Act of 2015 primarily 
sponsored by Senator Warner (D – Virginia).536 These bills proposed process-based incentives 
whereby health-care professionals would be reimbursed for documenting advance care planning 
discussions. While these bills have not passed, in November 2015, the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) finalized changes to the physician fee schedule that includes new 
payment codes to reimburse health-care professionals for discussing advance care planning.537 
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These changes were supported by the American Medical Association and a number of advocacy 
groups with minimal public or political opposition. When the CMS Chief Medical Officer 
announced the final changes in the fall of 2015, he declared that the agency had received 
“overwhelmingly positive comments” in response to a draft rule published earlier in the year.538 
The new changes are minimal, and the policy allocates minimal time for the advance care 
conversations at a low reimbursement rate. Providers are compensated $86 for a first session of 
thirty minutes in a doctor’s office ($80 in a hospital setting) and $75 for a follow-up. The policy 
requires no specific diagnosis and sets no guidelines for end-of-life discussions. Conversations 
center on medical directives and treatment preferences, including hospice enrollment and the 
desire for care if patients lose the ability to make their own decisions.539 
According to recent data released by the CMS, nearly 14,000 providers billed almost $35 
million, including nearly $16 million paid by Medicare, for advance care planning conversations 
for about 223,000 patients from January through June of 2016.540 Use of the guidelines is on 
track to outpace an estimate by the American Medical Association, which projected that about 
300,000 patients would receive the service in the first year.541 In California alone, which 
recorded the highest payments, about 1,300 providers provided nearly 29,000 services to about 
24,000 patients at an overall cost of about $4.4 million, including about $1.9 million paid by 
Medicare.542 The data likely reflects early adopters who were already having the discussions and 
quickly integrated the new billing codes into their practices. Many physicians are still unaware of 
the new guidelines. For instance, data from Aethna Health shows that about 17 percent of 34,000 
primary care providers at 2,000 practices billed for advance care planning in all of 2016.543 
These numbers will likely grow, regardless of some flaws in the new policy. For instance, many 
voices have objected to the minimal reimbursement schedule. A physician makes about $400 on 
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average to perform a colonoscopy, which takes much less time than an advance care discussion. 
A colonoscopy takes skill and practice to do well, but so do advance-care planning discussions. 
This is especially true when the person creating the plan has a significant illness.544 Furthermore, 
end-of-life care planning can be pointless without corresponding changes in how healthcare 
system covers medical costs in the last years of life. In many cases, insurers will pay for invasive 
procedures that require hospital stays but not for expanded use of palliative care or home-based 
interventions—no matter what patients might request. Providers can make reliable plans with 
their patients, but these plans may not be followed through because the system is designed to 
make hospitalization the easiest option.545   
Framing code status discussions  
Surrogate decision makers for ICU patients with advanced critical illness are often asked 
to determine whether use of life support and cardiopulmonary resuscitation is consistent with a 
patient’s values and goals. In order to answer this question, family members need a good 
understanding of not only their loved one’s values but also the potential outcomes of treatment. 
A number of studies have shown that prognostic information affects decisions to withhold or 
withdraw life support.546 However, disagreements about prognosis between physicians and 
family members are very common. A lack of ability to understand physicians’ prognostication is 
often considered a cause of these disagreements. A number of recent studies suggest that 
optimism bias, or the mistaken belief that patient is at less risk of experiencing negative 
outcomes than suggested by evidence, is the main cause of disagreements between families and 
providers.547 Families may believe that patients’ faith, uniqueness, strength of character, and will 
to live may influence outcomes differently from what is suggested by the provider. In a study by 
Zier et al., families’ interpretations of prognostic statements expressing a low risk for death were 
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relatively accurate, but interpretations of statements conveying a high risk for death were more 
optimistic than the actual meaning. Interpretations of the statement “90% chance of surviving” 
did not differ from the actual meaning, but interpretations of “5% chance of surviving” were 
significantly more optimistic. Researchers concluded that families need optimism in the face of a 
poor prognosis, and they rely on optimism bias to interpret prognostication information which in 
turn leads to the futile use of CPR and life-sustaining treatment.548  
 The way physicians frame end-of-life care options and the kind of language they use in 
these important discussions may increase or decrease this optimism bias. Optimism bias 
underlies risky behavior.549 Similar to many nudges, framing effects are also more pronounced in 
decisions involving risk or uncertainty. People are reliably found to be risk averse when gambles 
are framed in terms of gains and risk-seeking when equivalent gambles are framed in terms of 
losses. Similarly, when healthcare interventions are framed in terms of survival versus mortality 
rates, people display the same risk-seeking/risk averse behavior.550 One of the ways framing may 
affect decisions is by influencing the decision maker’s emotional response to the decision. Some 
support to this hypothesis is found in studies suggesting that framing effects may result from 
differential activation in the emotional centers of the brain. Considering this connection between 
optimism bias and decisions involving risk, a group of researchers from the same institution as 
the study on optimism among surrogates explored the use of different frames and their impact on 
optimism bias in decisions about CPR. Researchers found that several frames were effective in 
reducing optimism bias. For instance, when asked to choose between CPR and a DNR order, 60 
percent of the participants went for CPR. However, when the doctor used the phrase "allow 
natural death" instead, only 49 percent of patients chose resuscitation. In addition, when the 
doctor said, "In my experience, most people do not want CPR," only 48 percent decided to go 
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against the norm and choose CPR anyway (versus 64 percent when they were told CPR was the 
more popular decision).551  
 Framing of CPR discussions is very important. In these discussions, providers may ask 
questions such as “If your heart stops beating, do you want us to try and start it again?” or “If 
you stop breathing, do you want us to put in a breathing tube?” or the more loaded question “Do 
you want us to do everything?” These questions are problematic because patients are offered no 
tangible alternatives; in essence, the choice they are presented with is between doing everything 
and doing nothing. This is the reason researchers suggest to use the term allow natural death 
(AND) to imply a course of treatment during a natural disease progression.552 Comfort measures, 
supportive care, and allowing a natural death to occur should be more explicitly presented as care 
options in the ICU. Clarifying for patients the difference between the interventions of attempted 
resuscitation and those of supportive care associated with allowing a natural death could provide 
valuable nudge and assistance with patient care decisions. Furthermore, the full code status is 
often considered as a social norm due to perceptions formed by movies and TV shows. This 
social norm is often inappropriately applied to patients at the end point on a known dying 
trajectory. Physicians can address this norm by prefacing the discussion of CPR with “In my 
experience, most people don’t want CPR,” thus setting a different norm.553 Finally, framing the 
CPR decision as the patient’s and not the surrogate’s is a useful nudge to remind the family 
member that they are acting as an informant, rather than relaying their own preferences, and to 
reduce feelings of responsibility or anticipated regret for the decision.554 
Framing palliative care as treatment and not as giving up 
Patients and caregivers often see palliative care as being equated with death, loss of hope, 
dependency, and going into places you never get out of again.555 Similarly, healthcare providers 
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interpret choices between aggressive treatment and palliative care as “doing everything or doing 
nothing,” where palliative care is essentially viewed as “pulling the plug” or “doing nothing.” 
Some physicians may view palliative care as incompatible with the hospital and ICU goals of 
saving lives, and some intensivists perceive instituting palliative care as being “soft” or “giving 
up.” Their views are reflected in the way they frame conversations about palliative care. These 
“nothing left to do” conversations often frame palliative care as a way to help people die 
comfortably rather than an approach to care that allows them to live with the highest quality of 
life for as long as possible.556 When options are presented in this way, patients and families may 
see palliative care as a potential loss of care, of treatment, and of hope. According to the prospect 
theory, people make decisions based on the potential value of losses and gains rather than the 
final outcome. They interpret the outcomes of a decision as gains and losses, and they are more 
sensitive to losses than to equally valuable gains.557 This loss-aversive nature of patients’ choices 
may explain their decisions to refuse palliative care. When palliative care is framed as a loss of 
treatment, people will cling on to the aggressive care option even when the chances for it to be 
successful are very slim. The same behavior is demonstrated in gamblers who will continue to 
gamble after a significant loss in attempts to recoup losses rather than going home. 
Consequently, people are more risk averse when the probability of benefit is high but more risk-
seeking when it is low.558  
One recent study compared the language used by physicians to introduce treatment 
options for terminally ill ICU patients.559 Researchers were interested in exploring different 
frames used for life-sustaining treatment versus palliative treatment. The study found that when 
discussing these end-of-life treatment options, physicians most commonly presented intubation 
first and did not introduce palliation until after the patient or family members expressed their 
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preference to avoid intubation. In more than 100 encounters in which life-sustaining treatment 
was introduced to the patient, the most common frame, used in every second conversation, was 
“must.” While talking about life-sustaining treatment, physicians would use phrases like “we 
may need to,” “he needs,” or “we should,” conveying an attitude of necessity adopted by the 
physician toward intubation. For example, one doctor stated, “He will more than 
likely require more oxygen in the near future…. At some point, it will require putting a tube 
down and breathing for you with a mechanical device.” In contrast, examples in which palliation 
was introduced using a “must” frame, such as, “So in talking to you guys it seems like we 
should do whatever we can just to make him comfortable,” occurred much less frequently, in 
only 22 conversations.560 
There were 86 conversations focusing on palliative care option, and the most common 
frame used in half of those conversations was “could.” This frame was expressed using words 
like “we can,” “we may,” and “the options include,” reflecting notions of optional possibility 
adopted by the physician regarding palliative care. For example, one provider offered, “There are 
a few things that we could try to make you more comfortable.” Another subject stated, “We can 
keep doing maximum management…and if things are not working, then we can just withdraw all 
those things…we can just control your pain…and we can consult some palliative care people to 
provide you some support.” In contrast, examples in which life-sustaining therapy was 
introduced using a “can” frame (e.g., “We could put you on a breathing machine if your 
breathing gets to be too labored.”) occurred much less frequently, in only 10 conversations.561 
This study highlights the difference in language used by physicians to discuss the available 
treatment options for a chronically ill patient who is likely to die in the ICU. The majority of 
physicians discussed life-sustaining treatment first and only introduced palliation as an 
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alternative after the patient revealed his preference to avoid intubation. They most often framed 
life-sustaining treatment as required, while palliative care was framed as optional. It is 
interesting to note that physicians who framed life-sustaining treatment as necessary said during 
debriefing interviews that life-sustaining treatment was not the appropriate option for the patient 
in this scenario. The framing of intubation as an imperative reflects the default to initiate or 
escalate life-sustaining therapy unless an alternative is actively chosen. Therefore, it is important 
to be mindful of this default and to present palliative care as therapy and not abandonment.  
Accountable justification for palliative care orders  
 Changing clinical decision-making among physicians is notoriously difficult due to many 
factors, including competing physician motivations, information overload, and clinician alert 
fatigue. Overprescription of antibiotics can be an example of such clinical decision-making that 
needs to be changed. Overuse of antibiotics exposes patients to an unnecessary risk of adverse 
drug events, increases health care costs, and increases the prevalence of antibiotic-resistant 
bacteria. In 2015, this overuse of antibiotics made Americans more vulnerable to a strain of 
bacteria that caused nearly half a million infections and contributed to at least 29,000 deaths.562 
Despite published clinical guidelines and decades of efforts to change prescribing patterns, 
antibiotic overuse persists, while many behavioral interventions such as education, clinical 
decision support, and incentives, had moderate results. One recent study used accountable 
justification as a way of changing prescription practices.563 Accountable justification was 
embedded in the electronic health record (HER). An EHR prompt asked each clinician seeking to 
prescribe an antibiotic to explicitly justify, in a free text response, her treatment decision. The 
prompt also informed clinicians that this written justification would be visible in the patient’s 
medical record as an “antibiotic justification note” and that if no justification was entered, the 
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phrase “no justification given” would appear. Encounters could not be closed without the 
clinician’s acknowledgment of the prompt, but clinicians could cancel the antibiotic order to 
avoid creating a justification note, if they chose. The accountable justification alert was triggered 
for both antibiotic-inappropriate diagnoses and potentially antibiotic-appropriate acute 
respiratory tract infection diagnoses.  
 This intervention was very successful in changing physician prescription practices. It 
reduced antibiotic prescription rates for acute respiratory infections by 18 percentage points, 
from 23 percent to 5 percent.564 There are several psychological processes at play that can 
account for the success of this nudge strategy. This intervention was based on prior findings that 
accountability improves decision-making accuracy and that public justification represents 
reputational concerns. In order to preserve their reputations, clinicians should be more likely to 
act in line with norms or what one “ought to do” as recommended by clinical guidelines. 
Accountable justification signals this norm, indicating that prescribing an antibiotic is not 
recommended. This may make the provider more likely to believe both that not prescribing an 
antibiotic is the best medical decision and that prescribing when it is not indicated violates 
professional standards.565 Furthermore, this nudge incorporates social accountability. Provider 
justifications become a separate part of the medical record, so a provider’s decision to prescribe 
is subject to the review and judgment of her peers.566 Finally, the justification alert implicitly 
designates non-prescription as the default action. Defaults may affect behavior for a number of 
reasons. They may be perceived as a recommended action, and they require less effort. In the 
case of antibiotic prescription, a provider could avoid the workflow disruption caused by the 
justification alert if she would cancel the order. Defaults may seem less anxiety-inducing as 
people tend to regret active choices that lead to poor outcomes more than they regret failures to 
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act that lead to poor outcomes. Therefore, anticipated regret caused by adverse outcomes related 
to antibiotics will loom larger in this case.567  
 Similar accountable justification can be implemented in the ICU context, nudging 
providers to consider palliative care and asking them to write a justification for delays in 
ordering palliative care consults. Given that the default in the ICU is aggressive treatment, 
inadequate time is devoted to developing alternative care plans, which results in patients 
receiving aggressive care despite minimal chance of recovery. This leads to inadequate symptom 
management at the end of life. Implementing palliative care consults in a form of accountable 
justification has a potential to change this dynamic. When a similar intervention was 
implemented for heart failure patients at the St. Francis Regional Medical Center, over 90% of 
these patients were able to see a palliative care specialist. This also led to a decrease in 
readmission rates by 6% over the course of one year.568 A similar dynamic is described among 
lung cancer patients. Even though most professional guidelines suggest the need for early 
integration of palliative care for this group of patients, less than 25% of them receive palliative 
care consultations. When palliative care consults were introduced as the default during ICU 
admission, researchers observed significant improvement in patient symptoms. In addition, 
although few (12%) patients had an advance directive before the consultation, and most (81%) 
had "full code" status at that time, decisions were made not to attempt resuscitation in the event 
of arrest for 70% of patients after discussions with the palliative care specialists. More than 40% 
of the lung cancer patients seen in palliative care consultation were alive at hospital discharge.569  
Potential nudges for End-of-life Care: Patients 
Default options in advance directives  
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The need to improve communication between patients and providers about the 
preferences for end-of-life care is clear. While most critically ill patients value comfort and 
dignity over life extension, the current healthcare system is set up to promote aggressive 
treatment near the end of life. It takes a persistent request from patients or families to change this 
life-extending course of action. There are many effective approaches to improving 
communication in critical care that may still fail to produce immediate change when 
implemented. Advanced care planning requires complex interactions among many stakeholders, 
a conducive environment that will enable patients to explain their values and goals, and a 
healthcare system structured to give voice to these goals when decisions must be made. Given 
this complexity, communication interventions may lack scalability. On the other hand, advance 
directives represent a straightforward and easy to implement approach. These documents are 
designed to give voice to patients so their preferences and wishes can be respected. However, 
most of the currently used forms carry the same implicit bias that tends to favor life extension in 
the absence of advance directives. For example, in the widely used “Five Wishes” document, the 
option “I want to have life support” is listed first in all three clinical scenarios, despite evidence 
that the ordering of choices influences the choices selected and that the option presented first will 
likely be the one most people will select.570  
 Given the importance of the choices embedded in advance directives, it is important to 
understand how the structure of advance directives affects patients’ stated preferences. A number 
of recent studies demonstrate that the ability of patients to avoid unwanted care may be promoted 
by structuring advance directives in a way that comfort measures are presented as the norm, and 
life-sustaining interventions are to be provided only if actively requested.  Kressel and Chapman 
presented hypothetical advance directives to college students571 and to a small sample of elderly 
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outpatients.572 In both groups, participants were significantly more likely to choose aggressive 
interventions should they become terminally ill when receipt of such therapies was framed as the 
default. These findings suggest that people often lack well-formulated and strongly held views 
on what type of interventions at the end of life will best promote their values. Insights from 
behavioral economics suggest that preferences for end-of-life care are likely to be “constructed” 
at the moment people are asked to express them, rather than reflective of strongly held 
preferences, because such choices are made infrequently and represent a complex decision.573 In 
many other settings, patients usually seek to simplify their choices by sticking with the default 
option. These default effects occur when a patient can express one preference by explicitly 
answering a question (checking a box) and a different preference, the default preference, by 
failing to explicitly answer a question (not checking the box).574 For example, as mentioned in 
chapter two, Johnson and Goldstein found that organ donation rates in countries with presumed 
consent policies (default to donate organs) were twice as high as in countries with explicit 
consent policies (default to refuse donation).575  
Halpern and colleagues conducted a study to examine how default options influence the 
choices of seriously ill patients in real advance directives, even after patients were alerted to the 
default option and their responses to it. They found that default options have large influences on 
seriously ill patients’ actual choices for health care interventions at the end of life. Overall, most 
patients with terminal illnesses expressed preferences for comfort-oriented care when offered the 
opportunity to state these preferences in real advance directives, but the proportions of patients 
choosing this option differed significantly depending on how the default was set. For example, 
the proportion of patients choosing to forgo feeding-tube insertion was 54 percent in the comfort-
default group, 45 percent in the standard advance directive group, and 26 percent in the life-
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extension default group. For cardiopulmonary resuscitation, corresponding proportions were 
42 percent, 32 percent, and 20 percent. Interestingly, the effect persisted even when patients were 
made aware of the defaults and shown how they had responded to them. Only 2 percent of 
patients in Halpern’s study wanted to reconsider their choices after being alerted to the 
manipulation of the default option, but ultimately these patients did not change their original 
selections. Additionally, the authors suggest that intentionally setting defaults does not impact 
patients’ satisfaction with their choices, implying that patients were content to be guided in their 
end-of-life choices.576  
Incentivizing completion of advance directives  
The current demographic trends in the US documents a growing aging population and an 
increase in the prevalence of chronic diseases among adults over 45 years old. This reality of 
more people living with, declining from, and ultimately dying of a chronic condition raises 
challenges that require new ways of thinking about death and dying.577 Planning for the end of 
life has a potential to prevent unnecessary suffering and promote individual choices regarding 
end-of-life care. However, the number of people who completed advance directives remains low 
despite promotion and education efforts. A Pew Research Center survey in 2009 found that only 
29 percent of people had a living will.578 In 2007, a Harris Interactive study put the proportion 
with advance directives at two in five.579 Even among “severely or terminally ill patients,” the 
majority had no advance directives in their medical records, reported researchers for the 
federal Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.580 A more recent large study of advance 
directives completion rates suggests that only 25 percent of Americans have an advance 
directive. The traditional approach to the promotion of advance directives is through clinic or 
hospital-based education.581 However, the science of decision-making suggests that education 
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alone may not be enough to overcome psychological biases that interfere with advance care 
planning.  
In order to complete an advance directive, a patient must be willing to think about and 
plan for death as well as to believe that completion of an advance directive has benefits that 
cannot be obtained by some other means. Thinking about death is stressful at best, while the 
benefits from completing advance directives are set in the future. The unpleasant aspect of 
completing advance directives arises up front, and the future benefits of having completed an 
advance directive may not be enough to offset the present discomfort. In many areas of life, 
people tend to discount future benefits in order to avoid present pains.582 Furthermore, optimism 
bias may also prevent patients from completing advance directives. People tend to be optimistic 
about future life events. All newlyweds believe their marriage will last, even when they are 
presented with concrete data about divorce rates, and most smokers believe they will not suffer 
the harms of tobacco despite recognizing full well how many people do. Therefore, people may 
believe they are less at risk of dying connected to machines in the ICU compared with others. 
Tangible, immediate rewards such as financial incentives can be effective in overcoming these 
biases. Financial incentives for the completion of advance directives can reduce the immediate 
costs of unpleasant thoughts involving death and make the completion of advance directives 
more attractive. Financial incentives have been used successfully to promote other health 
behaviors influenced by present-biased preferences, such as smoking cessation583 and weight 
loss.584 
Under the Medicare Choices Empowerment and Protection Act, recently introduced by 
Senator Tom Coburn of Oklahoma and co-sponsored by Senator Chris Coons of Delaware, 
seniors could receive up to $75 for completing advance directives. This bill encourages people 
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on Medicare to register advance directives with the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS). Medicare beneficiaries would receive a one-time payment of $75 for creating an online 
directive, or $50 for creating one manually. The payment from CMS would come either as a 
check or direct deposit.585 A recent study by Barnato et al. examined the potential effectiveness 
of financial incentives on advance directive completion rates. While the overall effect was 
modest, researchers suggest that these incentives work best in combination with incentives 
targeting providers. Considering the fact that providers are now being reimbursed for advance 
care discussions, adding one more layer of incentives by rewarding patients for the completion of 
advance directives may prove to be an effective way of boosting up the presently low rates of 
completed forms. An active choice approach can be another way of improving advance care 
planning. Active choice is based on the idea that “forcing” individuals to choose between two 
options, instead of letting them go with a default option or avoid choice altogether, encourages 
more individualized choice.586 In a recent study by Halpern et al, employees at the University of 
Pennsylvania employee orientation were randomized to a “forced active choice” condition, in 
which they were required to either complete an advance directive or decline to do so, or to a 
control condition, in which they could complete an advance directive or skip ahead to the next 
section. Giving participants the forced active choice to accept or to decline to complete an 
advance directive resulted in higher rates of completing advance directives.587  
Informed assent for decisions about futile life-sustaining treatment 
As has been mentioned earlier in this chapter, about one in five Americans die in an ICU. 
Many deaths in the ICU involve withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining therapies.588 These 
decisions to withhold or withdraw life support are very challenging. They often depend not only 
on medical facts alone but also on the values of the patient. Because these patients cannot 
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actively participate in decisions about their medical care, physicians and families often assume 
this responsibility. These decisions cause a lot of emotional distress for everyone involved, and 
they are often the cause of disagreement between families and providers in the ICU. The shared 
decision-making model suggests that physicians need to provide families with relevant medical 
information, they have to elicit information about the patient’s values and treatment preferences, 
and then they must provide a treatment recommendation and share in the deliberative process. 
There is no consensus, however, on how much decision authority a physician should assume. 
While many physicians prefer not to provide recommendations or personal opinions in order to 
preserve autonomy, this is not necessarily what surrogates need. As mentioned in the last 
chapter, one study shows that out of almost 800 surrogate decision-makers, 14.8% preferred to 
leave all decisions to the physician, 23.8% preferred that the physician make the final decision 
after considering their opinion, 39.1% preferred shared decision-making, 21.8% wanted to make 
the final decision after considering the physician’s opinion, and only 0.5% preferred to make 
treatment decisions alone.589 The distribution of preferences in this study shows that physicians 
should not adopt a “one size fits all” approach to these emotionally-charged conversations.  
In their opinion piece published in CHEST journal, Curtis and Burt suggest that ICU 
providers don’t have a moral obligation to discuss or offer futile therapies such as CPR.590 In 
cases of withholding CPR or withdrawing medically not indicated life-sustaining treatment, it is 
ethically acceptable to obtain an informed assent rather than insisting that patients or families 
always bear the burden of explicit consent. Informed assent is a process in which providers offer 
full information about the risks and benefits of the treatment, convey their recommendation and 
reasons why this treatment is not recommended, and clearly indicate that patients and family are 
allowed to defer to the provider’s judgement. This would signal to the patient or family that their 
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physician is prepared to relieve them of the unwanted burden of making life-or-death 
decisions.591 There are many families that agree that CPR or other life-sustaining therapy would 
not be appropriate. However, they often express hesitation in bearing the burden of being the 
ultimate decision maker. The informed assent model allows patients or their families to be active 
participants in the decision-making process without being burdened with the guilt of “letting 
their loved-one die.” This approach maintains all the elements of informed consent with the 
exception of an active choice. Patients or surrogates need to be well-informed, they need to 
understand the reasons why CPR is not recommended, and they should be aware that, while they 
are asked to defer to the physician’s judgement, they still have a right to take the lead in 
deciding.   
This approach should be adopted with caution and used only for specific groups of 
patients. During the process of eliciting patients’ values, physicians need to exclude those 
families or patients who subscribe to the vitalist approach. For vitalists, quality of life has no 
importance, and as long as the heart is beating and the lungs are functioning with or without the 
mechanical support, they would prefer to keep on going. The informed assent approach would 
not be suitable for this group of families and patients.592 Furthermore, this approach should not 
be used when providers are uncertain about the possibility of success or when the providers’ 
convictions about withholding or withdrawing treatment are based on their value judgments 
about the patient's resulting quality of life. In these situations, there is no sufficient moral 
justification for using the alternative of deferring to a unilateral clinician decision. Instead of 
using informed assent, physicians may express their opinions and recommendations about the 
likelihood and desirability of treatment alternatives, but patients and families should be clearly 
informed that medical expertise has limited relevance in arriving to a final decision.593 The 
  
228 
 
potential concern about preserving autonomy in the context of informed consent can be relieved 
by the fact that patients and families are explicitly informed about the possibility to disagree with 
providers’ recommendations.  
Order effect in presentation of options  
Patients and families need to make many important decisions during their ICU stay. 
Treatment related decisions are especially important, and physicians strive to provide a balanced 
description of the risks and benefits of the treatment in question in order to assist patients or 
families in making these difficult decisions. Most physicians attempt to present medically-
relevant facts in an unbiased manner. However, human judgment is known to be sensitive to the 
order in which a person receives information.594 Order of presentation can influence trivial 
decisions as well as judgments of great importance, such as the determination of guilt by 
jurors.595 People can be influenced by a recency bias – they may remember the most recent 
information they receive better than earlier information, and, as a result, their perceptions can be 
disproportionately influenced by this recent information. Accordingly, patients who learn about 
treatment benefits first and risk information second might better remember the risks and make 
treatment choices that are more influenced by this recently received risk information.596 People 
can also be influenced by a primacy bias – they may better consider the information listed first 
rather than last, particularly when the list is long597. These primacy and recency effects were 
demonstrated in physicians’ judgements. Research shows that physicians place more weight on 
items of clinical data when they learn them late in a diagnostic evaluation instead of at the 
beginning.598 
While the effect of information order on physicians' decision-making has been 
documented, there is little research about the impact of information order on the decision-making 
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of patients. Limited research shows that patients are less favorable about a procedure and less 
likely to consent to it when they read about the risks after the benefits instead of before the 
benefits. This order effect was observed when patients were asked about influenza immunization 
and screening sigmoidoscopy but was not observed when they were asked about carotid 
endarterectomy.599 These findings raised the possibility that the variability could be due to 
differences in risk associated with interventions, differences in benefits, or differences in 
familiarity with the diseases used in the scenarios. Some studies suggest that primacy has a 
greater effect on patient decisions about treatment. Thus, one study exploring how the difference 
in designing patient decision aids affects preferences for obstructive sleep apnea treatment found 
a significant primacy effect. Patients were more likely to choose the treatment option presented 
first.600 Similar effect was observed in a study of preferences for aspirin therapy for symptomatic 
carotid artery disease. The authors suggest that this effect arises because people typically process 
sequential information by contrasting each new piece of evidence with their current opinion. 
Furthermore, this effect was more pronounced for riskier decisions.601  
While there are no current studies on the order effect in decision-making about treatment 
options in the ICU, it is possible to assume that the way information is presented to the patient 
will likely affect their choices. Many ICU options can be presented first or last, for instance, in 
discussions involving decisions between continuing intensive care or switching to palliative care. 
Physician can lead with the discussion of risks related to continuing intensive care, or he can 
start the conversation by discussing benefits and risks of switching to palliative care. On the 
other hand, discussions involving code status involve two pieces of information that can be 
presented in a different order. The common practice for critical care doctors is to lead the 
discussion with information about the medical situation and prognosis. When this information is 
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presented, the physician asks about the patient’s values, and then both family and physician 
explore options that would match patient values and the gravity of her condition. Alternatively, 
physicians can open the family conference with an exploration of the patient’s values and then 
tailor prognostication information according to what is learned in the beginning. It is also 
possible that by getting to know the patient and family better, the physician may frame 
prognostication information differently.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on a few ideas. It has analyzed the need for behavioral 
interventions or nudges in critical care. It has unpacked the concept of nudge and looked at some 
ethical implications of using this strategy in the context of healthcare. It has considered potential 
benefits of using nudges in healthcare and has suggested several strategies that may persuade 
providers and patients to make better decisions in the context of critical care. The first suggestion 
made in this chapter was that critical care has a dire need to find ways of improving 
communication between providers and patients or their families and that many traditional 
approaches were not able to fulfill this need. Admission to the ICU is often a therapeutic trial. 
While the primary goal of critical care is to help patients survive acute threats to their lives, this 
goal often remains unattainable. Approximately 20% of all deaths in the United States, or 
540,000 deaths per year, occur in the ICU.602  The majority of ICU deaths involve decisions to 
withhold or withdraw life-supporting therapies. Two truths ensure that this transition from 
aggressive to palliative care will remain difficult, despite the best efforts of providers. “First is 
the widespread and deeply held desire not to be dead. Second is medicine’s inability to predict 
the future, and to give patients a precise, reliable prognosis about when death will come. If death 
is the alternative, many patients who have only a small amount of hope will pay a high price to 
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continue the struggle.”603 Behavioral economics studies the way people make risky decisions 
under uncertainty. It offers the strategy called nudge.  
This strategy was proposed in the book with the same title authored by Thaler and 
Sunstein. The authors start from the proposition that “individuals make pretty bad decisions - 
decisions they would not have made if they had paid full attention and possessed complete 
information, unlimited cognitive abilities, and complete self-control.” Because of these 
limitations of human decision-making, there is a role for what Thaler and Sunstein call a choice 
architect, someone who “has the responsibility for organizing the context in which people make 
decisions.” Thaler and Sunstein have invented this term, but they claim that the corresponding 
job description already exists; for example, a doctor who has to describe alternative treatments to 
a patient is acting as a choice architect. Choice architects are supposed to rearrange the physical 
and social environment in order to make people change behavior to “make the choosers better 
off, as judged by themselves.”604 The methods they can use are multiple. They might arrange the 
options presented to people so that the better choice becomes default, whereas making 
suboptimal choices requires active decision-making. The example used in this chapter is default 
option in advance directives where active decision-making is required for choices of aggressive 
care at the end of life. Another method is to change the environment to encourage desired 
behavior. This chapter suggests altering the way in which providers place orders to require 
accountable justification for delaying palliative care orders in patient electronic records. These 
are examples of nudges, or liberty-preserving approaches, that steer people in particular 
directions but that also allow them to go their own way.  
There are many benefits to using nudges in healthcare. Nudges are cost-efficient. A 
recent study of nudge interventions reported that the cost-effectiveness of nudging can be 100, 
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and even 1,000, times greater than more traditional interventions, such as educational 
campaigns.605 Nudges are often inspired by laboratory experiments, and these interventions are 
built on empirical evidence. Finally, nudges are the best strategy in cases when patients refuse to 
make an active choice. When faced with difficult decisions involving choice of treatment or 
intervention, patients or families may be aware of their lack of information. They can be afraid to 
make a wrong decision because the amount of information coming at them is often confusing, 
and the choices presented to them can be painful. They may not want to take responsibility for 
potentially bad outcomes for themselves. They may be under stress, lack the capacity to process 
the required amount of information, and, therefore, would prefer some kind of nudge or default 
choice or strong suggestion. This fact can also be one of the reasons why nudges are not only 
effective but also ethical strategies. Decision-making in critical care is often very complex, and, 
therefore, enhancing patients’ capacity to make better choices has an intrinsic value in itself. 
While there can be a concern that nudges represent a form of manipulation due to bypassing the 
deliberative properties of a patient, this chapter suggests that most nudges are effective because 
they are designed to inform people. Some others work because they make certain choices easier, 
and people often choose the path of least resistance. Some such nudges, like defaults, work 
because of the power of inertia and procrastination. Some nudges work because they make some 
fact or option or risk salient when it previously was not (i.e., reminders to take medications). In 
other words, nudges help patients to find the best means for achieving their goals. Additionally, 
in many cases, nudges or choice architecture is an inescapable reality.  
This chapter suggests several nudge strategies that can be applied in the context of critical 
care. It evaluates the recent policy of reimbursing providers for advance care planning 
discussions. Under this policy, providers are compensated $86 for a first advance care planning 
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discussion of thirty minutes in a doctor’s office ($80 in a hospital setting) and $75 for a follow-
up. Additionally, this chapter considers the use of various frames in discussions about CPR. For 
instance, when doctors use the phrase "allow natural death" instead of “do not resuscitate,” when 
they frame this decision as the patient’s and not the surrogate’s, and when they shift the implied 
social norm to avoiding resuscitation (“In my experience, most people don’t want CPR.”), the 
outcomes of end-of-life choices improve significantly. In a similar way, physicians can frame 
palliative care as a therapy and not as “giving up” or “pulling the plug.” The use of accountable 
justifications for palliative care orders embedded in electronic records can help physicians to be 
more mindful about the need to start this therapy early in the ICU admission. There are a number 
of nudges designed with the patients in mind to make their choices about end-of-life care easier 
in the context of an ICU admission. One strategy, mentioned earlier, requires switching the 
default option in advance directives from provision of aggressive to provision of palliative care. 
The chapter also recommends introducing financial incentives to increase the low rate of 
completion of advance directives. The unpleasant aspect of completing advance directives 
(thinking about death) arises up front, and the future benefits of having completed an advance 
directive may not be enough to offset the present discomfort. Financial incentives may shift this 
balance. Additionally, the choice to withdraw life-sustaining treatment is very painful for many 
surrogates. Providers can use the informed assent option to alleviate surrogates from this burden 
by stating the reasons why CPR is not recommended and asking for their agreement with the 
physician’s judgement. Finally, the way choices are presented in decisions about therapies may 
influence patients or surrogates. This chapter suggests that starting conversation with palliative 
rather than with aggressive care in the discussion of options may sway surrogates’ preferences. 
Additionally, instead of first mentioning prognostication information, providers may want to 
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start with the discussion of values and then later provide tailored information about the 
prognosis.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSIONS 
In the US, about 2.5 million people die each year, approximately 41% of these deaths 
happen in hospitals, and nearly 60% of hospital deaths occur during or shortly after ICU care.606 
These numbers mean that more than one in five Americans die while in an ICU or soon 
thereafter. The overwhelming majority of these deaths follow decisions to limit life-sustaining 
treatment. Proper risk communication has an effect on what medical intervention the patient will 
receive and whether futile care will be provided. Proper risk communication is the best way to 
ensure that patients receive the end-of-life care they want. Additionally, it is the most effective 
way to limit the increase in provision of futile treatment that is responsible for driving up overall 
costs of healthcare. A recent study on the frequency of futile treatment in ICU shows that more 
than one in ten patients being treated in ICUs were at some point receiving what doctors deemed 
to be futile care. In those cases, intensivists believed patients would never survive outside an 
ICU or that the burdens of their care “grossly outweighed” any benefits.607 Treating each of those 
patients costs about $4,000 per day. Given this substantial cost, strategies to reduce futile care 
could have an impact on total healthcare spending.608 
One of the ways to mitigate these costs is to create a working framework for risk 
communication that would address different cognitive limitations and emotional biases that 
affect the way in which risk information is interpreted. The move from paternalism to the current 
emphasis on patient empowerment and shared decision-making has meant that patients and 
surrogates want and need comprehensive and understandable information about their conditions 
and treatment. This must include information about the risks and benefits of the different 
treatment options if patients are to participate fully in decisions about their care.  However, 
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complicating their queries, the intricacy of rational decision-making, are emotions. It is often 
noted (but rarely studied) that patients and surrogates are swayed by their emotions at least as 
much as they are convinced by rational arguments. What role should emotions play when we 
judge whether an intervention and its complications are morally acceptable? Though there is a 
great deal of empirical research on emotions and risk perception, there has been a lack of 
philosophical research on this topic, especially when it comes to futility considerations in critical 
care. There is a need to understand and improve upon the ways in which end-of-life decisions are 
made. Instead of passively accepting emotional influences on choice, there is a need to discuss 
their ethical relevance and design morally appropriate policies aimed to increase the probabilities 
that end-of-life choices match the goals of patients. 
Chapter one discussed the fact that risk is perceived and acted upon in two ways. Risk as 
feelings refers to intuitive responses in the context of moral decision-making. Risk as analysis 
brings logic, reason, and scientific deliberation to bear on decision-making. In the context of 
critical care, patients and their families may rely on emotion in judgment and decision-making as 
a source of information about whether or not they are at risk. Positive feelings act as an 
incentive, motivating people to act to reproduce those feelings, while negative feelings motivate 
actions to avoid those feelings. Additionally, emotions may help patients integrate information. 
Comparing risky options (for instance, alternative cancer treatment options such as surgery and 
radiation) that hinge on many factors can be a complex task. However, comparing one’s feelings 
about the options can simplify the process of decision-making. The downside is that this 
simplification process may overlook important information.  
The research presented in the first chapter has highlighted the difficulties patients and 
providers face when trying to make healthcare decisions. Various heuristics and biases can affect 
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the decision-making process, in terms of how people make decisions and how critical medical 
information is presented. These heuristics can be traced to the simultaneous operation of dual 
cognitive processes in judgement, and particularly to the intuitive system, which highlights 
associations between events and offers rapid evaluations of decision situations. The theories of 
decision-making described in this opening chapter divide decision-making into two types of 
processes: intuitive (fast, reflexive, and requiring minimal cognitive resources) 
and analytical (slow, deliberate, and demanding more conscious effort). Intuitive processes are 
based on pattern recognition, allowing providers and patients to save time and effort by matching 
already-known patterns to particular decisions and actions. While some may consider intuition a 
better way of making decisions, while other may caution against its perils, the research presented 
in the opening chapter shows that this is not a useful dichotomy. It is simplistic to consider 
intuition as superior to analytical reasoning or vice versa. Human decision-making involves both 
processes, and different situations require different approaches. For example, decisions that need 
to be made in a split second, those that depend on social and emotional intelligence, or those that 
call for inspiration and creativity may be effectively made in the intuitive mode. On the other 
hand, those that have no room for error, such as treatment decisions about an aggressive cancer, 
can only be made analytically. 
The majority of current ethical decision-making models provide a logical and reasoned 
process for making ethical judgments, but these models are removed from research in the fields 
of psychology and decision-making. These models rely upon assumptions of rational and 
conscious reasoning despite the fact that the many nonrational factors presented in the first 
chapter influence ethical thought and behavior, including emotions, intuitions, and heuristics. In 
addition to a presumption of rationality, traditional bioethics models assume that patients and 
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families know their health preferences, especially when it comes to end-of-life choices. There is 
also a presumption that, once given enough information, patients and families will use it to make 
rational choices. One less explicit assumption of traditional bioethics is that patients’ values and 
preferences are context independent. In other words, patients should make similar choices 
regardless of the framing of options in terms of survival or mortality rates. Research presented in 
the opening chapter proves the opposite – patients and families rarely have stable values and 
preferences. Their preferences are context dependent and can change with the way the options 
are presented to them. Finally, traditional bioethics assumes that even if patients and providers 
make mistakes in decision-making, these mistakes are random and not predictable. However, 
research discussed in chapter one demonstrates that there is a systematic way to predict some 
cognitive errors in patients’ decision-making and even to use this knowledge to improve their 
choices. 
Doctors often have to make rapid decisions, either because of medical emergency or 
because they need to see many patients in a limited time. Psychologists have shown that rapid 
decision-making is aided by heuristics—strategies that provide shortcuts to quick decisions—but 
they have also noted that these heuristics frequently mislead both providers and patients. 
Heuristics may lead to ‘‘cognitive biases’’ or systematic and predictable errors in judgment that 
result from reliance on heuristics. For example, people have a tendency to view losses as 
looming larger than corresponding gains (‘‘loss/gain framing bias’’—a phenomenon central to 
prospect theory), to make judgments of likelihood or frequency based on ease of recall rather 
than on actual probabilities (availability bias), and to allow previously spent time, money, or 
effort to influence present or future decisions (sunk-cost effect). People have a tendency to 
remember and be more influenced by options or facts that are presented first or last (order effect: 
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primacy/recency), to choose what others choose (bandwagon effect), to go with whatever option 
is selected as the default (default bias), to view harms from commission as worse than harms 
from omission (omission bias), and to inaccurately estimate future emotional states (impact bias). 
It is not difficult to see how these biases and heuristics might play out in a medical 
context. A patient with atrial fibrillation might refuse to take warfarin because she is concerned 
about causing a hemorrhagic stroke despite greater risk of having an ischemic stroke if she does 
not take warfarin (omission bias). A physician might diagnose chronic appendicitis in patients 
who present with a new onset of non- specific abdominal pain because he himself had abdominal 
pain that turned out to be appendicitis several months earlier (availability bias). Another example 
of this bias is the documented tendency of doctors to overestimate the risk of addiction when 
prescribing opioid analgesics for pain relief and to undertreat severe pain as a result. Risk of 
addiction is actually low when patients receive opioids (particularly controlled release 
formulations) for pain, but opiate addiction tends to receive high publicity and so, through the 
availability heuristic, its likelihood may be overestimated. The representativeness bias has also 
been shown in providers’ decision-making. Providers were given two fictitious scenarios of 
patients with symptoms suggestive of either a heart attack or a stroke and asked to provide a 
diagnosis. The heart attack scenario sometimes included the additional information that the 
patient had recently been dismissed from his job, and the stroke scenario sometimes included the 
information that the patient's breath smelt of alcohol. The additional information had a highly 
significant effect on the diagnosis and made it less likely, consistent with the representativeness 
bias, that the providers would attribute the symptoms to a serious physical cause.  
Chapter two discussed the fact that in the moral domain, patients and providers also rely 
on fast and frugal decision rules or heuristics that produce judgments quickly based on limited 
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information. As was shown in chapter one, most research on heuristics has been conducted by 
psychologists in the area of risk and probability estimates. Their work deals not with moral 
questions but with some factual issues such as judgments of frequency, probability, and risk. 
Chapter two suggested that in a similar fashion, when confronted with a complex moral issue, 
people resort to moral heuristics and simplify their judgments by using the familiar to judge the 
unfamiliar. Kahneman and Frederick define heuristics as a psychological process of attribute 
substitution. When people have to make judgments of a target attribute (a process that is 
computationally complex), they tend to substitute it with a more easily calculated heuristic 
attribute. In other words, when someone tries to answer a difficult and unfamiliar question, they 
may actually answer a related but different question, without realizing that a substitution has 
taken place. Chapter two suggested that moral intuitions fit the pattern of heuristics since moral 
intuitions involve 1.) A target attribute that is relatively inaccessible, 2.) A heuristic attribute that 
is more easily accessible, and 3.) an unconscious substitution of the target attribute for the 
heuristic attribute. 
Researched presented in this chapter shows moral heuristics can generate our intuitions 
about fairness and justice, and right and wrong. For instance, Sunstein has described a number of 
moral heuristics: do not knowingly cause human death, do not permit wrongdoing for a fee, 
punish betrayals of trust, and do not tamper with natural processes for biological reproduction. 
These moral heuristics are different from the cognitive ones. As the name suggests, moral 
intuitions bear moral implications while cognitive heuristics do not. Facts and simple logic can 
be a good test of whether a cognitive heuristic is at work. It is more difficult to demonstrate that 
a moral heuristic is at work due to the fact that it is more difficult to agree on what constitutes a 
moral error. In addition, assessment of accuracy for moral heuristics requires social consensus, 
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while assessment of accuracy for heuristics about objective facts do not. It is important to keep in 
mind that moral heuristics provide an explanation of actual behavior, and they are not normative 
ideals. Furthermore, if moral actions can be based on heuristics, it may conflict with traditional 
standards of morality. Heuristics have little in common with consequentialist views that assume 
that people should make an exhaustive analysis of the consequences of each action. They do not 
share common ground with the striving for purity of heart that Kant considered to be an absolute 
obligation. They do not fit easily into virtue theory or Kohlberg’s theory of moral development.  
Chapter two outlined several moral heuristics that may be relevant to the process of 
decision-making in critical care, especially when it comes to end-of-life decisions. First is 
commission/omission distinction that focuses on the goodness of action. People tend to judge the 
outcomes from commission as worse than those resulting from omissions. Omissions may be a 
result of ignorance, but commissions are usually not. Additionally, commissions may involve 
more malicious intent than omissions; commissions require more effort, that in itself being a sign 
of strong intentions. Nevertheless, there are many cases that do not involve these distinctions and 
should be judged equally. In the realm of critical care, withholding and withdrawing care can be 
used as the morally equivalent example of commission/omission distinction. Clinicians are 
psychologically more comfortable withholding treatments than withdrawing them. The 
withdrawal of care is often associated with a greater sense of causing the patient’s death, 
responsibility, and even guilt. The second heuristic, means to an end/end in itself, focuses on 
one’s intentions. When judging the necessity of life-sustaining treatment, some clinicians may 
perceive it as a “bridge to something” and means to an end (recovery). These physicians would 
not initiate aggressive care without having a clear endpoint. Some other intensivists have a rather 
  
242 
 
open-ended approach to the use of life-sustaining treatment. Instead of being viewed as a means 
to achieve an end (recovery), this treatment is often considered as an end in itself.  
The third heuristic focuses on time and connects timing of end-of-life conversations with 
judgements of fairness. The outcome of moral decisions often varies a great deal depending on 
the time that is available for their consideration. Near future events are more emotionally 
arousing than the distant ones. Because perceptions of fairness and morality tend to be based on 
these emotional reactions, the chapter suggests that such judgments will be more extreme for 
events set in the near future than for events set in the distant future.609 In the context of ICU 
decision-making, timing of end-of-life conversations can affect judgements about the morality of 
resulting decisions. The vast majority of patients with incurable cancer talk with a physician 
about their options for care at the end of life, but often not until late in the course of their illness. 
These belated conversations tend to occur under particularly stressful conditions - when patients 
have been admitted to a hospital for critical care. This deprives patients of the opportunity for 
deliberation that would have been possible months earlier, when the conversation could have 
occurred under less trying and hectic conditions. 
The fourth heuristic focuses on identifiability, and it is called rule of rescue. People often 
have a strong intuitive sense that we ought to rescue those in serious need, even in cases where 
we could produce better outcomes by acting in other ways. This moral urgency is the reason why 
we mount expensive searchers — for sailors lost at sea, for example—when there is little chance 
of finding those who are missing. This rescue heuristic is also the reason why some patients 
receive a second or third heart or liver transplant even though first-time recipients have a higher 
one-year survival rate. Jones coined the term “rule of rescue” to describe the imperative we feel 
to rescue identifiable individuals facing avoidable death, without giving too much thought to the 
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opportunity cost of doing so. The fifth heuristic focuses on the naturalness of a decision, and it 
explains preference for natural death. People tend to associate naturalness with reduced risk. For 
instance, obstetricians and gynecologists who showed preference for natural over identical 
synthetic hormones also held more negative attitudes toward hormone replacement therapy, 
considering it an “unnatural” intervention whose overall benefits outweigh risks. Many end-of-
life disputes and disagreements arise from the determination about those responsible for causing 
death when medical treatment is unsuccessful, which makes it an important moral issue. There is 
a tension between the concept of natural death, which attributes death to patients’ bodies, and 
hastening death through withholding or withdrawing treatment, which attributes death to 
intensivists. Therefore, natural death becomes a moral heuristic, determining causation and 
attribution in end-of-life choices. 
Finally, the last heuristic focuses on agency and discusses ownership of decisions. When 
a physician has a sense of decision ownership, they then become personally invested in clinical 
decisions made for their patients. Decision ownership is the cognitive-affective phenomenon in 
which a medical practitioner develops a sense of responsibility over decisions about care for a 
particular patient and personal investment in this decision-making process. The more a physician 
invests herself into a clinical case by investing her time, ideas, psychological/intellectual energy, 
the more she feels ownership over decisions resulting from this investment. Unfortunately, the 
opportunity to foster ownership of decisions in patient care is not readily available in the context 
of ICU care due to the shortage of intensivists and resulting shiftwork. Lack of ownership 
induced by the shiftwork mentality in critical care may foster diffusion of responsibility. 
Diffusion of responsibility refers to the observation that the mere presence of other people in a 
situation makes one feel less personally responsible for the events that occur in that situation. 
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Decreased ownership may also lead providers to focus on short-term benefits and disregard 
future losses. The presence of this heuristic described in chapter two can be tied to particular 
features of a hospital.  
Chapter three starts with the importance of shared decision-making and ways of 
communicating risks and benefits of an intervention in this context. The goal of shared 
decision‐ making is to improve patients’ decision‐ making process, and to match patients’ 
intervention choices with their preferences for the benefits and harms of intervention options. 
Clinical guidelines suggest that shared decision-making is essential when there are no clear 
standards of care for patients’ treatment decisions and when patients’ preferences for risks and 
benefits of interventions influence choices. Most medical decisions are complicated by uncertain 
or unknown evidence about risk/benefit information. However, little is known about how to 
communicate this scientific uncertainty (the quality of risk information) to patients, including 
uncertainty about statistical risk (e.g., wide confidence intervals) and uncertainty about the 
strength and quality of available evidence used to make health decisions. Physicians are often 
hesitant to communicate uncertainty to patients, despite the prevalence of uncertainty in medical 
decisions. Some physicians have been trained to accept and manage uncertainty internally and 
provide a confident recommendation to patients as they guide them in clinical decisions. 
Physicians may also believe that communicating the complexity of uncertainty will overwhelm 
and confuse patients. Full disclosure of scientific uncertainty in addition to discussion of options 
could actually impair patients’ ability to make informed decisions. Some patients also avoid 
statistical uncertainty (“ambiguity aversion”) and defer or reject decision‐ making as a 
result. Therefore, is there an ethical imperative to disclose ambiguity in risks of a treatment?  
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Chapter three focuses on ambiguity as a special kind of uncertainty and differentiates it 
from risk or complexity. Under risk, the consequences of possible outcomes for a given decision 
are not certain, but the probabilities of different outcomes can be estimated. Complexity occurs 
when providers may know the probabilities of an outcome yet still be uncertain about the 
severity of this outcome and its scope or timing. Under both risk and complexity, the 
probabilities of different outcomes can be estimated, whereas under ambiguity, even these 
probabilities are not known. Ambiguity is defined as “uncertainty about uncertainty” or 
uncertainty about the strength or validity of evidence about risk. Ambiguous situations are 
specifically problematic because the information available to inform a decision is inconsistent or 
contested. Ambiguity is present in many decisions about treatments. Knowledge about treatment 
effects, in specific rare but serious side effects, is nearly always less precise, as some newer 
treatments may have been studied for only a few years. A number of ethical issues arise in 
deciding whether ambiguity needs to be disclosed by providers. Disclosure of ambiguity may 
harm the patient by provoking anxiety or causing a nocebo effect when a side-effect is produced 
by negative expectations rather by the drug itself. Furthermore, it is not clear how much risk 
should be disclosed. Maybe this is the case of too much information? When we recognize that 
the possession of information carries trade-offs, maybe this is the situation when the “totality of 
evidence” may increase patient’s autonomy but reduce her welfare?  
There are three arguments, presented in chapter three, that point out to the ethical 
obligation of disclosing ambiguity in decisions about treatments. While physicians may feel an 
impulse to reduce worry and decisional conflict when describing treatment options to patients, 
bioethics literature suggests that ambiguity in risk information should be communicated to 
patients to avoid an artificial sense of certainty. If patients are informed about ambiguous risks, 
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they can, in turn, alert their provider early on in case they see the signs of adverse effects. 
Furthermore, anxiety and uncertainty arising from ambiguity can be interpreted as indicators that 
patients truly understand information and can engage in shared decision-making. Patients’ 
anxiety does not always translate into harm for the purpose of nondisclosure. Deliberate 
withholding of information from a competent patient, thereby disempowering this patient, 
requires greater justification than the reference to anxiety, distress, and inability to make rational 
choices. Second, the limited disclosure of ambiguous risks can be considered paternalistic. The 
presence of paternalism can be explained by the fact that the patient does not even know that a 
decision to withhold information has been made, and thus makes a treatment decision believing 
it to be based on all material information when it is not. When a provider avoids disclosure of 
certain information because it will upset the patient, this implies that the doctor has a highly 
developed predictive skill regarding decision-making of individual patients, which is rarely true. 
Finally, it can be argued that in certain cases, nondisclosure and lying can be viewed as morally 
equal. 
Chapter four builds on the observations made in previous chapters that patients and their 
families often make irrational decisions in critical care, giving preference to a choice involving 
inaction even though this choice may cause greater harm than adopting a particular course of 
action. They often prioritize short-term benefits over long-term consequences, choosing 
interventions out of fear even when the consequences can be serious. A good decision in the 
context of critical care assumes the provision and understanding of relevant information. The 
type of information most often communicated in the intensive care unit (ICU) setting is risk 
information. Comprehension of this information is a precondition of a rational and informed 
decision. Because of the inherent uncertainty in medical practice, this risk information often 
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must be expressed in numbers and percentages. People often misunderstand this information. 
Can persuasion serve as a positive tool in provider–patient communication when patients or their 
loved ones clearly misunderstand risks or make decisions that contradict their long-term goals? 
Rational appeals in critical care fail to move patients or surrogates to a better course of action. 
Appeals to their emotions are considered illegitimate because they may preclude autonomous 
choice. The goal of this chapter was to discuss whether it is always unethical to change 
someone’s beliefs, whether persuasive communication is inherently harmful, and whether it 
leaves no space for voluntariness. To answer these questions, the chapter relied on Aristotle’s 
work, Rhetoric. 
In considering whether there is a place for emotionally charged messages in a patient–
provider relationship, the chapter attempted to delineate the nature of this relationship and 
describe the duties this relationship implies. The chapter offered examples of persuasive 
communication used in critical care and discussed whether providers may have a duty to 
persuade patients. The opening sections surveyed a number of definitions found in relevant 
literature and outlined some of the concepts included in the proposed definition. The chapter 
defined persuasion as a form of influence wherein one person intends to produce a change in the 
behavior or opinions of another using words to convey information, feelings, or reasoning, or a 
combination thereof, while leaving enough freedom to choose otherwise. This definition helps to 
distinguish instances of persuasion from cases of manipulation, coercion, and deception. 
Considering the fact that patients and families often make irrational decisions and the fact that 
doctors inadvertently influence their choices, the chapter suggested that persuasion can be a 
positive tool in medical communication. Some may consider the shared decision-making model 
as a better choice over persuasion. However, this chapter showed that this model is limited. 
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Doctors often fail to solicit values. Even when they do, the values employed to navigate difficult 
decisions in critical care raise difficult questions. Due to the fact that these values reflect a hard 
reality to face and difficult trade-offs that need to be made, they are rarely thought of in advance. 
This reality significantly limits often unrealistic understanding of autonomous choice and shared 
decision-making.  
This reality also points to the fact that the process of shaping patients’ or families’ 
decisions is an inescapable reality. The way doctors frame their questions or present relevant 
medical information will inevitably shape preferences. This reality supports the applicability of 
persuasion in clinical decision-making.  Doctors should assume responsibility in recognizing the 
previously mentioned contextual influences that may hamper the ability of surrogates to achieve 
their goals. They should attempt to modify these contextual factors and biases in a way that 
would assist surrogates in reaching the desired outcomes. In cases where there is one treatment 
that provides a greater measure of comfort or leads to improved clinical outcomes, doctors 
should attempt to influence or steer decision-making processes to help surrogates or patients 
choose that particular intervention. Chapter four also identified some of the strategies of 
influence in medical communication. One example is framing of “do not resuscitate” 
conversations as heroic measures and invasive treatment. The power of video consent was given 
as another example of persuasion. Video materials are associated with a significant and dramatic 
change in subjects’ preferences for medical care and an improved understanding of disease. Use 
of defaults in advance directives and use of analogous language are given as examples of 
persuasive techniques. The chapter concludes with the suggestion that when patients or families 
clearly do not understand risks or make decisions that contradict their long-term goals, 
persuasion can be used as a positive influence. 
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Chapter five continues the discussion of persuasion from the perspective of autonomy. If 
the process of shaping patients’ or surrogates’ decisions is an inescapable reality, where does this 
leave our understanding of autonomy? If the process of decision-making is heavily influenced by 
subconscious processes such as heuristics and biases, how does this understanding modifiy the 
traditional notion of autonomy? Most of the answers proposed so far have been focused on 
minimizing the influence of heuristics and biases by either alerting people about these influences 
or framing things in a variety of ways to reduce the pull of a potential frame. For instance, a 
physician going through the decision-making and consent process with a patient should provide 
this patient with the frame of both survival and mortality. However, this physician should also 
pair these frames in such a way that survival would be first in one set and then mortality would 
be first in the second set in order to avoid anchoring bias. Survival and mortality rates should be 
presented in both percentages and frequencies to avoid the frequency/percentage bias. This list 
can go on.  
This reality may lead some to argue for the applicability of nonargumentative forms of 
influence in the process of decision-making. Being grounded in the principles of behavioral 
economics, this “soft paternalistic” model makes use of interventions aimed at suggesting one 
choice over another by gently steering individual choices and enhancing directions, yet without 
imposing any significant limit on available choices. This model proposes to organize the context 
in which surrogates make decisions and minimize the negative impact of cognitive biases against 
potentially beneficial choices and outcomes. Physicians should assume responsibility in 
recognizing the previously mentioned contextual influences that may hamper the ability of 
surrogates to achieve their goals. Furthermore, they should modify these contextual factors and 
biases in a way that would assist surrogates in reaching the desired outcomes. In cases where 
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there is one treatment that provides a greater measure of comfort or leads to improved clinical 
outcomes, physicians should attempt to influence or steer decision-making processes to help 
surrogates or patients choose that particular intervention. For instance, when a young patient who 
has lost limbs in recovery from sepsis refuses to continue treatment because of not being able to 
imagine life without the ability to move around, it might be ethically justifiable to persuade him 
to go on with the treatment by focusing his attention on the number of things he will be able to 
do afterward.  
This approach aiming at influencing choice without restricting it is obviously 
questionable due to a number of considerations. Physicians may influence choices to serve their 
own interests. Their authority in interfering with value-laden decisions can be objectionable. 
Most of the objections pertain to the ideals of clinical autonomy and decision-making, but their 
practical application is plausible under the condition of certainty. However, confidence is not 
achievable in the context of the ICU as none of the factors that may influence surrogates’ 
decisions can be known with certainty. Most ICU patients suffer from a number of co-existing 
acute and aggressive conditions, making the prognostication efforts extremely difficult. Some of 
them are admitted to the ICU with rare conditions for which there is little known in terms of 
outcomes. Whether the patient’s past experiences of treatment or the clinician’s experience of 
treating other patients with similar symptoms is the basis for judgment about the likely effects of 
an intervention, there is no escape from the reality of uncertainty about the outcomes. 
Uncertainty about the utility of most ICU interventions is inevitable. Under the conditions of 
uncertainty, surrogates will take their decisional cues from the attending intensivist. This 
uncertainty will inevitably affect the way intensivists present options and communicate with the 
family.  
  
251 
 
The fifth chapter questioned the traditional paradigm of using autonomy as the central 
decision-making priority for incapacitated patients in the ICU context. While many clinicians 
may believe that they have a duty to reduce personal influences on their patients’ decisions, 
chapter five suggested that removing clinicians’ influence from the decision-making process is 
neither possible nor desirable. Knowledge of relevant medical information about risks and 
benefits is believed to foster the rational aspect of surrogate decision-making. Chapter five 
highlighted many cognitive difficulties in processing risk information, questioning the ability of 
surrogates to have an operational level of knowledge. Finally, the ability of advance directives to 
secure the intentionality of patients’ decisions and guard them from undue influence was 
questioned on the grounds of research in affective forecasting errors. The concept of shared 
decision-making and the possibility of shaping patients’ decisions were suggested as possible 
remedies for gaps in substituted judgment.  
Chapter six gave a more detailed overview regarding ways of using nonargumentative 
influence in clinical decision-making. This chapter argued for the need to implement behavioral 
interventions or nudges in critical care. It has unpacked the concept of nudge and looked at some 
ethical implications of using this strategy in the context of healthcare. It has considered potential 
benefits of using nudges in healthcare and has suggested several strategies that may persuade 
providers and patients to make better decisions in the context of critical care. The first suggestion 
made in this chapter was that critical care has a dire need to find ways of improving 
communication between providers and patients or their families and that many traditional 
approaches were not able to fulfill this need. The traditional approaches rarely incorporate the 
influence of heuristics on decision-making, while approaches rooted in behavioral economics are 
designed to rely on the more realistic way people make decisions. These approaches are called 
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nudges, and they were first introduced in the book with the same title authored by Thaler and 
Sunstein. The authors start from the proposition that “individuals make pretty bad decisions - 
decisions they would not have made if they had paid full attention and possessed complete 
information, unlimited cognitive abilities, and complete self-control.” Because of these 
limitations of human decision-making, there is a role for what Thaler and Sunstein call a choice 
architect, someone who “has the responsibility for organizing the context in which people make 
decisions.” Thaler and Sunstein have invented this term, but they claim that the corresponding 
job description already exists – for example, a doctor who has to describe alternative treatments 
to a patient is acting as a choice architect. The choice architects are supposed to rearrange the 
physical and social environment in order to make people change behavior to “make the choosers 
better off, as judged by themselves.”  
The methods a choice architect can use are multiple. They might arrange the options 
presented to people so that the better choice becomes default, whereas making suboptimal 
choices requires active decision-making. The example used in this chapter is default option in 
advance directives where active decision-making is required for choices of aggressive care at the 
end of life. Another method is to change the environment to encourage desired behavior. This 
chapter suggests altering the way in which providers place orders to require accountable 
justification for delaying palliative care orders in patient electronic records. These are examples 
of nudges or liberty-preserving approaches that steer people in particular directions but that also 
allow them to go their own way. There are many benefits to using nudges in healthcare. Nudges 
are cost-efficient. A recent study of nudge interventions reported that the cost-effectiveness of 
nudging can be 100, and even 1,000, times greater than more traditional interventions, such as 
educational campaigns. Nudges are often inspired by laboratory experiments, and these 
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interventions are built on empirical evidence. Finally, nudges are the best strategy in cases when 
patients refuse to make an active choice. When faced with difficult decisions involving choice of 
treatment or intervention, patients or families may be aware of their lack of information. They 
can be afraid to make a wrong decision because the amount of information coming at them is 
often confusing, and the choices presented to them can be painful. They may not want to take 
responsibility for potentially bad outcomes for themselves. They may be under stress, lack the 
capacity to process the required amount of information, and, therefore, would prefer some kind 
of nudge or default choice or strong suggestion. This fact can also be one of the reasons why 
nudges are not only effective but also ethical strategies. 
 Decision-making in critical care is often very complex and, therefore, enhancing 
patients’ capacity to make better choices has an intrinsic value in itself. While there can be a 
concern that nudges represent a form of manipulation due to bypassing the deliberative 
properties of a patient, chapter six suggested that most nudges are effective because they are 
designed to inform people. Some others work because they make certain choices easier, and 
people often choose the path of least resistance. Some such nudges, like defaults, work because 
of the power of inertia and procrastination. Some nudges work because they make some fact or 
option or risk salient when it previously was not (reminders to take medications). In other words, 
nudges help patients to find the best means for achieving their goals. Additionally, in many cases 
nudges or choice architecture is an inescapable reality. Chapter six suggested several nudge 
strategies that can be applied in the context of critical care. On the part of the provider, it 
reviewed the potential of reimbursing them for advance care planning, use of various frames in 
discussions about CPR, the use of accountable justifications for palliative care orders embedded 
into electronic records, and framing of palliative care as a therapy instead of doing nothing. On 
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the part of patients, this chapter suggested the use of defaults in advance directives, incentivizing 
completion of advance directives, the use of order effect in conversation about futile treatments, 
and the use of informed assent in discussions about CPR.  
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